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1
Introduction
Work is the primary activity in most people’s adult lives. Not surprisingly, work-
related issues are discussed intensively in the public debate. This is particularly
evident in labor market policies, which have a far-reaching impact on the lives
of a large majority of people.
How labor markets react to technological change, demographic shifts or institu-
tional changes has important consequences for the distribution of prosperity and
opportunities throughout society. Knowledge of the labor market’s response to
changes in demand, supply or its institutional framework is essential to design
effective labor market policies.
The aim of this dissertation is to contribute to a better understanding of labor
market responses both to single policies and larger trends. It comprises three essays
covering a broad spectrum of related labor market issues. The effects of labor market
institutions on employment and wages are a common theme of all three essays.
The second chapter examines the labor market responses to a specific institutional
change. In this chapter, I analyze, how fixed-term employment contracts affect
employment, wages and the careers of labor market entrants. I exploit variation
from a 2001 German reform, that made using temporary employment contracts more
difficult for small establishments. Using data from the Mikrozensus and the German
social security records I find, that the reform led to a decrease in the use of fixed-term
contracts but had only a negligible impact on employment. Notably, I provide novel
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evidence for a lower bargaining power of workers in fixed-term contracts. Moreover,
I also find that the reform increased the job stability of labor market entrants.
The third chapter has a wider perspective, as it examines the evolution of the
East German wage structure in response to changes in the workforce, labor demand
and institutions. In this chapter, which is joint work with Christina Gathmann we
analyze the East German Wage structure over the last two decades and compare
it to the West. Our results suggest that wage inequality in the East exceeds
that in the West, especially at the top of the wage distribution. We also show
that wage inequality is no longer rising in Germany and even declining in East
Germany after 2009. We analyze the role of changes in workforce composition
through selective entry and exit into employment on wage inequality and show
that accounting for these changes can only partly explain the observed pattern.
Moreover, we examine the role of two large institutional changes, de-unionization
and sector-specific minimum wages. We analyze the decline in collective bargaining
in the late 1990s and find that it affected different segments in the labor market
in the East compared to the West, as unionization was much less prevalent at the
bottom of the wage distribution in East Germany than in the West. Sector-specific
minimum wages, in turn, have been an important factor in the decline in wage
inequality since 2009. Lastly, we also analyze, how labor demand has affected
the wage distribution. We find that a slowdown in the supply of highly educated
workers, likely due to outmigration, plus an upward trend in high-skilled demand led
to a strong increase in their skill premium, which contributed considerably to upper
tail inequality. Moreover, we also analyze the role of occupational polarization
and trade-related industrial shifts for the East German wage structure and find
that they had only a weak impact on wage inequality.
The fourth and last chapter of this dissertation has a slightly more distant
connection to labor market institutions. In this chapter, which is also joint work with
Christina Gathmann, we propose a new way to estimate labor supply elasticities from
hypothetical choice questions. Importantly, we devise a new approach that allows
us to estimate a friction-less preference for leisure, while most quasi-experimental
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approaches yield a compound measure combining both preferences and frictions.
Such frictions could be caused both by optimization errors and restrictions in the
production schedule of firms to specific hours/wages bundles. Measuring, a friction-
less labor supply elasticity allows us to get a better measure of a true behavioral
elasticity that matters for long-term welfare, as well as an initial assessment of
the potential magnitude of frictions. This is related to the broad themes of labor
market institutions of this dissertation in two ways. First, labor supply elasticities
(especially with regard to non-labor income) are an important measure for the
design of equalizing institutions in the labor market, as they yield a measure for the
size of the disincentive effects of transfers and benefits. Second, having a measure
for a frictions-less labor supply elasticity could enable economists to identify which
frictions are due to institutional barriers, like legal limits on working times or
the availability of child-care arrangements.
Even though the chapters of the thesis cover a wide range of topics, they share
important aspects. First, all chapters have an empirical focus and rely on data-sets
that are representative for the German population. Second, all chapters examine how
wages or employment respond to changes in labor market policies or overall market
conditions. Lastly, each chapter also provides information that can contribute to
the regulatory process, as all of them address some institutional features of the
labor market. In this respect, the direct analysis of fixed-term regulation in the
second chapter, the assessment of the role of minimum wages or trade unions for
wage inequality in the third chapter, and the estimate of hypothetical labor supply
responses in the fourth chapter all offer policy-relevant information.
Hereafter, I provide a brief introduction to the various chapters of my thesis.
1.1 Employment Protection and Fixed Term Contracts
Evidence from a German Reform
In the second chapter, I examine the impact of temporary employment contracts
on wages, employment and the career trajectories of labor market entrants. Gov-
ernments across Europe have liberalized temporary labor contracts to stimulate
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employment. However, due to worries about the long-term outcomes of these
reforms, there are several recent policy proposals advocating renewed restrictions of
fixed-term employment.(see The Economist, 2018; Reuters, 2016; Zeit, 2018)
In this chapter, I use variation from a 2001 German reform, that made it more
difficult for small establishments to use fixed-term contracts. Generally, employers
in Germany have to provide an objective reason why a new job is fixed-term. Before
the reform, the courts only examined stated reasons based on whether the employer
could possibly circumvent employment protection. Since small establishments were
exempt from employment protection they were also not limited in their use of
fixed-term contracts. The reform introduced a specific list of objective reasons why
a contract could be fixed-term that now applied to all plants regardless of their
size. The list of reasons was largely identical to the ones courts examined for larger
establishments before the reform. Consequently, small plants had a new restriction
on the use of temporary employment, while nothing changed for larger plants.
Intuitively, small plants should use relatively fewer fixed-term contracts after
the reform, as using them becomes more complicated. However, it is not clear
from the outset how employment and wages should react. Therefore, I use a
theoretical search and matching model based on Cahuc et al. (2016) to derive
some empirical predictions on job-creation and destruction and the conversion of
temporary into permanent contracts. The model predicts that both job-creation
and job-destruction should decline after the reform.
Using a difference-in-differences approach and data from the Mikrozensus and
the German social security records, I then compare small and larger establishments
before and after the reform. I find that the reform led to a decline in the use of
fixed-term contracts by small establishment. Moreover, I find the negative effects
on job-creation and destruction that my theoretical framework predicts. However,
the overall effects of the reform on employment were negligibly small. Remarkably,
the reform had positive wage effects. Interestingly my theoretical framework allows
for positive wage effects of the reform if the bargaining power of workers is lower in
fixed-term contracts. Then the lower probability that a new job will be temporary
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after the reform also reduces the probability that an employees next job-match has
a low bargaining power. This in turn increases her outside option and thereby raises
her wage. Thus, the positive wage effect I find indicates that bargaining power is
lower in fixed-term contracts. Since a large part of the policy debates on fixed-term
work centers on the effects of fixed-term contracts on young workers, i also examine
how the reform affected the careers of labor market entrants. For affected labor
market entrants I find and increase in cummulated wages and a decrease in the
time out of work in the first 5 years after entry. Combined, these results indicate
that the reform has had little impact on employment, but positive wage effects and
increased the long-term job security of labor market entrants.
1.2 Evolution of the East German Wage Structure
The third chapter of this dissertation, which is co-authored with Christina Gathmann,
examines the development of wage inequality in East Germany between 1995 and
2014. The sharp increase in wage disparities in several countries over the recent
decades has led to renewed public interest and a lively debate on the causes of wage
inequality. The role of labor market institutions like unions and minimum wages in
compressing the wage structure is central to this debate (see e.g. Lee (1999); Autor
et al. (2016b) for minimum wages; and Card (1992); DiNardo et al. (1996) for unions).
While much of the previous literature has focused on the United States, the
considerable differences in wage inequality trends across countries raise a number of
questions. The key issue is to what extent different institutional structures across
countries can explain the different inequality trends.
The German labor market offers a unique setting to explore this topic. Europe’s
largest economy underwent a astounding change from sluggish economic growth
and rising unemployment in the 1990s to stable employment growth since 2004.
Both the Great Recession and the Euro Crisis had only little impact on growth
and employment. This remarkable transformation from the ‘sick man of Europe’
to an ‘economic superstar’ drew a lot of attention to Germany’s unique labor
market institutions (Dustmann et al., 2014).
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Yet, what is probably most special about the German economy, is the unprece-
dented merger of two very different states into a common institutional structure. A
large economic literature studied the transition of the East German labor market
(see e.g. Hunt, 2002; Orlowski and Riphahn, 2009) and its consequences for inequal-
ity (e.g. Biewen, 2001; Fuchs-Schu¨deln et al., 2010). However, most recent studies
on the German wage structure have focused on West Germany arguing that the
East German labor market is structurally too distinct to analyze the two together
(Dustmann et al., 2009; Card et al., 2013). It is not clear how East German wage
inequality has evolved in the last decades, that these studies analyze.
Using detailed administrative data on workers and their employers, we compare
the evolution of wage inequality in East and West Germany over the past decades.
The trends in the two regions are very similar: wage inequality, irrespective of
how we measure it, has increased for most of the period. While there is almost no
wage growth in the middle of the East or West German wage distribution, there
are sizable wage gains at the top and real wage losses at the bottom. Since 2010,
however, wage inequality leveled of and even reversed, mostly because of wage
gains at the bottom of the wage distribution.
Subsequently, we explore which factors explain the development of the wage
structures in the East and to which extent these forces differ from those in West
Germany. We have four main findings. First, we show that the composition of the
labour force and selective entry and exit do not have much influence on the wage
structure in East and West Germany. Second, the reduction in union coverage does
not play a role in the rising wage inequality in East Germany, despite a stronger
decline than in the West. The main reason for this surprising result is that union
coverage rates at the bottom of the East German wage distribution are significantly
lower than in West Germany. Third, the introduction of industry-specific minimum
wages can explain all of the reversal of wage inequality in East Germany after 2009.
Since wages are about 25% lower in East Germany than in the West and minimum
wages are mostly set at the same level for all of Germany, their impact is considerably
higher in the East. Finally, we turn to the demand side to explain the substantial
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increase in top-end wage inequality before 2010. In East Germany two-thirds of
this increase can be accounted for by wage differentials between education and age
groups and inter-industry differentials, while these factors explain only one third of
the increase in West Germany. A stagnant supply of high-skilled workers plus an
increasing trend in high-skilled demand, partly due to high outmigration rates of
young and skilled workers, is the main factor for the growth in the East German
skill premium and its large impact on inequality at the top of the wage distribution.
1.3 A Novel Approach to Estimate Labor Supply Elasticities:
Combining Data from Actual and Hypothetical Choice
In the last chapter of my dissertation, which is a joint work with Christina Gathmann,
we propose a new approach to estimate labor supply elasticities. To identify
preferences for leisure, we pose a sequence of hypothetical labor supply choice
scenarios to a representative sample of respondents in Germany.
Since the preference for leisure determines how individuals trade off leisure
time and income, it is a key parameter in labor economics. Insights into the
income / leisure trade-off are particularly important for the design of success-
ful economic policies, as this trade-off determines the response of labour supply
to social transfers or taxes.
Accordingly, an extensive economic literature has estimated labor supply elas-
ticities using different econometric approaches. However, a number of recent
contributions (e.g. Keane, 2011; Meghir and Phillips, 2010; Pencavel, 2016) argue
that the common empirical approaches might not identify the preference for leisure
after all. Rather, many estimates of the labor supply elasticity are a compound
measure that captures both preferences and frictions. Such frictions could be
caused both by optimization errors and restrictions in the production schedule
of firms to specific hours/wages bundles.
We estimate a friction-less preference for leisure from hypothetical choice sce-
narios. For our approach, we ask the participants of a representative survey of
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the German population about their choices in a variety of hypothetical labor sup-
ply scenarios. Each scenario consists of two options that define a combination of
hours worked, wages and other income. Survey participants then choose which
alternative they would prefer.
Our approach could provide important new insights to supplement existing
econometric knowledge with additional information that is not readily available
with observed actual choices. Since the hypothetical choice scenarios are not
limited by what nature offers, we can elicit choices over a wide range of wage
and hours and get estimates even for individuals, who not be affected in typical
quasi-experimental settings.
Our results show that preferences for leisure from hypothetical choices are larger
than those from observed choices pointing to the importance of frictions. We also
document that preferences for leisure differ substantially along observable and
unobservable dimensions. These results suggest that estimates from local variation
might not be a good proxy for labor supply responses in the broader population.
Although this points to behavioural long-term elasticities greater than previous
estimates, the measures are still relatively close to other literature. As a result,
the disincentive effects of progression taxation lie in a similar order of magnitude,
even taking into account possible frictions.
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Employment Protection and Fixed Term Contracts:
Evidence from a German Reform
2.1 Introduction
Over the last three decades, the use of fixed-term contracts has increased considerably
in large parts of Europe. This trend has been driven by several reforms that have
removed restrictions on fixed-term work. The aim of these reforms was to increase
the flexibility of firms to respond to economic changes.1 As the political costs
for a more wide-ranging revision of employment protection were high, the strict
dismissal protection rules for permanent employees remained largely unchanged,
while fixed-term jobs were liberalized. However, concerns about the long-term
effects of these reforms have recently led to increased political efforts in several
European countries to reverse some of these liberalizations.2
An extensive economic literature studies the effects of firms’ access to temporary
work when strict employment protection provisions apply to open-ended contracts.
1Such flexibility measures were often motivated by fears that strict employment protection
has rendered European labor markets rigid and was thereby detrimental to employment. These
fears were linked to an economic debate that has examined the institutional differences between
the US and several European countries (Bertola, 1999; Nickell, 1997). In this debate, increases
in European unemployment in the 1980s were often attributed to more rigid labor markets in
Europe compared with the US.
2Political proposals to again restrict fixed-term contracts were discussed in Spain, Italy and
Germany (see The Economist, 2018; Reuters, 2016; Zeit, 2018). These political debates focused
both on worries about the circumvention of employment protection through fixed-term contracts
and the impact on the stability of young workers’ careers .
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Remarkably, the assessment of the benefits of fixed-term employment is mixed in the
related economic theory. Although temporary contracts could offer companies the
opportunity to hire less skilled workers without risking high firing costs in case of non-
performance (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992), there could be some adverse effects.
For instance, employers might exhibit a different hiring behavior, when both types of
contract are easily available. As firms face high firing costs for open-ended contracts,
while fixed-term contracts without firing costs are available, employers might
substitute from permanent to fixed-term contracts. (Blanchard and Landier, 2002;
Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002; Cahuc et al., 2016). Consequently, a combination of
strict legal requirements for the termination of permanent jobs with weak restrictions
on the creation of temporary contracts could contribute to a segmentation of the
labor market with protected insiders in permanent employment and outsiders who
remain in repeated temporary contracts in lower paid entry level jobs.
In this paper I analyze a 2001 German reform that made it more difficult for
small establishments to use fixed-term contracts. Before the reform plants below
the employment protection threshold of 5 employees did not have to provide a legal
justification for the use of temporary contracts. Prior to the reform, jurisdiction
had only considered the possible circumvention of employment protection as the
sole criterion for the admissibility of a fixed-term contract. Thus, only plants
affected by employment protection had to provide a justification, why a job was
fixed-term. The reform introduced a list of objective grounds, why a contract could
be fixed-term. These objective grounds were largely identical to those considered
by the courts for larger plants before the reform, but were evaluated by the courts
regardless of plant-size after the reform. Thus, the legal barriers to hire employees
on fixed-term contracts for plants below the employment protection threshold rose
compared with those above the threshold.
To derive empirical predictions for this reform, I use a theoretical search and
matching model by Cahuc et al. (2016) that explicitly describes the contract-type
choice of firms. In the model firms hire workers to take advantage of production op-
portunities with different expected length. I first present the equilibrium conditions
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for job creation, job destruction and the share of jobs that are started with a perma-
nent contract. Moreover, I outline, how these conditions are related to employment
and wages. Then I present the results of a comparative static analysis to show, how
these variables change as the use of fixed-term contracts becomes more difficult.
I then use a basic differences-in-differences research design to answer the fol-
lowing questions: (1) How did the reform influence the take-up of fixed-term
contracts? (2) What were the effects on flows to and out of employment? (3)
How did the reform affect wages? (4) What impact did the reform have on the
careers of labor market entrants?
As the first step, I show that the share of fixed-term workers decreased in treated
plants, both for new contracts and overall. For new contracts the fixed-term share
decreased by approximately 3 percentage points whereas the overall post-reform
fixed-term share decreased by 0.7 percentage points. The decrease of 3 percentage
points amounts to 10 % of the average use of fixed-term contracts in Germany.
Thus, these effects have considerable economic significance.
In a next step, I analyze how the reform has affected employment flows. Contrary
to the large effects on the share of fixed-term contracts, I only find very minor
employment effects associated with the reform. Both the decline in job creation
and the increase in the conversion from temporary to permanent contracts are quite
small. This suggests that the strong effect on the share of fixed-term contracts is
partly due to more jobs starting directly with a permanent contract.
For earnings, the theoretical model predicts that a temporary contract restriction
can have a positive wage effect, if the bargaining power of workers is worse in fixed-
term contracts and the likelihood that a prospective new contract is temporary
decreases. This effect should particularly emerge if the employment response to
a reform is small and the reduction in the fixed-term share is large. Consistent
with this model prediction and my other empirical results, I find a 2.3 % increase
in the wages of new contracts.
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Lastly, I also examine some long-term effects for labor market entrants, who
joined affected firms after the reform. The core result of this analysis is a siz-
able increase in cumulated wages over the first years in the labor market and a
decrease in the time out of work and the number of jobs. Moreover, I provide
suggestive evidence that the likelihood to remain fixed-term decreased for this
group of labor market entrants.
Together these results imply that the reform had only little effect on employ-
ment but a positive effect on new contract wages and increased longer term job
security for labor market entrants.
This article contributes to several strands of economic literature. First, it
adds further evidence to the literature that studies, how employment protection
rules relate to the use of fixed-term contracts and how reforms of temporary
contracts affect their share in total employment (Centeno and Novo, 2012; Bassanini
and Garnero, 2013; Hijzen et al., 2017). While much of this work is based on
aggregate cross country data (Lazear, 1990; Kahn, 2010; Garibaldi and Violante,
2005; Bassanini and Garnero, 2013), several more recent studies have examined
the effects of changes in fixed-term legislation using with-in country variation and
micro data. However, many of these studies (Autor et al., 2007; Aguirregabiria and
Alonso-Borrego, 2014; Cappellari et al., 2012) are at the firm level, whereas certain
interesting outcomes of reforms such as long-term wage effects require employee
data. Consequently, this article adds further evidence to a smaller set of empirical
work that combines employee data with reform variation (e.g. Garc´ıa-Pe´rez et al.,
2018; Hijzen et al., 2017; Saggio et al., 2018).
Second, in contrast to most other literature, I analyze a scenario in which fixed-
term rules became more stringent in Germany. Most other studies are concerned
with fixed-term contract liberalizations in Southern European countries like Spain
and Italy. This is particularly interesting, since Southern European countries
traditionally have a different approach to employment protection than Germany
(see. Boeri et al., 2011). For example, temporary contracts are used much more
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intensively in some countries such as Spain.3 Moreover, the rigor of employment
protection laws also differs between Southern Europe and Germany (OECD, 2013).
Thus, the evidence in this paper is obtained under different labor market conditions
and allows or a better understanding of the effects of fixed-term work restrictions
in countries where temporary employment is used less.
Third, my work documents novel positive wage effects for a restriction of
fixed-term contracts. This is evidence for lower negotiating power for workers
in temporary employment relationships.
Lastly, the article also contributes to a growing literature that analyzes whether
fixed-term contracts offer long-term opportunities or if they bind employees into
low-paid entry-level positions (Booth et al., 2002; Ichino et al., 2008; Autor and
Houseman, 2010; Saggio et al., 2018). I find only minor effects on employment
but relatively strong increases in labor market entrants’ cumulated wages and job
security. This assessment of the impact of the reform on later outcomes for labor
market entrants also relates to a literature on the long-term effects of labor market
conditions at entry (Altonji et al., 2016; Oreopoulos et al., 2012).
The article proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the institutional
background of the reform and describes how employment protection and fixed-term
work are regulated in Germany. Section 3 provides a discussion of the theoretical
mechanisms that determine how a limitation of fixed-term contracts might affect
the use of different contract types, employment and wages. Section 4 describes
the datasets, I use for the analyses. Section 5 presents the empirical strategy
Section 6 reports the results. Section 7 provides a range of robustness checks for
my findings. Finally, section 8 concludes.
3For example, about 30 % of all employment contracts in Spain are fixed-term, compared to
only 12 % in Germany (see figure 2.A1 in the appendix).
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2.2 Institutional Background
2.2.1 Fixed-term contract law in Germany
Most employment contracts in Germany are commonly unlimited. If a firm dismisses
a permanent employee, significant firing costs are incurred in the form of notice
periods, severance payments or administrative effort. In most cases, half a month’s
salary per year of employment is paid as severance payment. The firm must
also observe notice periods ranging from 2 weeks to 6 months, depending upon
the seniority of the employee.
In addition, larger establishments have to comply with further firing restrictions
from the Dismissal Protection Act (Ku¨ndigungsschutzgestz). Specifically, employers
have to provide evidence that one of the particular dismissal reasons named in the
law is satisfied. The act only allows dismissals related to the personal situation of
the person to be dismissed (e.g. long-term sickness), breach of contractual duties
(e.g. fraud or theft), or operational reasons related of the business of the employer.
For a dismissal due to operational reasons, which is the most common type of
dismissal, the employer must show, that the job position permanently ceases to
exist and no other appropriate vacant job exists in the entire firm. Since the burden
of proof for a dismissal is relatively high, employees and employers often agree on
severance payments to avoid lengthy legal disputes. Whether these stricter firing
rules apply is entirely determined by the number of full-time employees.4 In 2001
the size threshold for the employment protection law was at 5 employees.5
Alternatively firms can hire employees under fixed term contracts. Once a fixed
term contract reaches its termination date, it can be dissolved without any dismissal
costs. However, it is more difficult to justify the termination of a temporary contract
before it expires. In general, fixed-term contracts are only permitted if employers
4More precisely, newer versions of this law are based on the number of full-time equivalents,
where workers up to 20 hours per week are counted with a factor of 0.50, and workers up to 30
hours with a factor of 0.75
5Before 1997 the threshold for dismissal protection was at 5 employees. For the period from
1997 to 1998 it was increased to 10 employees. Between 1999 and 2004 it was reduced back to 5
employees and since then it has again been set at 10 employees. The 1996 and 1999 employment
protection reforms are analyzed by Bauer et al. (2007), while Bauernschuster (2013) discusses the
2004 reform.
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state an objective reason, why a job could not be permanent (e.g. project work
or replacement during sick leave).6 However, before the 2001 reform, which I
analyze in this paper, smaller firms were exempt from providing a justification
for using fixed-term contracts.
2.2.2 The 2001 Part-Time and Fixed-Term Contracts Act
Table 2.1: Reform variation
Before 2001 After 2001
Subject to EPL  
≥5 Employees
Objective reasons
(EPL circumvention)
Objective reasons
listed in law
Not subject to EPL  
<5 Employees
No restriction Objective reasons
listed in law
Note.- This table summarizes the relevant variation from 2001 Part-Time
and Fixed-Term Contracts Act.
In January 2001, the Part-Time and Fixed-Term Employment Act was signed
into to law to implement the EU Directive 1999/70/C. This new law changed the
rules concerning the justification of fixed-term contracts.7 Prior to the reform, the
judiciary assessed the admissibility of grounds for the use of a temporary contract
by examining whether the contract could possibly be used to circumvent dismissal
protection. By definition, establishments below the employment protection threshold
could not circumvent dismissal protection. As a result, these establishments were
not restricted in their use of fixed-term contracts. This changed as the new law
6There is an exception to this rule for contracts shorter than two years. Since 1985 firms are
allowed to use these shorter temporary contracts without naming an objective reason. After 2
years a firm can not legally offer workers a further fixed-term contract without naming an objective
reason. This exception from the default is based on a temporary exemption to boost employment
that was introduced in 1985. This rule for short fixed-term contracts was renewed two times and
lastly made permanent. However, these rules remained unaffected by the reform. See Hunt (2000)
for an analysis of the 1985 law that introduced short-term fixed-term contracts without objective
reason.
7The same law also introduced new rules, which allowed longer fixed term contracts without
objective reasons for workers above the age of 58. However, these rules should act in the same
direction as the rest of the law, as firms above the employment protection threshold have a higher
incentive to make use of temporary contracts.
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specified a list of legal justifications for a contract limitation regardless of the
employment protection status.8
The objective reasons listed in the law are largely similar to those courts evaluated
to determine whether the use of fixed-term contracts did constitute a employment
protection circumvention before the reform. However, these new reasons are now
evaluated by the courts independently of their potential for the circumvention of
employment protection laws and plants below the employment protection threshold
also have to providence evidence that these reasons are satisfied. Thus, after the
reform hiring workers in fixed-term contracts based on an objective reason became
comparatively harder for firms below the employment protection threshold (see
Table 2.1 for a short overview of the variation introduced by the law).
This introduces variation in the potential to use fixed term contracts between
the firms that are subject to employment protection rules and the firms that are not.
Thus, I can compare workers in firms above and below the employment protection
threshold before and after the reform.
2.3 Theory
Intuitively, plants below the employment protection threshold should use relatively
fewer fixed-term contracts after the reform, as the legal requirements for their
admissibility increase. However, the effects on other outcomes such as overall
employment or wages are not clear from the outset. To derive further predictions
on the impact of the reform, I introduce a search and matching model based on
Cahuc et al. (2016), which explicitly examines firms’ choices between permanent and
fixed-term jobs.9 I use this model to qualitatively study, how a increase in the costs
of fixed term contracts should affect the employment behavior, the type of contracts
chosen and wages in establishments below the employment protection threshold.
8The reasons include temporary need of the job on the part of the employer, trial periods
or fixed-term periods following training or studies, employment to substitute another employee,
reasons related to the person of employee or the nature of the job and the limited availability of
public funds.
9Additionally I also incorporate some extensions of the model from Saggio et al. (2018) into
my theoretical framework
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In the model, firms hire workers to take advantage of production opportunities
with different anticipated durations. Specifically, jobs differ in the arrival rate of
shocks that renders them unproductive. Firms and employees jointly maximize
a match surplus that depends on this rate and share it through Nash bargaining.
Fixed-term and open-ended contracts differ in their termination rules.
Firms have to pay a firing cost to dismiss an employee on an open-ended contract
if she becomes unproductive. However employees on fixed-term contracts can be
dismissed free of charge after the contract term, yet not before. If a fixed-term
employee becomes unproductive before the contract has ended, the firm has to
keep paying the employees salary until the contract term expires. Jobs that start
fixed-term can be converted to permanent when the contract expires. Alternatively
fixed-term contracts can be terminated free of charge after the term date. Renewing
the job with another fixed-term contract is not possible. These rules lead to
different surpluses for permanent and temporary contracts for a given expected
productive duration of a job.
In a first step, this allows me to distinguish different thresholds on the shock
arrival rate that determine whether jobs are started permanent, started fixed-term
and then converted to open-ended contracts or started on temporary contracts
but terminated after the term or not created at all. In a second step, I can derive
how a change in the costs of writing a fixed-term contract affects these thresholds.
This also yields predictions about job creation, job destruction and the share of
new contracts that are started permanent. Lastly, I can analyze how this increase
in contract writing costs affects wages.
For an increase in the cost of establishing fixed-term contracts, the model predicts
two countervailing influences on overall employment. For one, fewer fixed-term
jobs are created. At the same time, it increases the incentive to retain fixed-term
employees in permanent contracts, which reduces job destruction.10
10This basic result has been obtained by a large part of the theoretical literature on fixed-term
contracts (e.g. Alonso-Borrego et al., 2005; Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay,
2002). However, much of the theoretical literature on fixed-term contracts models them as
screening device to learn about productivity (e.g. Faccini, 2014; Blanchard and Landier, 2002),
which is at odds with two empirical observations. First, there exist both contracts that are either
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Beyond these predictions on employment, I also study, how the reform should
affect wages of permanent and fixed-term employees. In the baseline that abstracts
from differences in bargaining power between contract types, there is only a negative
wage effect on wages through a decrease in labor market tightness. However, once I
assume that employees have less bargaining power in temporary jobs, a positive effect
on wages is possible. This effect results from an increase in the value of the outside
option of the employee, as the probability that a prospective new job is permanent
and she therefore is able to exercise greater negotiating power in this job increases.
I will now outline the basic premise of the model and describe the equilibrium
conditions for job creation, job destruction and wages.
2.3.1 Model Setup
The model economy consists of identical, infinitely-lived, risk neutral workers and
firms, who face the same discount rate r. Since workers are identical, their total
mass is normalized to 1. Labor is the only input used by perfectly competitive
firms. All jobs produce the same quantity of output y > 0 per unit of time, but
production opportunities differ in their expected duration. This difference between
the expected durations is modeled as shocks, which reduce the output produced per
time unit to y = 0 and arrive at the Poisson rate λ.11 Job seekers and vacancies
meet according to a standard constant returns to scale matching technology and the
job-type λ ∈ [λ; λ¯] is randomly drawn from a distribution with λ ∼ G(λ) on match.
Firms and workers maximize a job-type dependent match surplus of S(λ) and
share it using Nash bargaining. Depending on the size of this match surplus, they
choose between permanent and temporary contracts. Permanent contracts are open
ended but are terminated if the job becomes unproductive. At termination the
shorter than the legal probation period or longer than the typically estimated time needed for
screening. Second, a learning perspective ignores the higher prevalence of fixed-term contracts in
industries with short production opportunities (e.g. Bassanini and Marianna, 2009)
11There is empirical evidence that fixed-term contract use depends strongly on the length of
production opportunities. For example, Dra¨ger and Marx (2017) find that workload fluctuations
increase the likelihood of hiring fixed-term workers in countries with less flexible labor markets.
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employer pays a firing cost f to dissolve an unproductive permanent contract.12
Temporary contracts have an endogenous duration D(λ) till they expire and can not
be ended before. If a job becomes unproductive before the end of its entire term, the
company must continue to pay the employee’s wage until the contract expires.13 If
the contract stays productive for the whole duration D(λ), workers and firms decide
whether to dissolve the employment relationship free of any firing cost or whether to
establish a permanent contract with a new wage. Agreeing upon another fixed-term
contract after the term is not possible.14 Firms pay contract writing costs that
differ between fixed term (cFT ) and permanent contracts (cP ).15 The reform is later
modeled as an increase in the contract writing costs for fixed-term contracts cFT .
The difference between the surplus of a temporary contract with optimal du-
ration SFT (λ,D∗(λ)) and the surplus of a permanent contract Sp(λ) determines
the contract type choice in equilibrium. I provide a detailed definition of the
surplus by contract type in appendix 2.B.1.
2.3.2 Equilibrium Conditions
Cahuc et al. (2016) show that, given that both types of contract exist in an equilib-
rium, there are three unique endogenously determined levels of λ that determine
job creation, job destruction and the initial type of contract.
First, the level λP with SP (λP ) = 0 determines whether fixed-term jobs are
continued after the termination date. Second, the value λFT with SFT (λFT ) = 0
specifies a bound for temporary job creation. Lastly, λE with SP (λE) = SFT (λE)
12f is assumed to be a red-tape cost and not a transfer from the firm to the worker (such as a
severance pay) as such transfers can be neutralized by appropriately designed contracts.
13This represents the standard case in German fixed-term contract law, as a jointly determined
dismissal provision between the employee and the firm is required for the premature termination
of fixed-term contracts. Deviations from this basic rule are only possible in special cases like fraud
or theft. Moreover, not all jointly determined termination provisions are legally justified. Similar
rules also apply in other European countries like France, Belgium and Italy.
14Although it is theoretically possible to establish consecutive fixed term contracts with a valid
objective reason in Germany, the law regards this as the default case. Renewing a fixed-term
contracts requires a special new objective reason for an extension. Moreover the courts evaluate
the number of past contracts and the total employment duration to establish whether a new
fixed-term contract was valid.
15Both terms represent legal costs of writing contracts. cFT is higher than cP as firms need to
provide an admissible objective reason to establish fixed-term contracts.
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defines a level of λ at which firms are indifferent whether they should start a job
with a fixed-term or permanent contract. The necessary condition for the existence
of such a type of equilibrium with λE > λP > λFT is that SFT (λP ) > 0.16
Figure 2.1: Choice Between Fixed-Term and Permanent Contracts
Surplus
0 λλFTλPλE
SP (λ)
SFT (λ)
Permanent Jobs
Fixed Term jobs
coverted to permanent
Fixed Term jobs
not converted
No jobs
created
Figure 2.1 illustrates the contract choice for different levels of λ.17 For values
of λ below λE, the expected duration of a production opportunity is sufficiently
large to create jobs with permanent contracts. For values of λ ∈ [λE, λP ] jobs are
created with a fixed-term contract but converted to permanent contracts if they
stay productive until D∗(λ). As the surplus of continuing the job in a permanent
contract is below zero for λ ∈ [λP , λFT ], jobs in this range are started fixed-term and
destroyed once the contract expires. Jobs with very high shock arrival rates above
λFT generate negative surplus even for fixed-term contracts and are not created.
The equilibrium in the labor market is defined by the conditions that determine
the parameters λFT ,λP and λE and a condition on the matching between workers
and vacancies. Unemployed workers u find vacancies v according to a standard
16A more detailed overview of the equilibrium conditions can be found in the appendices 2.B.3
and 2.B.3.
17The figure is based on figure 6 in Cahuc et al. (2016)
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constant returns to scale aggregate matching function m(v, u) (Pissarides, 1979).
Therefore, the vacancy fill rate q(θ) and the employment finding rate θq(θ) solely
depends on the ratio of the number of vacancies v over the number of unemployed
workers u, which is the labor market tightness θ = v
u
. Not filling a vacancy implies a
cost of κ > 0. If there is a match both parties learn the true value of λ and use the
contract type rules for λ to decide whether they enter an employment relation. If the
worker and the firm sign a contract, they negotiate a wage using Nash bargaining.
The share of the surplus retained by workers is γc ∈ [0, 1) with c = {FT, P}.
Similarly to Saggio et al. (2018) I will later discuss the reform effects both for an
equal bargaining power (γFT = γP = γ) for fixed-term and permanent workers and
for a case were fixed-term workers have a lower bargaining power (γFT < γP ) .
If all profitable opportunities for job creation are exploited, the expected profit
for vacant jobs is equal to the cost κ. This yields the free entry condition in equation
2.1, which specifies the labor market tightness in the equilibrium.
κ = q(θ)
[
(1− γP )
∫ λE
λ
Sp(λ)dG(λ) + (1− γT )
∫ λFT
λE
ST (λ)dG(λ)
]
(2.1)
Moreover, this condition can be used to pin down the value of the outside option
in the equations that define λE, λP and λFT . The value of this outside option is
simply given by the sum of a flow utility of unemployment z and the expected
surplus share of a job evaluated at the job finding rate θq(θ).
rU = z + θq(θ)γP
∫ λE
λ
SP (λ)dG(λ) + θq(θ)γFT
∫ λFT
λE
SFT (λ)dG(λ) (2.2)
Rearranging the free entry condition to get an expression for
∫ λFT
λE
SFT (λ)dG(λ)
and substituting this into equation 2.2 yields
rU = z + θq(θ) γFTκ1− γFT + θq(θ)
γP − γFT
1− γFT
∫ λE
λ
SP (λ)dG(λ). (2.3)
Note that the last term in equation 2.3 becomes zero, if the rent-sharing parameter
does not differ between contract types. This term is the valuation of the additional
rent that workers can extract under a permanent contract. Thus, for γFT = γP the
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value of the outside option solely depends on z, γ, κ and the labor market tightness
θ, while it additionally depends on λE for differential rent-sharing.
Substituting the value of the outside option from equation 2.3 into the equa-
tions defining γFT , γP and γE provides a system of equations that specifies the
equilibrium (θ∗, λ∗E, λ∗P , λ∗FT ).
2.3.3 Wages
Continuing wage payments under a permanent contract satisfy the following Nash
bargaining first order condition:
γP [ΠP (λ) + f ] = (1− γP ) [Vp(λ)− U ] (2.4)
Consequently this implies that the wage for a permanent contract is given by
wp = γp(y + rf) + (1− γp)rU, (2.5)
which would reduce to the outside option rU if the workers bargaining power γP
was zero. The continuing wage for fixed-term contract can be obtained in similar
way and is given by the following wage equation:
wFT = γFT
(
ry
r + λ
1− e−(r+λ)D∗(λ)
1− e−rD∗(λ)
)
+ (1− γFT )rU (2.6)
The term 1−e−(r+λ)D
∗(λ)
1−e−rD∗(λ) evaluates the odds of a shock not occurring before the
duration D∗(λ) has elapsed and is decreasing in D∗ for a fixed λ.
This is because, at a given expected productive duration of 1/λ, the probability
that a job will become unproductive during the contract term increases with the
length of D∗. Thus, as D∗ decreases in U for a fixed λ, an increase in the value of
U leads to an increase in both the first and the second term of wFT .
2.3.4 Comparative statics
I now summarize how an increase in the cost of establishing a fixed-term con-
tract cFT affects the equilibrium values (θ∗, λ∗E, λ∗P , λ∗FT ) and the equilibrium wages
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for permanent and fixed-term contracts, if rent-sharing is identical for both con-
tract types. A more detailed overview of the comparative statics is in the ap-
pendices 2.B.2 and 2.B.3.
For a fixed level of labor market tightness, creating jobs with high shock arrival
rates becomes less desirable as λFT declines. However, there is also a feedback
channel to this effect. As less jobs are created after the cost increases, market tight-
ness decreases, which in turn leads to a decrease in the value of the outside option.
Lastly a decline in the outside option shifts λFT upwards. However, it can be shown
that the direct effect dominates, and overall λFT declines for an increase in cFT .
Furthermore, more fixed-term contracts are converted to permanent contracts
as λP increases with an increase in cFT . This comes from both a direct effect of
costs on λP and an indirect effect through decreasing labor market tightness.
There are two countervailing effects on the parameter λE that determines
whether jobs are started with fixed-term or permanent contracts. First, there is a
positive direct effect on λE, since for a fixed θ it is more costly for firms to establish
fixed-term contracts. Second, a declining labor market tightness could possibly
offset this effect by a decrease of U(θ), which negatively affects λE. The overall
effect on λE is not clear from the onset and depends on different model parameters.
Generally the only possible wage effect on permanent wages in the setup with
identical bargaining across contract types is negative, as decreasing labor market
tightness leads to a decrease of the outside option and hence also to a decrease of the
permanent wage wp(λ). A decline in U(θ) can also lead to a decrease in fixed-term
wages. However, there is a second effect in the opposite direction for fixed-term wages
as the reform leads to an increase in the optimal duration of fixed-term contracts,
which in turn leads to an increase in the the first wage term in equation 2.6.
For the case of differential rent sharing, the value of the outside option does
not only depend on labor market tightness θ but also on the parameter λE that
determines whether a job is created on a fixed-term or a permanent contract.
Intuitively, a higher λE raises the value of unemployment, as the chance that a
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new employment contract is permanent and lets employees keep a larger share
of the match surplus increases.
This influence of the parameter λE on the value of unemployment adds additional
indirect effects to the reform effects on the parameter λFT and λP . Interestingly,
these additional influences can act in different directions, as the reform effect on
λE is ex-ante ambiguous. For example, if the reform increases λE, this leads to
a decrease of U(λE, θ), which has a negative impact on λFT , whereas in the case
where the reform decreases the λE, this raises U(λE, θ) and thus also λFT .
Overall the direct effect of the reform on λT still dominates provided that
λE increases, which leads to lower job-creation in affected firms after the reform.
However, the effect on job-destruction is now indeterminate as λP can be affected
in either direction depending on the basic parameters of the model.
Table 2.2: Model predictions
1. Equal bargaining power 2. Less bargaining power in temporary jobs
γFT = γP γFT < γP
λFT ↓ Less job creation as jobs with very
short expected productive durations
are no longer created
λFT ↓ Less job creation as jobs with very
short expected productive durations
are no longer created
λP ↑ More temporary jobs are converted to
permanent contracts once their term
expires
λP ↕ Effect on contract conversion remains
a priori indeterminate
λE ↕ A priori indeterminate effect on
contract-type at start
λE ↕ A priori indeterminate effect on
contract-type at start
wFT ↓, wP ↓ Negative wage effect as labor market
tightness decreases
wFT ↕, wP ↕ Indeterminate wage effect as an in-
creasing λE can lead to a higher out-
side option.
Note.- This table contains a short overview of the main model predictions.
Interestingly, differential rent sharing between permanent and fixed-term con-
tracts now also allows for positive wage effects. This happens if the overall effect of
an increase in cFT on U(λE, θ) is positive. As in the case with equal rent sharing,
this effect is again clear for permanent wages, but can be counteracted by a reaction
through the optimal duration for fixed-term wages.
Table 2.2 provides a short summary of the main model predictions.
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2.4 Data Sources
2.4.1 Mikrozensus
To analyze the 2001 reform in fixed-term employment rules, I use the Mikrozensus,
a repeated cross-sectional survey of 1% of the German population. My analysis
is based on data between 1996 and 2010 as information on the contract type is
only available for survey waves after 1996. Multiple characteristics make the data
particularly suitable for examining fixed-term employment.
First, the data contain information on whether a contract is temporary and also
includes its official duration for time periods before and after the reform. Contrary to
that, German Social Security data only includes the fixed term status of employees
for years after 2011. Second, the data includes questions on the plant size, which can
be used to determine whether a workers plant is subject to employment protection
laws. Finally, the Mikrozensus is a large representative sample of the German
population, including about 14000 new employment relationships per year, allowing
me to analyze the effect of fixed term employment legislation on hiring behavior.
I distinguish three skill groups based on the highest educational qualification.
An individual is medium-skilled if she has completed an apprenticeship or graduated
from high school (Abitur). A person is high-skilled if she graduated from college
or university. However, the proportion of high skilled workers in treated plants is
very small.18 Therefore, I exclude high-skilled workers from my sample.
The Mikrozensus also provides information on net personal income that combines
wage income with earnings from self-employment, rental properties, pensions as well
as other public transfers (like welfare or child benefits). I convert net personal income
to 2014 prices using the national consumer price index and use this information
to analyze the wage effects of the reform.
For the analysis, I restrict the sample to West German individuals between
the ages of 20 and 62. I further exclude people, that are either self-employed, in
18For new contracts, there are less than 41 observations in 2001, and ca. 50 observations per
year on average
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civilian or military service or in vocational training, since the legal rules regarding
employment protection and fixed term work do not apply to these groups.
2.4.2 Social Security Data and Establishment History Panel
While the Mikrozensus contains detailed information on contract types and wages, it
is not suitable for analyzing employment effects. Since it is a repeated cross-sectional
data set, each person is observed at only one point in time.
However, administrative social security data allows for a more detailed analysis
of the theoretical predictions on job-creation and destruction, as it is possible to
follow individuals over time. Although contract types are not directly observable in
the social security data for the reform period, this allows for both analyses on the
transition between unemployment and employment and an analysis on the long-term
reform effects for labor market entrants. Consequently, I use a 2% random sample
of the population of workers and plants covered by the social security system in
Germany, to study employment effects and long-term reform outcomes in more detail.
I apply the same sample restrictions as for the Mikrozensus data to make the
results more comparable across data sets. Since the education variable in the
social security data is missing for about 20% of the observations and exhibits some
inconsistencies over time, I use the panel structure of the data to impute education
in the current year from past and future spells following Fitzenberger et al. (2006).
The data provide information on each individual’s employment status in the
social security system as of June 30th each year. Moreover, the wage variable
reports the average daily wage for the employment spell that contains this reference
date. As with virtually all social security data, the wage variable is right-censored
at the social security threshold. I impute censored wages under the assumption that
the error term in the wage regression is normally distributed allowing for separate
variances by year and gender (Gartner, 2005). However, since the data-set is
restricted to low- and medium-skilled individuals less than 4% of wage observations
are affected by the imputation procedure. Furthermore, I also convert wages to
2014 prices using the national consumer price index.
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2.4.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.3: Proportions of fixed-term employees by gender, age and education
Women
20 to 26 27 to 32 33 to 38 39 to 43 44 to 48 49 to 54 55 to 59 60 to 62
Low Education 14.7% 7.5% 6.5% 5.9% 4.6% 3.4% 2.7% 2.7%
Middle Education 20.9% 7.9% 5.4% 5.3% 4.6% 3.3% 2.6% 3.2%
Men
20 to 26 27 to 32 33 to 38 39 to 43 44 to 48 49 to 54 55 to 59 60 to 62
Low Education 18.3% 7.9% 4.8% 3.8% 3.2% 2.7% 2.6% 2.9%
Middle Education 25.9% 10.7% 4.8% 3.3% 3.1% 2.8% 3.1% 3.8%
Note.- This table displays the proportion of fixed-term employees with-in gender, age and education groups
Source: Mikrozensus sample for West German employees aged 20 to 65
In the following, I display some summary statistics from the Mikrozensus sample.
Table 2.3 shows the proportions of fixed-term employees for 8 different age and edu-
cation groups separately for women and for men over the entire observation period.
The proportion of fixed term contracts in the two youngest age groups is much higher
than in all other age groups. Additionally in these two age groups the fixed-term
proportion increases with education, while the difference between different education
types is much smaller for older age groups. Gender differences are relatively small.
The fixed-term shares for younger workers is relatively high reaching almost 26
% for male middle-educated workers under 26. For workers above the age of 26 the
fixed-term shares are drastically smaller. However, 9.9 % of all contracts observed
are fixed-term, which is close to the OECD average of 11.2 %. (OECD, 2017).
Figure 2.A2 in the appendix plots the time trend of the proportion of fixed
term contracts both for the overall working population and for new contracts.
Both measures have increased markedly over the sample period. Between 1996
and 2010 the proportion of fixed term contracts for new employment relationships
increased by 15 percentage points.
Lastly, I report some summary statistics by employment protection status
and time period in table 2.4.
Matching the stronger incentive to use temporary contracts, the proportion of
fixed-term employees is higher in firms that are affected by employment protection.
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics for the Mikrozensus data
Workers in firms that are not affected by employment protection
Pre reform period (1996-2000) Post reform period (2001-2010)
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Fixed Term 0.044 0.205 0.060 0.238
Real net monthly income 1931.946 1082.619 2025.035 1421.328
Hours worked per week 30.477 13.382 28.213 13.617
Female 0.653 0.476 0.658 0.474
Age 40.093 11.429 41.200 11.334
Service Sector 0.680 0.466 0.717 0.450
Middle Education 0.769 0.422 0.773 0.419
Observations 30,423 149,592
Workers in firms that are subject to employment protection
Pre reform period (1996-2000) Post reform period (2001-2010)
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Fixed Term 0.053 0.225 0.075 0.264
Real net monthly income 2019.406 967.815 2101.062 1238.247
Hours worked per week 35.077 9.340 34.477 10.082
Female 0.436 0.496 0.456 0.498
Age 40.624 10.967 41.428 10.923
Service Sector 0.539 0.498 0.615 0.486
Middle Education 0.832 0.374 0.828 0.378
Observations 247,605 752,799
Note.- This table provides means and standard deviations for fixed-term status, real income, hours
worked and age by employment protection status both for the pre-reform and post-reform periods.
Moreover it also reports the proportion of female workers, medium educated individuals and employees
in the service industry.
Source: Mikrozensus sample for West German employees aged 20 to 65
Average wages are only slightly higher for firms above the employment protection
threshold. Average working hours are however larger. Moreover, the proportion of
female workers is higher for firms below the employment protection bound.
While the average age is nearly identical for the two groups, firms that are not
affected by employment protection tend to employ more low skilled individuals and
are more likely to be active in the services sector of the economy.
Altogether, employees in firms above and below the employment protection
threshold are generally quite similar.
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2.5 Empirical Strategy
The Part-Time and Fixed-Term Contracts Act of 2001 has raised the regulatory
requirements for the use of temporary contracts for plants below the employment
protection threshold. This induces variation in the relative costs of writing fixed
term contracts between firms above and below the employment protection threshold.
Thus, I can use a simple difference-in-differences research design, which compares
employees in treated plants (i.e. not subject to employment protection) to those in
control plants (i.e. subject to employment protection) before and after the reform.
For outcome variables such as the likelihood of a new contract to be fixed-
term, the transition from unemployment to employment and net wages the es-
timation equation is given by
Outcomeipt = αNo EPLip×Post 2001t+βPlant-sizep+γyeart+λXipt+εipt,
(2.7)
where i indexes individuals, p indexes plant-size categories, and t indexes
years. I include year and firm size dummies, as well as a set of control variables
Xipt for the age, education and the gender of the individual and the industry of
the firm at the 2-digit level .
The variable No EPLif × Post 2001t is an interaction effect between the
employment protection status of a workers firm and an indicator variable for
years after 2001. I use the respectively applicable plant-size limit for each year to
determine, whether a firm is subject to employment protection or not. Since I control
for plant-size and year fixed effects, the effect of the reform α is identified by the
change in the respective outcome variable in firms above the employment protection
threshold, relative to the other firms, in 2001 or later relative to 2000 or earlier.
My identification strategy requires that plants do not deliberately change their
size in response to the reform and move from the control into the treatment group.
However, I can use information on plant size, to analyze whether plants changed
their size around the threshold after the reform. Moreover, I can later also further
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alleviate these concerns by comparing plants that are farther away from the actual
employment protection threshold.
Furthermore, other legal changes that are happening at the same time and affect-
ing firms along the employment protection threshold differentially can not be distin-
guished from the reform effect. However, there were no major changes to employment
legislation at the same time and the other rules introduced in the same law were
unrelated to the employment protection status of firms and fixed-term employment.
Lastly, parallel trends between the treatment and control group is the central
assumption for the validity of my identification strategy. I address this issue in
several ways. I graphically plot the development for all available years before and
after the reform. Moreover, I also extend the above regression to account for timing
of the effects to see, whether there are any significant pre-reform differences once
I account for fixed group characteristics and controls.
2.6 Results
The baseline of the theoretical model predicts both a decline in temporary job
creation and an increase in the conversion of fixed-term contracts into permanent
jobs. Thus, if the reform had any effect, I should observe a response in the share
of fixed-term contracts in the treatment group.
2.6.1 Use of fixed-term contracts
Consequently, I begin by assessing the impact of the reform on the uptake of
fixed-term contracts by plants that are not subject to employment protection rules.
As a first step, I plot the proportion of new contracts that are fixed term.
Figure 2.2 shows that up to 2001 the trends in hiring fixed-term employees
moved roughly in parallel for both types of plants and diverged afterwards. After
2001, there is an increase in the use of fixed-term contracts for new hires in both
the treatment and the control group. However, the increase is considerably larger
for plants that are subject to employment protection.
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Figure 2.2: Trends for the proportion of fixed-term contracts by employment protection
status
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Note.- The figure plots the proportion of new fixed term contracts by employment
protection status.
Source: Mikrozensus sample for West German employees aged 20 to 65
Besides, this first overview is in line with the expected incentives for the use of
fixed-term contracts. Plants larger than the employment protection threshold have
a stronger incentive to make use of temporary employment and consequently have
a larger share of fixed-term contracts pre-reform. As the 2001 reform has made it
more difficult for plants not covered by employment protection to use fixed-term
contracts, the trends between the two groups diverge.
Next, I explore the effect of the reform more formally. Table 2.5 contains the
results of difference-in-difference regressions for the fixed-term share in both new
contracts and all employment relationships. Columns (1) to (3) limit the sample
to new contracts, while columns (4) to (6) are calculated for the whole sample
of all employment relationships. Each column presents a regression of the fixed
term status of an employment contract on plant-size category and year fixed effects.
The plant-size categories for all regressions are plants of 1 to 5 employees, 6 to
9 employees, 10 to 19 employees and 20-49 employees. The plant-size category
32 2.6. Results
Table 2.5: Difference-in-Difference Equations for likelihood of being fixed-term (New
contracts)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
New contracts Overall
No EPL×Post 2001 -0.0404*** -0.0302*** -0.0316*** -0.00895*** -0.00510** -0.00695**
(0.00566) (0.00533) (0.00535) (0.00157) (0.00175) (0.00237)
Female -0.00534 -0.0510*** -0.0500*** 0.00363 -0.0153*** -0.0155***
(0.00648) (0.00366) (0.00376) (0.00265) (0.00203) (0.00201)
Medium Education -0.0656*** -0.0702*** -0.0704*** -0.0392*** -0.0394*** -0.0395***
(0.00730) (0.00711) (0.00738) (0.00203) (0.00208) (0.00208)
Age -0.0151*** -0.0144*** -0.0142*** -0.0170*** -0.0167*** -0.0167***
(0.00210) (0.00178) (0.00186) (0.00151) (0.00148) (0.00147)
Age2 0.000159*** 0.000152*** 0.000149*** 0.000167*** 0.000163*** 0.000163***
(2.63e-05) (2.17e-05) (2.28e-05) (1.53e-05) (1.48e-05) (1.47e-05)
Constant 0.493*** 0.595*** 65.21** 0.451*** 0.476*** 12.04**
(0.0413) (0.0381) (23.26) (0.0318) (0.0331) (4.271)
Wild Bootstrap CI [-0.054;-0.022] [-0.041;-0.012] [-0.043;-0.017] [-0.012;-0.005] [-0.011;-0.001] [-0.013;-0.001]
Plant-size fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effcts YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effects NO YES YES NO YES YES
Industry Trends NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 45,571 45,103 45,103 519,207 513,112 513,112
R2 0.042 0.069 0.072 0.036 0.046 0.047
Note.- This table contains the results of regressions of the main difference-in-differences estimation equation for the likelihood that
a contract is fixed-term. Columns (1) to (3) restrict the sample to new contracts, while columns (4) to (6) are computed for the
sample of all employment relationships.
Cluster-robust standard errors for firm size clusters in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
increases due to data limitations for firms above 10 Employees.19
To account for within plant-size dependence of hiring behavior, I cluster standard
errors at the level of plant-size categories. Since the number of plant-size clusters
is relatively small I also report wild bootstrap confidence intervals (Cameron
et al., 2008) where appropriate.
The coefficient of −0.0404 in column (1) indicates a 4.04 p.p. decrease in the
fixed-term share of new contracts in firms not subject to employment protection.
Adding additional industry fixed effects reduces the estimated effect to 3 percentage
points. Standard errors also remain stable and the estimated effect is highly
statistically significant in all regressions. Furthermore, the effect remains stable
at 3 percentage points, even if I allow for differential industry-specific trends over
time in column (3). Since the average fixed-term share for new contracts before the
reform was 35%, the effect represents an economically substantial 10 % decrease.
19I analyze plant-size restrictions and different levels for fixed-effects in the robustness section.
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Figure 2.3: Coefficient plot for the dynamics of the reform
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Note.- The figure plots the coefficient of interactions between years and the employment
protection threshold indicator in a regression of the fixed-term status of a new contract
on firm-size fixed effects, year-fixed effects, the respective interactions and a all control
variables included in table 2.5.
Source: Mikrozensus sample for West German employees aged 20 to 65
The overall fixed-term share of contracts in treated firms is also declining
accordingly. The coefficient of −0.00695 in Column (6) indicates a 0.696 p.p.
decrease in firms affected by the reform. This effect is also sizable, as the average
fixed-term share of all contracts in the sample is 9.9 %.
Next, I examine whether the effect of the reform is persistent or reverses after
some time. For this I re-estimate the same regression as in Column (1) of Table 2.5,
but replace the single difference-in-difference indicator with interactions between
each calendar year and an indicator for plants that are not subject to employment
protection. The coefficients for these interactions are plotted in figure 2.3.
For pre-reform years, the coefficients of the interactions of employment protec-
tion status and the calendar year are close to zero and statistically insignificant.
Consequently the trends in both types of firms before the reform are largely parallel.
Interestingly, the reaction to the reform is slightly delayed, as the main de-
crease is from 2002 to 2003. After 2003 there is a clear difference in the devel-
opment of the uptake of fixed-term contracts by employment protection status.
The difference slightly recedes after 2005 but stays stable a about 3 percentage
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points. Thus the reform is largely persistent at effect sizes similar to the simple
difference-in-differences specification.
2.6.2 Employment
The main predictions of the theoretical model discussed in section 2.3 concern
the destruction and creation of jobs. The basic model with equal bargaining
power across both contract types, predicts both a decrease in the creation of
fixed-term jobs and an increase in the conversion of jobs from fixed-term into
open-ended contracts (see Table 2.2).
A decline in temporary job creation implies a decrease in the likelihood that
a jobseeker will move out of unemployment. At the same time, the increase in
the conversion of fixed-term contracts into permanent contracts should reduce
the likelihood that employed individuals will become unemployed. Hence, I next
examine the impact of the reform on flows into and out of unemployment.
As the Mikrozensus lacks the panel structure that would be necessary to analyze
detailed employment flows, I use social security data, to estimate the reform effects
on employment flows. I report these results in table 2.6. While column (1) reports
results on the likelihood to switch from non-employment to employment, column
(2) contains the results for the probability to switch from an employment into an
non-employment spell. Thus, the first column is indicative about overall job creation
under the new rules, while the second represents the impact on job destruction. The
columns (3) and (4) are based on the same specification, but here the official unem-
ployment status is used as the base category instead of non-employment. Therefore
only job-seekers, who are officially registered as unemployed, are considered.
The −0, 0091 coefficient in the (1) column indicates a 0.9 percentage point
decrease in the likelihood that non-employed individuals moves into employment in
plants that are not affected by employment protection legislation. Given that on
average 5.9 % of the non-employed switch into employment per year, the effect of the
reform on the transition from non-employment to employment is relatively small.
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Table 2.6: Employment effects of the reform - IEB Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
flows from/to non-employment flows from/to unemployment
job creation job destruction job creation job destruction
No EPL×Post2001 -0.0091*** -0.0079*** -0.0037** -0.0074***
(0.00302) (0.0023) (0.00155) (0.00162)
Female -0.00436* -0.00771*** -0.01102*** -0.00911***
(0.00236) (0.0015) (0.00102) (0.00096)
Medium Education 0.02646*** 0.01971*** -0.01004*** 0.01067***
(0.00102) (0.0013) (0.00049) (0.00049)
Age -0.00891*** -0.0006** -0.00393*** 0.00141***
(0.00023) (0.00027) (0.00015) (0.00006)
Age2 0.0000695*** 0.0000059 0.0000539*** -0.00002***
(0.0000028) (0.0000035) (0.0000016) (0.0000007)
Constant 0.3104*** 0.09301*** 0.14889*** 0.01401***
(0.00494) (0.00474) (0.0032) (0.00184)
Plant-size fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 3228829 3228829 2401018 3228829
R2 0.02729 0.00459 0.00714 0.00683
Note.- This table contains the results of regressions of the main difference-in-differences specifica-
tion on flows from non-employment to employment, employment to non-employment, unemployment
to employment and employment to unemployment .
Cluster-robust standard errors for firm size clusters in parentheses.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
In addition column (2) also reports a 0.79 p.p. decrease in the probability
to move from a job in a plant below the employment protection threshold into
non-employment after the reform. Together with the results from column (1),
this implies a negligible overall effect on the transition from non-employment to
employment, since the effects in both columns are within a standard error range.
The results are very similar when I restrict the analysis to flows from and
to unemployment. Here however, the flow from unemployment to employment
exhibits a smaller decrease of only 0.37 percentage points, while the decrease in the
transition from employment to unemployment is similarly sized at 0.74 percentage
points. Although this suggests an overall positive effect on employment, the effect
is again not economically significant.
In sum, the reform has only a minimal impact on employment flows. This
suggests that the overall decrease in the temporary contract share is not only due to
a decrease in job creation and an increase in contract conversion, but also that the
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likelihood of starting a new job with a permanent contract has likely increased.20
2.6.3 Wages
I can use an identical approach to compute the wage effects of the reform. It is not
clear from the outset, what wage effect should be expected for the reform. While
theory predicts negative wage effects in a baseline model with equal rent sharing in
both contract types, positive wage effects of the reform are also possible if workers
have less bargaining power in fixed-term contracts. In this case, a lower probability
that a new employment contract is fixed-term after the reform implies an increase
in the value of the workers’ outside option and thus also their wages. Given that
the observed employment effects of the reform are small, while the decrease of
the temporary contract share is large, the basic prerequisites for this case appear
to be fulfilled. A post-reform increase in wages in treated plants would therefore
suggest lower bargaining power in fixed-term contracts.
Table 2.7: Wage effects of the reform
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
New contracts All contracts
Overall Permanent Fixed Term Overall Permanent Fixed Term
No EPL×Post 2001 0.0233*** 0.0146 0.0340** 0.00896*** 0.00605* 0.00888
(0.00701) (0.00931) (0.0116) (0.00234) (0.00301) (0.00855)
Female 0.0931*** 0.116*** 0.0652** 0.00376 0.0409 0.0312
(0.0248) (0.0326) (0.0227) (0.0201) (0.0317) (0.0184)
Medium Education 0.225*** 0.215*** 0.205*** 0.197*** 0.199*** 0.145***
(0.00491) (0.00528) (0.0111) (0.00427) (0.00483) (0.00700)
Age 0.0341*** 0.0448*** 0.00193 0.0450*** 0.0505*** -0.0193***
(0.00396) (0.00163) (0.00520) (0.00259) (0.00163) (0.00260)
Age2 -0.000394*** -0.000516*** -2.74e-05 -0.000458*** -0.000538*** 0.000260***
(4.95e-05) (2.12e-05) (6.70e-05) (3.06e-05) (2.04e-05) (3.43e-05)
Constant 6.394*** 6.162*** 6.882*** 6.301*** 6.160*** 7.394***
(0.0842) (0.0409) (0.102) (0.0660) (0.0513) (0.0575)
Wild Bootstrap CI [0.008;0.043] [-0.007;0.041] [0.007;0.056] [0.004;0.014] [-0.002;0.014] [-0.015;0.036]
Plant-size fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 51,647 30,623 15,328 622,565 460,470 51,237
R2 0.044 0.058 0.029 0.054 0.058 0.015
Note.- This table contains the results of regressions of the main difference-in-differences estimation equation for log net
personal income. Cluster-robust standard errors for firm size clusters in parentheses.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
20In the theoretical framework this represents an increase in the parameter λE
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Consequently, I analyze the impact of the reform on the wages for fixed-term
and permanent employees, both for new contracts and for all employees. The results
of the corresponding log wage regressions are shown in table 2.7. The first three
columns contain regressions for workers in new contracts, with regression results for
the overall wage effect of the reform in column (1). Furthermore, the regression in
column (2) is restricted to new permanent contracts, while column (3) displays results
for new temporary employees. Column (4) contains the results of a wage regression
for all employees, while the sample for column (5) is confined to all permanent
employees. Lastly, column (6) is computed for the sample of all fixed-term employees.
Overall, the results in column (1) indicate a highly statistically significant 2.33
% increase in wages for new contracts in the treatment group after the reform. Since
the effect for the entire work-force reported in columns (4) is significantly smaller,
the wage effects of the reform seam to be driven by new contracts.
The point estimates in columns (2) and (3) suggest that this wage increase
is larger for fixed-term employees at 3.4 % than for permanent employees at
1.46 %. However, the coefficient for new permanent contracts is not measured
precisely and it cannot even be excluded that the effect for open-ended contracts
is zero. Moreover, the standard error is so large that the coefficient for open-
ended contracts is within a distance of two standard errors from the coefficient
for fixed-term contracts. Consequently, comparisons of the effect size between
the contract types are not feasible.
2.6.4 Long-term outcomes for labor market entrants
So far I have analyzed the reform effects on the fixed-term share, employment and
wages. Next, I abstract from the predictions of the theoretical framework and
examine the long-term impact of the reform on labor market entrants. Questions
about the long-term impact of starting a career in fixed-term work are often at the
center of the policy debate on temporary work. In particular, the debate focuses
on whether fixed-term contracts are a stepping stone to a permanent job or a
dead-end for labor market entrants. Thus, I extend my analysis to examine how
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entry into the labor market under the new fixed-term employment policy affects
the long-term outcomes for post-reform entrants.
Table 2.8: Longterm effects of the reform
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
weeks weeks Log cumulative Likelihood Number
non-employed unemployed earnings Same Employeer of Jobs
No EPL Entry × Post 2001 Entry -3.0777*** -0.3138*** 0.1404*** -0.0099*** -0.2288***
(1.0957) (0.0592) (0.0091) (0.0038) (0.0207)
Female -10.4925 -0.636 -0.2898 0.0328 -0.5964
(0.5215) (0.0292) (0.0039) (0.0017) (0.01)
Medium Education -31.2032 -0.5778 0.524 0.0495 0.3866
(0.8681) (0.041) (0.005) (0.002) (0.0114)
Age -3.858 -0.0178 0.0337 0.0131 0.2128
(0.2313) (0.0095) (0.0012) (0.0005) (0.0027)
Age2 0.0618 0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0029
(0.00332) (0.00014) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00004)
Constant 123.205 3.7773 10.3459 -0.0979 -0.8147
(4.0647) (0.1762) (0.022) (0.0091) (0.0527)
Plant-size at Entry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Entry Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 214833 214833 214804 214833 214833
R2 0.0305 0.0147 0.0899 0.0230 0.0549
Note.- This table contains the results of regressions of the difference-in-differences specification for long-term effects of the reform on
post-reform entrants. All columns refer to outcomes in the first five years after labor market entry.
Cluster-robust standard errors for firm size clusters in parentheses.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
Once again, I use social security data since it allows me to track individuals
who have entered the labor market around the reform over time. In a similar
Differences-in-Differences setup as before, I compare the difference in the outcomes
of post and pre-reform entrants, who entered the labor market in plants below
and above the 5 employee threshold. This allows me to analyze outcomes such as
the likelihood to still be employed at the same employer as in the entry year, the
cumulative earnings and times out of employment for entrants in the first five years
after entry and the number of jobs in the first 5 years after entry.
I report the results of the respective regressions in Table 2.8. All regressions
in this table are based on difference-in-differences specifications that compare
outcomes of entry cohorts in the first 5 years after entry across the plant-size
threshold in the entry year.
The outcome variable for the regression in column (1) is the number of weeks
without employment in the first 5 years in the labor market, while column (2) reports
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the effect on the official duration of unemployment over the same period. Column
(3) contains results on log cumulative earnings. Moreover, the regression results for
the probability to remain at the same employer over the entire 5 year period are in
column (4). Lastly, column (5) reports the reform effect on the number of jobs.
Column (1) and (2) suggest that both the time out of employment and weeks of
unemployment declined considerably for post-reform entrants. Moreover column
(3) indicates a sizable increase in the earnings in the first five years of employment.
Although the likelihood to remain at the same employer marginally declines, column
(5) shows that the average number of jobs also declines. Together, the results
suggest that the stricter fixed-term hiring rules for small plants led to an increase
in job security and long-term wages for labor market entrants.
Table 2.9: Likelihood of long-term fixed-term employment for labor market entrants
(1) (2) (3)
Overall 2001 to 2005 2005 to 2010
No EPL × Entry after 2001 -0.0312*** -0.0405*** -0.0321***
(0.00481) (0.00889) (0.00380)
Female 0.0218*** 0.0165*** 0.0222***
(0.00229) (0.00428) (0.00185)
Age -0.00748*** -0.00634* -0.00789***
(0.00213) (0.00321) (0.00192)
Age2 9.19e-05*** 7.44e-05* 9.61e-05***
(2.52e-05) (3.90e-05) (2.32e-05)
Medium Education -0.0375*** -0.0209 -0.127***
(0.0115) (0.0173) (0.0318)
Constant 0.227*** 0.199*** 0.338***
(0.0489) (0.0613) (0.0406)
Wild Bootstrap CI [-0.041;-0.019] [-0.065;-0.023] [-0.040;-0.023]
Plant-size fixed effects YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Entry Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 95,423 22,930 78,520
R2 0.033 0.040 0.037
Note.- This table contains the results for the likelihood to stay fixed-term in later years
than the reform year.
Cluster-robust standard errors for firm size clusters in parentheses.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
Since the social security data do not contain information on the type of contract
for the relevant time-frame, I have to resort to information from the Mikrozensus
to assess how the reform has affected the long-term likelihood of remaining fixed-
term. Similarly to the other long-term outcomes, I use information on the first
40 2.7. Robustness
year in the labor market to compare entry cohorts across firm sizes for later years.
However, the Mikrozensus does not contain information on the firm-size at entry
and I can not track individuals across time. Therefore, I compare individuals across
their contemporaneous employment protection status and not the employment
protection status at labor market entry.
Although this has the disadvantage that plants in later years could differ from
the establishment at entry with regard to the employment protection status, this
still gives me suggestive evidence for the long-term likelihood of remaining in
temporary employment. The estimates for the long-term probability of staying
fixed-term are in table 2.9.
The first column suggests that the probability to be fixed-term has decreased
by 3.12 percentage points for workers who entered the labor market after 2001
and work in plants that are not subject to employment protection. Columns (2)
and (3) contain the same estimation for two distinct time-periods. For column
(1) this time-period is 2001 to 2005, whereas it is 2005 to 2010 for column (2).
Splitting the sample over time shows, that this decrease in the likelihood to be
fixed-term is roughly persistent.
2.7 Robustness
Next, I conduct some additional specification checks to assess the robustness of my
findings. First, I provide a more direct analysis for the parallel trend assumption
between plants that are affected by employment protection and those that are not
in section 2.7.1. Second, I examine, whether deliberate changes in the plant-size in
response to the reform pose a threat to my identification strategy in section 2.7.2.
Finally, I discuss in section 2.7.3, how changed sample restrictions affect my results.
2.7.1 Parallel pre-trends
In addition to estimating leads and lags of the treatment indicator (see figure 2.3),
I calculate placebo reform regressions on the likelihood to be fixed-term, where I
shift the introduction year of the reform to years prior to the reform.
2. Employment Protection and Fixed Term Contracts 41
Table 2.10: Placebo tests for the main specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1997 1998 1999 2000
No EPL × Post Placebo Year 0.0156 0.00880 0.00827 0.0176
(0.0118) (0.0114) (0.0113) (0.0203)
No EPL × Post 2001 -0.0493*** -0.0465*** -0.0473*** -0.0564***
(0.0101) (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0180)
Female -0.00535 -0.00536 -0.00535 -0.00535
(0.00648) (0.00649) (0.00649) (0.00648)
Age -0.0151*** -0.0151*** -0.0151*** -0.0151***
(0.00210) (0.00210) (0.00210) (0.00209)
Age2 0.000159*** 0.000159*** 0.000159*** 0.000159***
(2.62e-05) (2.63e-05) (2.63e-05) (2.62e-05)
Medium Education -0.0655*** -0.0656*** -0.0656*** -0.0656***
(0.00731) (0.00730) (0.00730) (0.00730)
Constant 0.488*** 0.491*** 0.492*** 0.492***
(0.0415) (0.0413) (0.0422) (0.0412)
Wild Bootstrap CI [-0.012;0.045] [-0.033;0.033] [-0.014;0.074] [-0.023;0.076]
Plant-size fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 45,571 45,571 45,571 45,571
R2 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042
Note.- This table contains difference-in-differences regressions for placebo reforms for the years 1997 to
2000.
Cluster-robust standard errors for firm size clusters in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
Table 2.10 shows the results for these regressions. All placebo reform indica-
tors regardless of the placebo year are statistically insignificant and very close
to zero. Taken together, this is further evidence for the validity of the paral-
lel trend assumption.
2.7.2 Plant-size response of the reform
If plants react to the reform by changing their size around the employment protection
threshold, there would be contagion of the treatment group into the control group.
To assess this concern, I use data from the establishment history panel to analyze,
how the plant-size distribution changed around the reform.
I start by plotting the plant-size distribution for the pre-reform year 2000 and
the year 2001 in figure 2.4. For the sake of clarity, only firms up to a size of 20
employees are taken into account in this figure. That is sensible, as the relevant
threshold at which manipulation was possible is 5 employees. In total, 60 % of all
establishments in the data set are smaller than 20 employees.
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Figure 2.4: Plant-size distribution before and after reform
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Note.- The figures plots the establishment-size distribution for the years 2000 and 2001
for establishments with less than 20 employees.
Source: Establishment history panel
The distribution is almost identical for the two years, hinting at only small
changes in plant-size for existing establishments. However, since changes are still
possible that would not be evident in the overall plant-size distribution, I next use
the panel structure of the data, to examine whether the rates of transition around
the plant-size threshold of 5 Employees was different in the reform year.
I plot two transition rates for the 2001 employment protection threshold of 5
employees in figure 2.5. The first is the share of all firms that had less than 5
employees in the previous year and more than 5 employees in the current year.
The second one is the share of plants, which had more than 5 employees in the
previous year but are smaller in the current year.
While there were substantial adjustments during the reform of the employment
protection threshold in 1999, the transition rates in 2001, the year of the fixed-term
contract reform, are roughly at their average level. Therefore, changes in plant-size
around the fixed-term reform are not a cause for concern.
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Figure 2.5: Plant-size transitions
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Note.- The figures plots the transitions rates of firms with less than 5 employees in the
previous year to more than 5 employees in the current year and vice versa.
Source: Establishment history panel
Nevertheless, I also compute some of my main results for subsamples that exclude
plant-size-categories right at the employment protection threshold to further alleviate
concerns about potential plant-size manipulation. For this I estimate the main
regressions for the likelihood of being fixed-term with two restrictions. The first
restriction is that i exclude plant-sizes of 4 or 9 employees. These are the plant-sizes
right below the employment protection thresholds for different years in the sample.
For the second restriction, I only consider the time period around the reform, during
which the employment protection threshold was at 5 workers and exclude plants
right at the threshold. The estimates for these regressions are in table 2.11.
Both restrictions have little effect on the outcome of the likelihood that a new
contract is fixed-term. The difference-in-differences coefficient changes very little
and is close to the original estimate. Moreover, the statistical significance of the
results also remains largely unchanged.
This mostly also applies to results for the wage effect on new contracts. However,
for the second restriction the wage effect becomes statistically insignificant. This
is likely due to large loss of observations in this sub sample.
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Table 2.11: Robustness: Excluding firms right at the threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fixed Term Log net income
All Restriction 1 Restriction 2 All Restriction 1 Restriction 2
No EPL × Post 2001 -0.0404*** -0.0405*** -0.0516*** 0.0227*** 0.0242*** 0.00503
(0.00566) (0.00610) (0.0143) (0.00579) (0.00642) (0.0216)
Age -0.0151*** -0.0155*** -0.0172*** 0.0367*** 0.0368*** 0.0404***
(0.00210) (0.00233) (0.00269) (0.00300) (0.00332) (0.00463)
Age2 0.000159*** 0.000165*** 0.000187*** -0.000428*** -0.000430*** -0.000449***
(2.63e-05) (2.91e-05) (3.04e-05) (3.70e-05) (4.09e-05) (5.83e-05)
Female -0.00534 -0.00558 0.00273 0.111*** 0.105*** 0.0648**
(0.00648) (0.00695) (0.00706) (0.0302) (0.0310) (0.0279)
Medium Education -0.0656*** -0.0658*** -0.0572*** 0.228*** 0.226*** 0.176***
(0.00730) (0.00780) (0.0137) (0.00432) (0.00481) (0.0178)
Constant 0.493*** 0.494*** 0.565*** 6.306*** 6.301*** 6.261***
(0.0413) (0.0467) (0.0602) (0.0757) (0.0811) (0.0990)
Wild Bootstrap CI [-0.055;-0.023] [-0.056;-0.025] [-0.116;-0.019] [0.010;0.036] [0.012;0.042] [-0.062;0.074]
Plant-size fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 45,571 41,670 11,903 43,398 39,675 11,494
R2 0.042 0.043 0.030 0.053 0.051 0.050
Note.- This table contains difference-in-differences regressions with different sample restrictions for firms right at the employment
protection threshold. For Restriction 1 firms with 4 and 9 employees are excluded. For Restriction 2 the sample is limited to
time-periods, when the employment protection bound was at 5 Employees and firms with 4 Employees are excluded. Cluster-robust
standard errors for firm size clusters in parentheses.
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
In summary, deliberate manipulation of the plant-size around the reform does
not seem to impair the validity of my estimates.
2.7.3 Additional Specification Checks
Finally, I also examine how the restriction of the sample to certain maximum
plant-sizes and the specification of the plant fixed effects affect my findings. For
this purpose, I explore two modifications to the main specification. For one, I limit
the maximum plant-size in the sample to 20 or 10 employees.21 And secondly, I
calculate all estimates with more detailed fixed effects for plant-size categories.
In the baseline estimation the fixed-effects on plant-size categories are defined
in size steps of 5 employees, whereas the detailed fixed-effects directly represent
plant-sizes in the smallest available increment.
21When I restrict the maximum plant-size to 10 employees, I also restrict the observation
period to years where the employment protection threshold was at 5 employees, as this restriction
excludes all plants above the employment protection threshold for years where the threshold was
at 10 employees.
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Table 2.12: Robustness: Plant-size restrictions (Fixed-term share)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Standard Sample Under 20 Employees Under 10 Employees
No EPL × Post 2001 -0.0404*** -0.0397*** -0.0300*** -0.0363*** -0.0357*** -0.0255** -0.0350* -0.0345* -0.0406**
(0.00566) (0.00545) (0.00536) (0.00879) (0.00863) (0.00821) (0.0168) (0.0169) (0.0162)
Female -0.00534 -0.00455 -0.0509*** -0.0114 -0.0104 -0.0542*** -0.0128 -0.0129 -0.0413***
(0.00648) (0.00613) (0.00370) (0.00678) (0.00632) (0.00319) (0.00952) (0.00963) (0.00564)
Age -0.0151*** -0.0152*** -0.0144*** -0.0138*** -0.0138*** -0.0131*** -0.0203*** -0.0202*** -0.0203***
(0.00210) (0.00210) (0.00178) (0.00206) (0.00205) (0.00158) (0.00364) (0.00363) (0.00338)
Age2 0.000159*** 0.000160*** 0.000152*** 0.000142*** 0.000143*** 0.000137*** 0.000221*** 0.000221*** 0.000226***
(2.63e-05) (2.63e-05) (2.18e-05) (2.56e-05) (2.56e-05) (1.96e-05) (4.17e-05) (4.16e-05) (3.81e-05)
Medium Education -0.0656*** -0.0663*** -0.0707*** -0.0593*** -0.0602*** -0.0640*** -0.0398** -0.0405** -0.0406**
(0.00730) (0.00700) (0.00696) (0.00784) (0.00746) (0.00716) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0135)
Constant 0.493*** 0.457*** 0.566*** 0.464*** 0.428*** 0.538*** 0.632*** 0.627*** 0.747***
(0.0413) (0.0416) (0.0412) (0.0377) (0.0393) (0.0383) (0.0852) (0.0849) (0.116)
Wild Bootstrap CI [-0.055;-0.020] [-0.054;-0.021] [-0.044;-0.013] [-0.060;-0.005] [-0.054;-0.007] [-0.046;0.004] [-0.076;0.005] [-0.072;0.004] [-0.075;-0.001]
Plant-size fixed effects Standard Detailed Detailed Standard Detailed Detailed Standard Detailed Detailed
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry fixed effects NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 45,571 45,571 45,103 33,593 33,593 33,255 6,132 6,132 5,996
R2 0.042 0.043 0.070 0.032 0.033 0.061 0.019 0.020 0.044
Note.- This table contains difference-in-differences regressions for the likelihood of a new contract being fixed term for different sub-samples of the data and different fixed effects
specifications. For columns (4) to (7) the sample is restricted to firms with less than 20 Employees. The regressions in the last three columns include only firms with less than 10
Employees and time-periods, when the employment protection bound was at 5 Employees. Cluster-robust standard errors for firm size clusters in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗ p < 0.1
The results for these specification checks for the likelihood that a new contract
is fixed-term are in table 2.12. None of the specification changes has a large impact
on the coefficient of interest. The estimated effect size remains roughly at 3 to
4 percentage points for any of the specifications. However the standard errors
are larger in the sample, where I reduce the maximum plant size to 10 employees
and the observed time-frame accordingly.
Moreover, the wage effect for new contracts also differs only minimally across
the various specification checks. I present the results for these effects in table
2.A1 in the appendix. Again there are only marginal changes in the effect size
across specifications.
In general, though, the specification checks suggest that my results are robust
against changes in plant-size constraints and the use of more detailed fixed-effects.
2.8 Conclusion
This chapter examines how a 2001 reform that raised the legal requirements for
the use of temporary contracts for small firms affected employment, wages and
the take-up of fixed-term contracts.
I find a sizable decrease in the utilization of fixed-term contracts for affected
plants, yet only negligibly small effects on employment. In line with the theoretical
46 2.8. Conclusion
predictions for a scenario in which workers have less bargaining power in fixed-
term contracts and the proportion of new fixed-term contracts decreases, I also
find positive reform effects on wages.
Furthermore, I also find some evidence that the reform has contributed to a
reduction in labor market segmentation for new entrants. For labor market entrants,
who joined affected firms after the reform year, I find an increase in cumulated
wages in the first 5 years, as well as a reduction in the time out of work. In
addition, I find suggestive evidence that the likelihood of remaining in temporary
employment for longer periods of time is diminishing.
Together, my findings contribute to an economic literature that is critical of
fixed-term employment as an exception to otherwise strict employment protection
in permanent jobs. My findings suggest that restrictions on fixed-term contracts
could be beneficial to workers, at least in the short term. However, this abstracts
from the longer-term adaptations of firms to changed legislation. For example,
firms could respond to increased labor costs by replacing labor with capital. Thus,
longer-term adjustments are an interesting point for future research.
Lastly, my findings for a German restriction of fixed-term contracts from 2001
offer further insights for the current plans of the German government to limit
fixed-term employment. Recently, the ruling coalition parties have agreed to reduce
the maximum permissible duration of fixed-term contracts, to limit the number
of renewals and to set a new quota for the maximum proportion of fixed-term
employees for larger firms (Coalition Agreement, 2018). The debate that preceded
these plans often focused on possible negative employment effects of a significant
restriction on firms’ use of temporary jobs.
Although the current German plans to limit the use of fixed-term contracts are
more extensive than the previous reform, the results of this article at least suggest
that fears about detrimental employment effects seem less warranted. However,
whether the more broad new reforms will have similar outcomes will ultimately
be a question for further research.
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2.A Additional tables and figures
Figure 2.A1: Share of fixed-term employment in OECD countries 2017
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Note.- The figures plots the share of employment contracts that are fixed-term for OECD
countries
Source: OECD (2018), Temporary employment (indicator)
Figure 2.A2: Proportion of fixed-term contracts over time
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48 2.A. Additional tables and figures
Table 2.A1: Robustness: Plant-size restrictions (Wages)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Standard Sample Under 20 Employees Under 10 Employees
No EPL × Post 2001 0.0227*** 0.0227*** 0.0150** 0.0257*** 0.0256*** 0.0173** 0.0302** 0.0292** 0.0223*
(0.00579) (0.00581) (0.00582) (0.00716) (0.00715) (0.00739) (0.0102) (0.00999) (0.0110)
Female 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.160*** 0.140*** 0.141*** 0.189*** 0.130*** 0.131*** 0.151***
(0.0302) (0.0305) (0.0292) (0.0324) (0.0328) (0.0307) (0.0239) (0.0242) (0.0285)
Age 0.0367*** 0.0367*** 0.0342*** 0.0398*** 0.0397*** 0.0374*** 0.0477*** 0.0473*** 0.0459***
(0.00300) (0.00297) (0.00313) (0.00259) (0.00255) (0.00281) (0.00441) (0.00429) (0.00412)
Age2 -0.000428*** -0.000427*** -0.000400*** -0.000465*** -0.000463*** -0.000438*** -0.000538*** -0.000532*** -0.000521***
(3.70e-05) (3.63e-05) (3.84e-05) (3.28e-05) (3.18e-05) (3.55e-05) (5.52e-05) (5.33e-05) (5.17e-05)
Medium Education 0.228*** 0.227*** 0.203*** 0.229*** 0.228*** 0.196*** 0.160*** 0.159*** 0.120***
(0.00432) (0.00447) (0.00727) (0.00527) (0.00565) (0.00988) (0.0253) (0.0257) (0.0248)
Constant 6.306*** 6.278*** 6.212*** 6.226*** 6.193*** 6.116*** 6.116*** 6.091*** 6.033***
(0.0757) (0.0791) (0.0972) (0.0640) (0.0660) (0.0771) (0.0860) (0.0854) (0.0878)
Wild Bootstrap CI [0.011;0.038] [0.010;0.038] [0.003;0.030] [0.011;0.052] [0.013;0.053] [0.002;0.045] [0.007;0.057] [0.005;0.057] [-0.004;0.050]
Plant-size fixed effects Standard Detailed Detailed Standard Detailed Detailed Standard Detailed Detailed
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry fixed effects NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 43,398 43,398 42,937 31,996 31,996 31,661 5,953 5,953 5,818
R2 0.053 0.053 0.078 0.060 0.060 0.089 0.059 0.060 0.096
Note.- This table contains difference-in-differences regressions for the log-personal income for new contracts for different sub-samples of the data and different fixed effects
specifications. For columns (4) to (7) the sample is restricted to firms with less than 20 Employees. The regressions in the last three columns include only firms with less than 10
Employees and time-periods, when the employment protection bound was at 5 Employees. Cluster-robust standard errors for firm size clusters in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
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2.B Model derivations
In this appendix, I will provide further details of the theoretical framework set out
in section 3. In particular, I provide detailed definitions of the surplus of creating
jobs by contract type (2.B.1). Moreover, I discuss the comparative statics of an
increase in contract writing costs for temporary contracts for both the case of
equal bargaining power (2.B.2) across contract types and lower bargaining power
(2.B.3) in fixed-term contracts.
2.B.1 Expected surplus for job creation
The expected surplus for creating a job of type λ is given by the sum of the associated
expected profit of the firm and the workers valuation of the match minus the workers
outside option. For a permanent contract the expected profit of the firm is given by
ΠP (λ) =
∫ ∞
0
[∫ τ
0
[y − w(λ)]e−rtdt− fe−rτ
]
λe−λτdτ − cP = y − w(λ)− λf
r + λ − cP ,
(2.8)
where the inner integral represents the discounted sum of expected profits until a
random termination date τ , while the term fe−rτ is the discounted value of the
firing costs at this date. The whole expression in the brackets is then integrated
over the poisson process density λe−λτ that determines at which date τ a job
of type λ becomes unproductive.
Similarly a workers valuation of a job is given by
VP (λ) =
∫ ∞
0
[∫ τ
0
w(λ)e−rtdt+ Ue−rτ
]
λe−λτdτ = w(λ) + λU
r + λ , (2.9)
where U is the workers valuation of the outside option of the match. The surplus
for a permanent contract is then given by
SP (λ) =
y − rU − λf
r + λ (2.10)
The expected profit of a firm for a fixed term contract is the sum of the discounted
profit flow up to an endogenous date D(λ) and the discounted value of continuing
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in a permanent contract at time D less the cost of writing the contract cFT .
ΠFT (λ,D) =
∫ D
0
[ye−λτ−w(λ,D)]e−rτdτ+max (ΠP (λ), 0)·e−λD ·e−rD−cFT (2.11)
Note that in the discounted flow of profits up to D only the productivity y is
evaluated at its survival probability, while wages are only discounted with r. This
reflects that employers have to keep paying the wage until D if the productivity
shock arrives before the expiration date of the contract. Moreover, the continuation
value is simply the discounted maximum of either the permanent contract profit
for the same job-type λ or 0.
Similarly a workers valuation of of a new fixed-term contract is given by
VT (λ,D) =
∫ D
0
w(λ,D)e−rτdτ +max (VP (λ), U) · e−λD · e−rD + U(1− e−λD)e−rD
(2.12)
Lastly, just as for an open-ended contract, the expected surplus for a fixed-term
contract is defined as the sum of the firms expected profit and the workers’ val-
uation less her external option.
SFT (λ,D) =
∫ D
0
[
ye−λτ − rU
]
e−rτdτ +max (SP (λ), 0) · e−(r+λ)D − cFT (2.13)
In the equilibrium workers and firms will choose the optimal duration D∗(λ),
since it maximizes the expected surplus for a contract given λ. Hence D∗(λ) is
obtained from the first order condition of equation 2.13 with regard to duration D:
∂ST (λ,D)
∂D
= ye−λD − rU − (r + λ)e−λDmax (SP (λ), 0) = 0 (2.14)
2.B.2 Case 1: Equal bargaining power across contract types
In the equilibrium four conditions are satisfied.
First, jobs are only created if the surplus of a temporary employment contract
is greater than zero. The parameter λFT is the maximum shock arrival rate at
which jobs can be created and is determined by the point at which the surplus of a
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temporary contract with optimal contract duration is zero. To obtain this expression,
I substitute the first-order condition of the fixed-term contract surplus with regard to
the duration D from equation 2.14 into SFT (λFT ) = 0. As a result, the equilibrium
condition on the fixed-term job creation hFTJCR(λFT , θ, cFT ) is given by
hFTJCR(λFT , θ, cFT ) =
y − rU(θ)
r + λFT
+ λFT
U(θ)
(
e−rD
∗(λFT ) − 1
)
r + λFT
− cFT = 0.
(FTJCR)
Second, as jobs with a shock arrival rate above λP are not continued after the end
of a temporary contract, the fixed-term job destruction is obtained from the point
at which the surplus of a permanent contract is zero SP (λP ) = 0.
hFTJDR(λP , θ) = λP − y − rU(θ)− rcP
cP + f
= 0 (FTJDR)
Third, the parameter λE, which specifies whether jobs start with a fixed-term or
permanent contract, is obtained by equating the surplus of a fixed-term contract
at optimal duration with the surplus of an unlimited contract.
hPvsFT (λE, θ, cFT ) = λE
U(θ)
(
e−rD
∗(λE) − 1
)
r + λE
+ λEf
r + λE
+(cP − cFT ) = 0 (PvsFT)
Lastly, the fourth condition is a free entry condition for firms and equalizes the
expected surplus of a job with the costs of its creation κ.
hEC(θ, cFT ) = κ− q(θ)(1− γ)
[∫ λE
λ
Sp(λ)dG(λ) +
∫ λT
λE
ST (λ)dG(λ)
]
= 0 (EC)
The valuation of unemployment in the first three equations U(θ) is an increas-
ing function in the labor market tightness theta and is given by equation 2.2.
By substituting this in the three conditions, I obtain an equilibrium with the
parameters (θ∗, λ∗E, λ∗P , λ∗FT ).
Next I obtain the effect on an increase in cFT on these parameters by using
total differentials of the equilibrium conditions
1. Impact on job creation: The effect on λFT is calculated from total differentials
of the free-entry condition and the fixed-term job creation rule.
∂λFT
∂cFT
= −
∂hFTJCR
∂cFT
∂hFTJCR
∂λFT  
Direct Effect
+
∂hFTJCR
∂θ
∂hFTJCR
∂λFT
×
∂hEC
∂cFT
∂hEC
∂θ  
Equilibrium Feedback Effect
(2.15)
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First, note that the derivatives for the fixed-term job creation rule with regard
to cFT , θ and λFT are:
∂hFTJCR(λFT , θ, cFT )
∂cFT
= −1 < 0
∂hFTJCR(λFT , θ, cFT )
∂θ
= ∂U
∂θ
⎡⎣ −r
r + λFT
+ λFT (e
−rD∗ − 1)
r + λFT
⎤⎦
= −∂U
∂θ
⎡⎣ r
r + λFT
+ λFT (1− e
−rD)
r + λFT
⎤⎦ < 0
∂hFTJCR(θ, λFT , cFT )
∂λFT
= ye
−(r+λFT )D∗(λFT )[(r + λFT )D∗(λ) + 1]− y
(r + λFT )2
< 0
The expression for ∂hFTJCR(θ,λFT ,cFT )
∂λFT
is calculated using a derivative of SFT = 0
with regard to λFT and λP > λFT . The negative sign of the expression stems
from the fact that e−x < 1
x+1 for x > 0:
ye−(r+λFT )D
∗(λFT )[(r + λFT )D∗(λ) + 1]− y
(r + λFT )2
<
y 1(r+λFT )D∗(λ)+1 [(r + λFT )D
∗(λ) + 1]− y
(r + λFT )2
= 0
Second, the derivatives of the free-entry condition are:
∂hEC(θ, cFT )
∂cFT
= −q(θ)(1− γ)
⎡⎣ ∫ λE
λ
∂SP (λ)
∂cFT
dG(λ) +
∫ λE
λ
∂SFT (λ)
∂cFT
dG(λ)
⎤⎦
= −q(θ)(1− γ)
⎡⎣ ∫ λFT
λE
−1 dG(λ)
⎤⎦
= q(θ)(1− γ)
⎡⎣G(λFT )−G(λE)
⎤⎦ > 0
∂hEC(θ, cFT )
∂θ
= −(1− γ)q′(θ)
[ ∫ λE
λ
Sp(λ)dG(λ) +
∫ λFT
λE
SFT (λ)dG(λ)
]
− (1− γ)q(θ)
[ ∫ λE
λ
∂SP (λ)
∂θ
dG(λ) +
∫ λFT
λE
∂SFT (λ)
∂θ
dG(λ)
]
> 0
The positive sign in the derivative with regard to θ follows from the definition
of q(θ) as decreasing function of θ and from the negative signs of both ∂SP (λ)
∂θ
and ∂SFT (λ)
∂θ
.22
22Since SP (λ) = y−rU−λfr+λ it follows that
∂Sp(λ)
∂U < 0. Moreover the value of U is increasing in
labor market tightness. Therefore it holds that: ∂Sp(λ)∂θ =
∂Sp(λ)
∂U(θ) · ∂U(θ)∂θ < 0. Similarly, it also
applies that ∂SFT (λ)∂U(θ) < 0, which implies
∂SFT (λ)
∂θ < 0
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Together, this implies a negative direct effect of an increase of cFT and a
positive feedback effect. Saggio et al. (2018) show that the direct effect
dominates. Thus, the overall effect of an increase of the contract writing costs
on job creation is negative.
2. Impact on job destruction: The total differential of the fixed-term job destruc-
tion rule is
∂hFTJDR
∂λP
dλP +
∂hFTJDR
∂θ
dθ = 0 (2.16)
Since ∂hFTJDR
∂λP
= 1 and ∂hFTJDR
∂θ
= r
cP+f
∂U(θ)
∂θ
this implies that the effect of the
reform on the conversion of fixed-term contracts to permanent is given by:
∂λP
∂cFT
= r
cP + f
∂U(θ)
∂θ
∂θ
∂cFT
> 0 (2.17)
As fewer temporary jobs are converted into open-ended contracts and are
terminated instead when λP rises, job destruction also increases.
3. Impact on the type of contract at job start: From the total differential of
hPvsFT (λE, θ, cFT ) it follows that:
∂λE
∂cFT
= −
∂hPvsFT
∂cFT
∂hPvsFT
∂λE  
Direct Effect
−
∂hPvsFT
∂θ
∂hPvsFT
∂λE
× ∂θ
∂cFT  
Feedback Effect
(2.18)
The derivatives used in equation 2.18 are
∂hPvsFT (λE, θ, cFT )
∂cFT
= −1 < 0
∂hPvsFT (λE, θ, cFT )
∂λE
=
−λEfr ∂D∗∂λ (λE)e−rD
∗(λE)
(1− e−rD∗(λE))(r + λE) ≥ 0
∂hPvsFT (λE, θ, cFT )
∂θ
= −λE ∂U(θ)
∂θ
1− e−rD∗(λE)
r + λE
< 0
There are again a direct effect and feedback effect on λE, albeit the overall
effect remains undetermined this time. However, Saggio et al. (2018) show
that the direct effect is larger then the feedback effect if
λT <
y − rcFT
f + cFT
(2.19)
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4. Effect on wages: Wages are only affected through the valuation of the outside
option. The derivatives of wages with regard to the cost of writing fixed-term
contracts are:
∂wP
∂cFT
= (1− γ)r∂U(θ)
∂θ
∂θ
∂cFT
< 0
∂wFT
∂cFT
= ry
r + λ
[
−re
rD∗(1− e−(r+λ)D∗)
(1− erD∗)2 +
(r + λ)e−(r+λ)D∗
(1− erD∗)
]
∂D∗
∂U
∂U(θ)
∂θ
∂θ
∂cFT
+ (1− γ)r∂U(θ)
∂θ
∂θ
∂cFT
< 0
2.B.3 Case 2: Differential bargaining power across contract types
I now consider the case in which workers in temporary contracts can only extract
a lower rent from the match-surplus compared to permanent contracts. In this
case, the equilibrium conditions remain largely similar to the case of equal rent
sharing. However, as discussed in the main text, the valuation of the outside
option in equation 2.3 now also depends on λE. Thus the changed equilibrium
conditions for this case are
hFTJCR2(λFT , λE, θ, cFT ) =
y − rU(θ, λE)
r + λFT
+ λT
U(θ, λE)
(
e−rD
∗(λFT ) − 1
)
r + λFT
− cFT = 0
(FTJCR2)
hFTJDR2(λP , λE, θ) = λP − y − rU(θ, λE)− rcP
cP + f
= 0 (FTJDR2)
hPvsFT2(λE, θ, cFT ) = λE
U(θ, λE)
(
e−rD
∗(λE) − 1
)
r + λE
+ λEf
r + λE
+ (cP − cFT ) = 0
(PvsFT2)
hEC2(θ, λE, cFT ) = κ− q(θ)(1− γP )
∫ λE
λ
SP (λ)dG(λ)
− q(θ)(1− γFT )
∫ λFT
λE
SFT (λ)dG(λ) = 0 (EC2)
Next, I again use total differentials of these conditions to derive the effects of
the reform on the parameters of interest. In a first step, I separately evaluate the
reform effect on λE and θ if the respective other parameter remains constant. I use
a total differential of hEC2(θ, λE, cFT ) to evaluate the reform effect on labor market
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tightness. For a given level of λE the effect of an increase in cFT on θ is negative as
∂θ
∂cFT
|λE is constant= −
∂hEC2
∂cFT
∂hEC2
∂θ
< 0 (2.20)
This results from the positive sign of both the numerator and the denominator
∂hEC2(θ, λE, cFT )
∂cFT
= q(θ)(1− γ)
⎡⎣G(λFT )−G(λE)
⎤⎦ > 0
∂hEC2(θ, λE, cFT )
∂θ
= −q′(θ)
[
(1− γP )
∫ λE
λ
SP (λ)dG(λ) + (1− γFT )
∫ λFT
λE
SFT (λ)dG(λ)
]
+ q(θ)
[
(1− γP )
∫ λE
λ
∂SP (λ)
∂θ
dG(λ) + (1− γFT )
∫ λFT
λE
∂SFT (λ)
∂θ
dG(λ)
]
> 0
Similarly, a total differential of hPvsFT2(λE, θ, cFT ) can be used to evaluate the
change in λE for an unchanged level of labor market tightness.
∂λE
∂cFT
|θ is constant= −
∂hPvsFT2
∂cFT
∂hPvsFT2
∂λE
> 0 (2.21)
This results stems from the different signs of the two derivatives used
∂hPvsFT2(λE, θ, cFT )
∂cFT
= −1 < 0
∂hPvsFT2(λE, θ, cFT )
∂λE
=
−λEfr ∂D∗∂λ (λE)e−rD
∗(λE)
(1− e−rD∗(λE))(r + λE) > 0
Thus, an increase in the contract writing costs for fixed-term contracts leads to a
higher proportion of jobs that start in permanent contracts, if the effect of labor
market tightness is not taken into account. Together with the above result on the
effect of changes on cFT on labor market tightness this shows that that reactions to
the reform on λE and θ counteract each other. However, labor market tightness
still overall decreases, while the effects on the valuation of unemployment and
λE are not clear from the outset.23
Next, I use these results to analyze job creation, job destruction, the likelihood
that a job starts on a permanent contract and wages.
23See Saggio et al. (2018) for a detailed discussion and a graphical representation of the
interaction of λE and θ.
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1. Impact on job creation: Using the total differential of hFTJCR2(λFT , λE, θ, cFT )
reveals a direct effect of cFT on λFT and two feedback effects through λE and
θ.
∂λFT
∂cFT
= −
∂hFTJCR2
∂cFT
∂hFTJCR2
∂λFT
−
∂hFTJCR2
∂θ
∂hFTJCR2
∂λFT
∂θ
∂cFT
−
∂hFTJCR2
∂λE
∂hFTJCR2
∂λFT
∂λE
∂cFT
(2.22)
with
∂hFTJDR2(λFT , λE, θ, cFT )
∂λFT
= ye
−(r+λFT )D∗(λFT )[(r + λFT )D∗(λ) + 1]− y
(r + λFT )2
< 0
∂hFTJDR2(λFT , λE, θ, cFT )
∂λE
= − ∂U
∂λE
⎡⎣ r
r + λFT
+ λFT (1− e
−rD)
r + λFT
⎤⎦ < 0
∂hFTJDR2(λFT , λE, θ, cFT )
∂θ
= −∂U
∂θ
⎡⎣ r
r + λFT
+ λFT (1− e
−rD)
r + λFT
⎤⎦ < 0
∂hFTJDR2(λFT , λE, θ, cFT )
∂cFT
= −1 < 0
Thus, the first two terms still represent a direct effect that leads to a decrease
in λFT for an increase in cFT and a feedback effect that increases λFT through
a decline in the outside option as the labor market becomes less tight. However
the third term is a feedback effect that acts through changes in the likelihood
that new jobs are started with permanent contracts. If the reform leads to
an increase in λE this second term acts in the same direction as the direct
effect, as the increase in the share of new permanent contracts increases the
outside option which in turn leads to a decline in λFT . Moreover, Saggio et al.
(2018) show that in this case the expected overall effect is the same both for
differential and equal rent-sharing. However, if λE decreases the overall effect
on λFT is not clear.
2. Impact on job destruction: Using a total differential of the fixed-term job
destruction rule yields an indeterminate effect of the reform on λP
∂λP
∂cFT
= r
cP + f
[
∂U(θ, λE)
∂θ
∂θ
∂cFT
+ ∂U(θ, λE)
∂λE
∂θ
∂λE
]
≶ 0 (2.23)
3. Impact on the type of contract at job start: Similarly to the other case, a
combination of the free-entry condition (EC2) and the contract type rule
(PvsFT2) allow for a wide range of decreases and increases in λE.
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4. Effect on wages: Wages are only affected through the valuation of the outside
option. The derivatives of wages with regard to the cost of writing fixed-term
contracts are:
∂wP
∂cFT
= (1− γ)r
[
∂U(θ, λE)
∂θ
∂θ
∂cFT
+ ∂U(θ, λE)
∂λE
∂θ
∂λE
]
≶ 0
∂wFT
∂cFT
=
(
ry
r + λ
[
−re
rD∗(1− e−(r+λ)D∗)
(1− erD∗)2 +
(r + λ)e−(r+λ)D∗
(1− erD∗)
]
∂D∗
∂U
+ (1− γ)r
)
×
[
∂U(θ, λE)
∂θ
∂θ
∂cFT
+ ∂U(θ, λE)
∂λE
∂θ
∂λE
]
≶ 0
Contrary to the other case, if the overall reform effect on the outside option
is positive, positive wage effects are also possible.
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Evolution of the East German Wage Structure1
3.1 Introduction
Wage inequality has been on the rise in many countries over the past decades,
drawing a lot of attention among scholars and the public alike. Most of the
attention has focused on the United States (see the overviews in Katz and Murphy,
1992; Bound and Johnson, 1992; Card and DiNardo, 2002; Lemieux, 2006; Autor
et al., 2008; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). The dispersion of wages in the United
States had increased both at the bottom and top of the wage distribution during
the 1980s. Since the 1990s, log wage gaps between the 10th and 50th percentiles has
been largely flat; log wage gaps between the 90th and 50th percentiles, in contrast,
increased by 10 log points between 1995 and 2012 (Autor et al., 2016a).
There is still a heated discussion about the forces underlying these developments
in the wage structure – and whether these are specific to the U.S. labor market,
like the growth of high-skilled supply, or apply more broadly, like technological
change, to all advanced economies. A key question is about the role of labor market
institutions like unions and minimum wages in compressing the wage structure
(see e.g. Lee (1999); Autor et al. (2016b) for minimum wages; and Card (1992);
DiNardo et al. (1996) for unions) or, in accounting for the sizable cross-country
differences in the evolution of wage inequality.
1This chapter is co-authored with Christina Gathmann
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Contrary to the common perception that wage inequality remained unchanged
in Continental Europe, the prominent study by Dustmann et al. (2009) documents
that wage dispersion has increased in West Germany between the 1980s and 2004
as well. While in the 1980s wage dispersion rose mostly at the top of the wage
distribution, the 1990s also saw rising wage inequality at the bottom. The authors
provide evidence that most of the movements at the top of the wage distribution
are accounted for by technology driven demand shifts while movements at the
bottom are better explained by supply shifts and the decline of union coverage
in West Germany since the mid-1990s.
Interestingly, most recent studies on German wage inequality focus on West
Germany arguing that the East German labor market is structurally too distinct to
analyze the two together (Dustmann et al., 2009; Card et al., 2013). Alternatively,
other works study the German labor market as a whole and hence abstract from
any structural differences between East and West Germany altogether (e.g. Dauth
et al., 2014, 2017b; Dustmann et al., 2014). Dustmann et al. (2014), for instance,
document how Germany evolved from being the “sick man of Europe” with high
unemployment to Europe’s economic superstar with strong employment growth
even during the financial crisis. A third and entirely separate literature investigates
the economic transition of the East German labor market (see e.g. Hunt, 2002;
Orlowski and Riphahn, 2009) and its consequences for inequality (e.g. Biewen,
2001; Fuchs-Schu¨deln et al., 2010).
Even more than twenty-five years after unification GDP per capita, wages and
labor productivity in East Germany still lag behind, while unemployment rates
exceed those in West Germany (Burda, 2008; Burda and Hunt, 2011; Burda and
Severgnini, 2018).2 The lag persists despite sizable outmigration, in particular by
2A particular focus of macroeconomic studies has been on the question to what extent the
East German economy has converged to its perceived West German benchmark. Under ideal
conditions, in particular similar institutions, free trade and mobility of capital and labor, we expect
full convergence as production factors move to equalize factor returns across regions. Yet, the
speed of adjustment crucially depends on the savings rate and mobility of production factors. The
latter depends, among others, on the generosity of the social welfare system and hence, whether
individuals move out of an economically depressed region, for example Sinn and Westermann
(2001).
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young workers, from East Germany (Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln, 2009; Hunt,
2006; Uhlig, 2008) and despite large capital investments, which have made the East
German economy on average more capital intensive than the West German economy
(Keller (2000); Burda and Hunt (2011) or Burda and Severgnini (2018)). The
lack of convergence has lead many to label East Germany a second “Mezzogiorno”
mirroring the sharp division in economic fortunes between Northern and Southern
Italy (Sinn and Westermann, 2001; Uhlig, 2008).
It is unclear, however, whether East Germany experienced similar developments
in its wage structure than West Germany. Has wage inequality also increased in
East Germany and is it above or below West German levels? Furthermore, is the
East German wage structure shaped by the same combination of supply and demand
side forces than West Germany? Or, are there still peculiarities related to the
transition process that shape the East German wage structure? Most importantly,
while labor market institutions are uniform across the country, does their impact
vary with the underlying structure of the labor market? In this chapter, we provide
answers to these important questions.
Using detailed administrative data on workers and their employers, we compare
the evolution of wage inequality in East and West Germany over the past decades.
We begin our analysis in 1995 to abstract from the turmoils of the immediate
post-unification years when unemployment skyrocketed following the shut down of
many former East German firms; and wages were pushed higher than productivity
gains in East Germany to reduce the large wage gaps to West Germany (Akerlof
et al., 1991). This study asks what has happened in the East German labor market
in the twenty years after the initial turmoil.
The descriptive analysis reveals that the observed changes in the wage structure
in East and West Germany over the past decades have a lot in common: wage
inequality, irrespective of how we measure it, has risen for most of the period.
While there is almost no wage growth in the middle of the East or West German
wage distribution, there are sizable wage gains at the top and real wage losses at
the bottom. Since 2010, however, wage inequality leveled of and even reversed,
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mostly because of wage gains at the bottom of the wage distribution. Despite the
similarities in the overall development, there are also two noteworthy differences
between East and West: First, the wage distribution in East Germany is more
dispersed than in West Germany by the end of our sample period. The higher
wage dispersion is primarily accounted for by sizable wage gains at the top of the
East German wage distribution that exceed the wage gains at the top in West
Germany. Wage earners at the 85th percentiles gained 20% between 1995 and 2014
but only 13% in West Germany over the same period. The second difference is
that the decline in wage inequality after 2009 is much more pronounced in East
Germany than in West Germany.
We then investigate what factors explain the evolution of the wage structures
in the East; and to what extent these forces differ from those in West Germany.
We have five main findings. First, we show that the composition of the workforce
and selective entry and exit have little effect on the wage structure in both East
and West Germany. Compositional changes through educational upgrading and
demographic ageing have little influence on the structure of wages. Adjusting for
workforce composition matters somewhat more for overall wage inequality at the
top in both East and West Germany. East and West Germany have been subject
to different population and employment dynamics: East Germany lost about 10%
of its population between 1995 and 2010 though population levels have stabilized
since then. Further, East German employment declined by 10% as well between
1995 and 2004, while employment has increased again since. We first show that
the average labor market leaver is somewhat below the median earner, but above
the 15th percentile in terms of wages and observable characteristics. Similarly,
the average entrant after 2004 is also located somewhere between the 15th and
50th percentile of the wage distribution. Imputing wages for leavers until 2004 and
entrants since 2004 suggest few effect for top end wage inequality (the 85-50 wage
gap) and slightly reduces wage inequality at the bottom (the 50-15 wage gap).
Our second finding is that the decline of union coverage plays no role for the
rising wage dispersion in East Germany – though union coverage declined even
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more dramatically in East Germany than in West Germany between 1995 and 2004.
The main explanation for this surprising result is that union coverage rates are at
a much lower level at the bottom of the East German wage distribution, where
most work is in the service sector, than in West Germany. Hence, the plummeting
coverage rates do little harm to East German wages at the bottom in East Germany,
but are responsible for some of the wage losses at the bottom in West Germany.
As coverage rates increase at higher wage percentiles, wages at the top of the East
German wage distribution would have been even higher in the absence of declining
coverage rates. We find no such effect for top end wages in West Germany.
The adoption of minimum wages in selected industries, in turn, is the main
driver for the turnaround in wage inequality after 2009. East German wages are
about 25% lower than West German wages, while minimum wages are either uniform
across the country or only slightly lower in East Germany – making the effective
minimum wage considerably higher in East Germany than in West Germany. We
then show that the sector-specific minimum wages can explain all of the turnaround
in wage inequality at the bottom of the East German distribution since 2010.
While minimum wages also raise West German wages at the bottom, the effect
is much smaller in absolute terms.
We then turn to the demand side for explaining the stark increase in top end
wage inequality prior to 2010. In East Germany, a large fraction (about 35%) are
accounted for by wage differentials between education and age groups; and another
30% are accounted for inter-industry differentials. Hence, these two factors can
explain two-thirds of the rise in wage inequality at the top in East Germany; they
explain less than one-third of rising inequality at the top in West Germany. The
importance of between-group wage differentials is also reflected in the skill premium
between the high- and medium-skilled, which has been rising much faster in East
Germany than in West Germany until 2010. A slowdown in the supply of highly
educated workers plus an upward trend in high-skilled demand in East Germany, in
part explained by disproportionately high outmigration rates of young and skilled
workers, is the main factor responsible for the strong growth in East Germany’s
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skill premium. Finally, we show that two prominent demand side forces fail to
explain the rise of East German inequality at the top: routine-biased technological
change and trade exposure. While routine-biased technological change generates
employment polarization, it has little effect on the East or West German wage
structure. Similarly, the sizable expansion of trade, a key motor for Germany’s
strong economic performance and employment growth, has only small wage effects.
Hence, wage dispersion in East Germany, where the economy’s export share has
traditionally been low, is unaffected by trade exposure. The contribution of trade
to top end wage inequality is somewhat more important in West Germany with
its many export-oriented industries, but remains modest overall.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the data sources
we use to analyze the evolution of the wage structure. Section 3 provides several
stylized facts about wage growth and wage inequality in East Germany over the
past decades and compares it to West Germany. Section 4 analyzes whether shifts
on the labor supply side may account for the observed changes in the East German
wage structure. Section 5 assesses the influence of labor market institutions as
possible drivers of employment changes, while section 6 turns to the labor demand
side and the evolution of wages. Finally, section 7 concludes.
3.2 Data Sources
To analyze the development of the wage structure in East Germany and to compare
it with West Germany, we merge administrative data based on individual social
security records with additional aggregate data on trade, technology and labor
market institutions. We discuss the main data source here; information on the
aggregate data can be found in appendix 3.A.
3.2.1 Individual Social Security Records (SIAB), 1995-2014
Our main data are a 2% random sample of the population of workers and plants
covered by the social security system in Germany.3 We observe for each individual
3The social security data cover around 80% of the German labor force excluding civil servants,
military personnel and the self-employed.
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whether she is employed within the social security system or whether she collects
unemployment benefits as of June 30th each year. The panel structure allows
us to follow each employee even if a worker changes jobs or moves to another
plant or region. As we are interested in the wage structure of the East German
economy, we focus on individuals whose workplace is based in one of the new
states (including Berlin) or who draw unemployment benefits in East Germany.
We thus include employees originating from West Germany or abroad in our
East German sample if they are employed or registered as unemployed in East
Germany. We include employees originating from East Germany migrating to
West Germany in our comparison sample of West German employees. Below,
we investigate outmigration and commuting from East to West Germany as one
channel of labor supply adjustment.
The wage variable records the average daily wage for the employment spell that
contains the reference date (June 30th).4 Like most social security data, our wage
variable is right-censored at the social security limit. As wages are lower in East
Germany, the share of censored wages in our data is lower in East Germany (6.6%)
than in West Germany (13.6%). We impute censored wages under the assumption
that the error term in the wage regression is normally distributed allowing for
separate variances by year and gender separately for East and West Germany. We
convert wages to 2014 prices using the national consumer price index.
We also know the detailed occupational and industry classification (at the 3-digit
level) of each employment spell. We distinguish three skill groups based on the
highest educational qualification. A person is low-skilled if she has neither finished
a high school or vocational degree. An individual is medium-skilled if she has
completed an apprenticeship or graduated from high school (Abitur). A person
is high-skilled if she graduated from college or university. In the raw data, the
education variable is missing for about 20% of the observations and contains some
inconsistencies over time. We use the panel structure of the data to impute missing
educational information and remove inconsistencies using past and future spells
4Because employers are required to update records only at the end of each year, this variable
may capture wage changes that occurred from January to December of the same year.
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following (Fitzenberger et al., 2006). We keep the small number of observations
with missing education even after imputation.
We restrict our sample to individuals between the ages of 20 and 62. We exclude
irregular, marginal and seasonal employment, apprenticeship and partial retirement
spells. Further, we focus in our analysis on full-time workers, which we define
as working at least 30 hours per week.5 Finally, we restrict our analysis to men
for two reasons. The main reason is a change of reporting full-time work in the
social security records in 2011, which makes it impossible to define a sample of
full-time working women consistently over time.6 The second reason we restrict
the analysis to men is that our main focus is on the comparison between the wage
structures in East and West Germany over the past decades. Our analysis thus
deals with two dimensions explaining the changes in the wage structure over time
and regions. The differences between men and women would add yet another layer
of complexity, which we leave for future research.
Table 3.B1 in the appendix shows summary statistics on aggregate economic
indicators, industry structure and wages for the East and West German sample in
1995, 2004 and 2014. That the transition from a socialist to a successful market
economy would have to a long and ropy process can be gauged from the aggregate
economic indicators. At the beginning of our sample period in 1995, East Germany’s
GDP per capita was almost one-third lower than West Germany’s GDP per capita.
By 2014, East German GDP is still one-quarter below West Germany’s GDP.
Over the same period, employment rates have increased and unemployment rates
decreased – though they are still above West German levels in 2014. The lower
level of economic activity is also evident in wages. In 1995, median wages in East
Germany are 30 percent lower than in West Germany and there is little convergence
5While information on actual working hours is not available over the full time period we study,
the data contain a indicator for full-time and part-time work. A job is classified as full-time if
working hours per week correspond or exceed the standard working time for full-time workers
defined in the collective bargaining agreement of the firm or respective industry.
6Prior to 2011, transitions between full- and part-time work within the same establishment were
often not reported by employers. The change in reporting requirements in 2011 thus generated a
huge spike in the share working part-time in 2011 among women, but not men (see Ludsteck and
Thomsen, 2016, for a detailed discussion).
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in wage levels over the next two decades. In fact, East German wages in 2014
are still below the wage levels West Germany had in 1995.7 We do, however,
see some convergence in the industry structure between East and West Germany.
East Germany still has a smaller manufacturing sector than West Germany, but
the employment gap between East and West Germany has narrowed substantially
– from 18% in 1995 to 8% in 2014. The service sector has been larger in East
Germany, but the employment gap narrowed to around 5% in 2014. The East
German construction sector, which employed almost 18% of all employees in 1995,
has shrank to a more reasonable 9% by 2014.
3.2.2 Linked Employer-Employee Data (LIAB), 1996-2014
Our main data do not contain information on union coverage, which has been
shown to influence the wage structure in West Germany during the 1990s and
2000s (Dustmann et al., 2009; Card et al., 2013). To analyze how changes in union
density have affected the wage structure in East Germany, we rely on the LIAB, a
linked employer-employee data set. The LIAB combines the IAB Establishment
Panel, a large-scale survey of plants, with social security records of all workers who
were employed in the surveyed firms as of June 30 each year (see Klosterhuber
et al., 2016, for a detailed description).
The LIAB has surveyed plants in West Germany since 1993, but covers East
German plants only since 1996. As the IAB establishment panel oversamples large
establishments and small states, we employ cross-sectional weights for adjustment.
An establishment can recognize a trade union either by joining an employers’
association or through direct negotiations between the firm and the union. Therefore,
the union variable in the LIAB distinguishes between industry-level agreements,
which are negotiated at a regional and industry level, firm-level agreements through
direct negotiations between the plant and a union, or no agreement at all.
7There is some modest convergence between East and West at the bottom and top of the
distribution: wages at the 15th percentile are 32% lower in 1995 and 27% lower in 2014, while
wages at the 85th percentile are 29% lower in 1995 and 25% in 2014.
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3.3 Stylized Facts about theWageStructure in East andWestGermany
We start out with several stylized facts about the evolution of the East German
wage structure over the past two decades and compare them to the developments
in West Germany. Figure 3.1 plots commonly used measures of wage inequality:
the standard deviation of log wages to assess overall inequality. We further show
the log wage gap between the 85th and 50th percentiles (the 80-50 Wage Gap) and
the log wage gap between the 50th and 15th percentile (the 50-15 Wage Gap) to
trace wage inequality in the top and bottom half of the wage distribution.8 The
left panel of figure 3.1 refers to East Germany, the right panel to West Germany.
Overall wage inequality rises steadily in both East and West Germany between
1995 and 2009. The fanning out of the wage distribution comes to a stop and even
reverses after 2009. While the standard deviation of wages rose in East Germany
from 0.37 to 0.51 in a 15-year period (1995-2009), it declined to 0.46 over the
next five years (2010-2014). Comparing the evolution in the upper and lower part
of the wage distribution over time suggests that the reversal is explained by a
reduction in inequality at the bottom (the 50-15 wage gap) and a leveling off at
the top (the 85-50 wage gap) after 2009.
8All measures of wage inequality are based on imputed wages rather than censored wages. The
percentile wage gaps are not affected by the imputation as less than 0.1 % of the observations
below the 85th percentile are censored. The standard deviation of wages is by definition somewhat
lower for censored wages, but its evolution over time is very similar to that for imputed wages in
both regions. Results for censored wages are available upon request.
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Figure 3.1: Measures of Wage Inequality
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Note.- The figures plot three measures of wage inequality: The standard deviation of
log wages, the log wage gap between the 85th and 50th percentiles and the log wage gap
between the 50th and 15th percentiles.
Source: 2% SIAB Sample for male full-time workers between the ages of 20 and 62.
The most striking feature of figure 3.2 is that wage inequality at the top has
been rising faster in East Germany (left panel) than in West Germany (right panel).
While the 80-50 log wage gap was around 0.42 in East and West Germany in 1995, it
rises to 0.6 in East Germany until 2009, but to only 0.5 in West Germany. The higher
dispersion at the top is all the more noteworthy as East German wages are on average
about 30 percent lower than wages in West Germany (see table 3.B1).9 In contrast,
the 50-15 wage gap shows a similar development in East and West, though the rise
is slightly more pronounced in West Germany and shows no reversal after 2009.
To track real wage gains and losses across the wage distribution, figure 3.2 plots
the evolution of real daily wages at the 15th, 50th and 85th percentile indexed to
1995. Consistent with the rise in overall inequality, the wage distribution has been
fanning out in both West and East Germany over the past two decades. There is
little real wage growth (of only 2%) for the median wage earner in East and West
over the 20-year period. Yet, the top of the distribution has experienced sizable wage
gains in both parts of the country, while the bottom of the distribution suffered real
wage losses. A closer look reveals striking differences in the observed wage gains and
9The fact that wage inequality in East Germany exceeds that of West Germany at the top of
the distribution is not an artefact of censoring. The wage gaps shown in figure 3.1 are based on
imputed and hence, uncensored wages. Furthermore, we find a very similar pattern if we plot the
75-50 log wage gap, for which the share of censored wages is very small.
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Figure 3.2: Real Wage Growth at the 15th, 50th and 85th Percentiles
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Note.- The figures show real wage growth at the 15th, 50th, and 85th percentiles of the
wage distribution relative to 1995.
Source: 2% Social Security Records (SIAB) for male full-time workers between the ages
of 20 and 62.
losses between East and West. Wage gains at the top of the distribution are much
larger in East Germany than in West Germany: Real wages at the 85th percentile
rose by 19% in East Germany between 1995 and 2014; in West Germany, real wages
at the top grew by only 13% – or a third less than in East Germany. At the bottom
of the wage distribution, wages evolved similarly in East and West until about 2009:
Real wages at the 15th percentile declined by 12-14% in both parts of the country
between 1995 and 2009. After 2009 however, wages at the bottom recovered more
in East Germany than in West Germany. Wages at the 15th percentile grew by
7% in the East, but only by 3% in the West between 2010 and 2014. As a result,
over the whole period, real wages at the 15th percentile declined by -11% in West
Germany, but only by -4% in East Germany. The pattern of relative wage gains and
losses shown in figure 3.2 also explain why the 50-15 wage gap has been rising until
2009 (see figure 3.1): the rise has less to do with wage gains by the median earner,
but more so with wage losses at the bottom of the German wage distribution.
Our results speak against the widespread view that little has changed in East
Germany after the immediate post-unification period. On the contrary, wage
inequality in East Germany has increased even more than in West Germany between
1995 and 2014, especially at the top of the distribution. While the wage distribution
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fanned out continuously in both parts of the country prior to 2010, the development
has been stopped and even reversed in East Germany since 2010 – mostly because
of relative wage gains at the bottom. The reversal of wage inequality stand in
stark contrast to developments in the United States where wage inequality, esp.
at the top of the wage distribution, continues to increase.
3.4 Supply-Side Changes
The observed shifts in the wage structure may be influenced by changes in work-
force composition or by selective entry and exit through un- or non-employment,
retirement and migration. We analyze each of these factors in turn.
3.4.1 Workforce Composition
Table 3.1 traces the composition of the workforce and the wage structure in East
Germany across education and age groups. We report the employment share, the
85-50 and 50-15 log-wage gaps by education and age in 1995, 2004 and 2014. All
reported values are calculated using imputed and hence, uncensored wages. To
the extent that our imputation method does not fully capture the long right tail
in wages, the 85-50 wage gap might understate true wage inequality at the top
among the group of high-skilled. The corresponding table for West Germany is
contained in table 3.B2 in the appendix. The employment shares suggest sizable
educational upgrading of the East German workforce over time. The share of
low-skilled workers (without a high school or vocational degree) declines from
4.2% to 1.8% and the share of medium-skilled workers decreases from 80.4% to
78.5% between 1995 and 2014. The share of high-skilled workers with a college or
university degree, in contrast, increases from 15.4% to 19.7% of the same period. A
comparison with West Germany, reveals that East Germany actually has a more
educated workforce than West Germany – a legacy of its socialist past: the share
of low-skilled, i.e. individuals with no high school or vocational degree, is 3 times
higher in West Germany (5.8% in 2014) than in East Germany (only 1.8% in 2014).
Yet, the share of college-educated increased much more in West Germany – in fact,
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almost doubled from 10.5% in 1995 to 20% in 2014 – than in East Germany. The
employment shares further indicate that the East German workforce is aging. The
share of young employees (20- to 36-year-olds) in all education groups declines
from 42.5% in 1995 to 31.6% in 2014. The share of older workers (47- to 62-
year-olds) in turn expands from 26.6% to 41.5% over the same period. A similar
pattern is observed in West Germany (see table 3.B2). These sizable shifts in the
educational and age composition of the East German workforce may account for
the rising wage inequality if the dispersion in unobserved skills, for instance, and
hence, the variability in wages is higher among older and more educated workers
(Lemieux, 2006). Yet, table 3.1 shows that overall wage dispersion does not increase
Table 3.1: East German Wage Inequality by Education and Age
Low Education
1995 2004 2014 1995 2004 2014
50-15 gap 85-50 gap 50-15 gap 85-50 gap 50-15 gap 85-50 gap Employment Share
20-36 0.43 0.33 0.61 0.46 0.29 0.44 1.7% 1.2% 1.0%
36-47 0.34 0.34 0.73 0.38 0.42 0.46 1.2% 1.0% 0.3%
47-62 0.34 0.34 0.50 0.39 0.57 0.35 1.3% 0.8% 0.5%
All 0.39 0.33 0.67 0.48 0.41 0.50 4.2% 3.0% 1.8%
Medium Education
1995 2004 2014 1995 2004 2014
50-15 gap 85-50 gap 50-15 gap 85-50 gap 50-15 gap 85-50 gap Employment Share
20-36 0.28 0.30 0.33 0.39 0.31 0.39 36.9% 26.7% 25.2%
36-47 0.29 0.34 0.34 0.42 0.34 0.48 24.4% 30.0% 21.0%
47-62 0.32 0.40 0.37 0.42 0.34 0.46 19.2% 23.0% 32.3%
All 0.30 0.33 0.34 0.42 0.33 0.44 80.4% 79.7% 78.5%
High Education
1995 2004 2014 1995 2004 2014
50-15 gap 85-50 gap* 50-15 gap 85-50 gap* 50-15 gap 85-50 gap* Employment Share
20-36 0.38 0.32 0.45 0.36 0.41 0.28 3.9% 3.6% 5.4%
36-47 0.35 0.32 0.43 0.34 0.48 0.29 5.5% 6.2% 5.6%
47-62 0.35 0.32 0.55 0.36 0.57 0.35 6.1% 7.4% 8.7%
All 0.37 0.32 0.49 0.34 0.49 0.34 15.4% 17.3% 19.7%
Note.- The table shows 85-50 and 50-15 log wage gaps in East Germany both across and within age and education
groups as well their employment shares in 1995, 2004 and 2014. The results are based on imputed and hence,
uncensored wages. The star denotes that the the 85th wage percentile for the high-skilled is above the censoring
bound.
Source: 2% SIAB Sample for East German male full-time workers between 20 and 62 years of age
monotonically with education: instead, wage dispersion is highest for low-skilled
workers throughout the period and lowest for the medium-skilled. Medium-skilled
workers, however, experience a monotonic increase in wage dispersion across age
groups. The pattern of rising wage dispersion across age groups becomes more
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pronounced even for the low- and high-skilled (except the 85-50 wage gap for the
low-skilled) over time. Furthermore, wage dispersion within education and age
groups rises substantially between 1995 and 2004, but levels off or even declines
for most age and education groups between 2004 and 2014. Exceptions are the 47-
to 62-year-olds where inequality increases for all education groups over time; and
the 85-50 wage gap of the low- and medium-skilled 36- to 47-year-olds.
Hence, while compositional changes are likely to play some role, the evolution
of within-group inequality suggest that workforce composition cannot explain most
of the observed changes in the East German wage structure. The wage patterns
for East Germany in table 3.1 differ from those observed in West Germany (see
table 3.B2 in the appendix) where overall and within-group inequality have been
rising over the 1995-2014 period. They also appear to differ from other advanced
economies like the United States which has experienced a long-term rise in both
overall and within-group inequality (Autor et al., 2008).
We next assess the quantitative importance of compositional changes for the
wage structure using the inverse probability weighting approach by DiNardo et al.
(1996). The basic idea is to decompose the wage distribution in period t fc(w|t)
into a price effect and a composition effect as follows:
fc(w|t) =
∫
f(w|x, T = t)ψxdF (x, T = t) with ψx = dF (x|T = 1995)
dF (x|T = t)
The weight ψx reflects the over- or underrepresentation of the characteristics x in the
current period t relative to the reference period (here, 1995). Technically, ψx is an
an inverse probability weight computed from the propensity score of being observed
in the reference period conditional on observed characteristics. We estimate the
propensity score using predetermined variables only: eight age groups and three
education groups as well as a full set of interactions.
Holding the workforce composition constant at 1995 levels but allowing prices of
different skill groups to change, we then construct conterfactual wage distributions
for each year t between 1996 and 2014. Reweighting the 2014 wage distribution to the
1995 demographics, for instance, generates the counterfactual wage distribution if the
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demographic characteristics had remained at their 1995 level, but employees would
be paid according to 2014 skill prices. Note that the decomposition method abstracts
from general equilibrium effects by assuming that skill prices do not respond to
compositional changes. Hence, the reweighting approach does not account for
changes in skill prices resulting from relative supply changes, for instance. We will
investigate the link between skill prices and relative supply changes in more detail
below. Figure 3.3 plots the actual and counterfactual 85-50 and 50-15 wage gaps
for East Germany (left panel) and West Germany (right panel). Wage dispersion
would have evolved very similarly in both parts of the country over time if we held
the education and age composition fixed at their 1995 levels (the dashed lines).
Compositional changes matter more at the upper tail (85-50 wage gap) of the wage
distribution – both in East and in West Germany. At the bottom of the wage
distribution, in contrast, compositional adjustments play little role in East Germany
and almost no role in West Germany. These conclusions do not depend on the choice
of reference period: we find similar counterfactual wage gaps if we re-weigh to the
workforce composition in 2004 or 2014 instead (see table 3.B4 in the appendix).10
10Looking at individual quantiles, wage growth from 1995 to 2004 would have been slightly
weaker across the entire distribution when the demographic composition is held constant. Wage
losses at the bottom of the distribution would have been more pronounced (7.5% rather than
6%) and wage gains at the 85th percentile would have been 10% rather than the actual 12%. For
the 2004-2014 period, workforce composition has little effect on observed wage patterns in East
Germany.
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Figure 3.3: Wage Gaps Adjusted to 1995 Demographics
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Note.- The figures plot the (log) wage gap between the 85th and 50th percentiles and the
(log) wage gap between the 50th and 15th percentiles. The solid lines show actual wage
gaps and the dashed lines counterfactual wage gaps after adjusting workforce composition
to 1995 demographics. The left panel refers to East Germany, the right one to West
Germany.
Source: 2% SIAB Sample for male full-time workers between the ages of 20 and 62.
Figure 3.3 does not distinguish between- and within-group (or residual) inequality,
which is useful to tie down the underlying sources of rising inequality. We thus
perform the same re-weighting approach to 1995 demographics on residual wages,
which we obtain from a Mincer-type regression of log wages on three education
groups, eight age groups and a full set of interactions, estimated separately for each
year. Figure 3.4 reveals that compositional changes are somewhat more important
for explaining residual inequality at the bottom of the East and West German
wage distribution. Its explanatory power for residual wage inequality is with at
most 10% still modest, however. In fact, residual wage inequality at the top and
bottom still follows the same time pattern in both East and West whether we
account for workforce composition or not. As such, compositional changes cannot
account for the rise in residual wage inequality. As before, these results also hold
for alternative choices of the reference period (see appendix table 3.B4). Finally, a
comparison of figures 3.3 and 3.4 shows that residual inequality in East Germany
increases more slowly than overall inequality between 1995 and 2010: while the
overall 85-50 wage gap rises by 0.17 log points, the residual 85-50 wage gap rises
by only 0.12. Hence, between-group inequality plays an important role in East
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Germany at the top of the distribution. In West Germany, all of the rise in the
85-50 wage gap by 0.10 log points occurs within education and age groups. At
the bottom of the wage distribution, we observe the opposite pattern: all of the
increase in East Germany’s 50-15 wage gap is accounted for by within-group wage
differences. In West Germany, the overall 50-15 wage gap increases by 0.14 log
points, while the residual 50-15 wage gap rises by 0.11 log points – hence, changes
in wage differentials between skill groups account for about 20% of the rise at
the bottom of the West German distribution.
Figure 3.4: Residual Wage Gaps Adjusted to 1995 Demographics
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Note.- The figures plot the residual wage gap (in logs) between the 85th and 50th
percentiles and the log wage gap between the 50th and 15th percentiles. The solid
lines show actual residual wage gaps, the dashed lines residual wage gap after adjusting
workforce composition to 1995 demographics. The left panel refers to East Germany, the
right one West Germany.
Source: 2% SIAB Sample for male full-time workers between the ages of 20 and 62.
Overall then, compositional changes in the workforce can neither explain the
striking growth in East German wage inequality, esp. at the top, until 2010
nor its turnaround since then. We therefore turn next to the question whether
selective changes along the employment margin had an influence on the East
German wage structure.
3.4.2 Changes along the Employment Margin
East Germany, like many post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe,
experienced sizable declines in population and employment during the transition
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period. Figure 3.5, which plots population and employment of East and West
Germany relative to 1995 reflects this pattern. Note that the numbers in figure 3.5
refer to all ages (for population) and all employees (for employment). During the
1995-2014 period, the population in East Germany shrank by 10%. Between 1995
and 2009, East Germany lost about 100,000 inhabitants each year; since 2010, the
trend has been reversed and population numbers have stabilized. More than half
of the decline in East Germany’s population is accounted for by the substantial
net outmigration to West Germany as shown in the left panel of figure 3.B1 in the
appendix.11 Outmigration to West Germany came to a halt by 2014, however. The
modest population gains since 2010 are accounted for by inflows of international
migrants to East Germany (mostly Berlin) as shown in the right panel of figure
3.B1 in the appendix. The population in West Germany, in contrast, has actually
increased slightly between 1995 and 2014 as West Germany absorbed the positive
net immigration from abroad (except during the 2008/2009 financial crisis when net
migration rates were negative) and the net outmigration from East to West Germany.
Figure 3.5: Employment and Population
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Note.- The figure shows population and employment in East and West Germany. Em-
ployment is measured relative to the working-age population. The jump in population
between 2010 and 2011 arises from projection adjustments after the Population Census of
2011.
Source: German Federal Statistical Office.
11In addition, fertility rates plummeted after unification (see e.g. Chevalier and Marie, 2017),
but then recovered and reached West German levels by 2008. Since 2008, fertility rates in East
Germany exceed West German fertility rates (Arntz et al., 2014).
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Figure 3.5 further indicates substantial employment losses of around 10% in
East Germany between 1995 and 2004.12 Since 2004, employment has risen steadily
and, by 2014, East Germany has about reached the employment level it had in
1995. West Germany in contrast, saw few employment changes prior to 2004, but
a substantial increase since then. By 2014, employment in West Germany is 15%
higher than in 1995. In sum, the evidence suggests that Germany experienced
large employment gains since 2004 – but West Germany has benefited from it
even more than East Germany. The cause for this employment miracle is still
debated: A prominent explanation attributes the employment growth to declining
labor costs and wage moderation fueled by the decline of unions’ bargaining power
(Dustmann et al., 2014). Another argument points to the export industries as
motor for net employment gains (Dauth et al., 2016). Finally, several authors
have linked the growth in employment to the comprehensive labor market reforms
(Hartz I-IV) that were implemented in Germany between 2003 and 2005 (see Krause
and Uhlig, 2012; Launov and Wa¨lde, 2013; Krebs and Scheffel, 2013; Burda and
Seele, 2016; Hartung et al., 2018).13 For the purpose of identifying the sources
of wage inequality, it does not matter which of these channels drives employment
growth. What is important here is whether higher inflows influence the observed
wage distribution indirectly through changing workforce composition and earnings
potential. We analyze the direct influence of unions and trade on the wage structure
in more detail in the next sections.
The evidence in figure 3.5 clearly demonstrates that we cannot ignore changes
along the employment margin when studying the East German wage structure. The
decline in East German employment before 2004 might compress wage inequality
and overstate wage growth in East Germany, for instance, if those leaving the labor
12These employment losses were preceded by sizable employment losses following the shutdown
of many companies shortly after unification (Insitut fu¨r Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, 2014).
13Several authors argued that declining replacement rates in the unemployment benefit system
(Hartz IV reform) increased job finding rates through higher search efforts (Krebs and Scheffel,
2013) or through changes in firms’ vacancy posting (Krause and Uhlig, 2012). Launov and Wa¨lde
(2013), in turn, attribute the higher job finding rates to improved placement by local employment
offices (the so-called Hartz III reform). Hartung et al. (2018), in turn, provide evidence that most
of the increase in employment is accounted for by a decline in separation rates after the labor
market reforms.
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market earn lower wages than the average East German employee. The decline in
population, in turn, might have the opposite effect as existing evidence suggests
that outmigration was disproportionately higher among young people and the
high-skilled (Hunt, 2006; Uhlig, 2008; Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln, 2009). The
stark employment growth in both East and West Germany after 2005, in contrast,
might reduce observed wage growth and overstate the rise in wage inequality if
those entering the workforce earn below-average wages.
To better understand the nature of selection, we now compare the characteristics
of individuals leaving the East German labor market between 1995 and 2004 and
those entering the East German labor market between 2004 and 2014 to the average
East German worker. The top panel of table 3.B5 in the appendix compares
employed stayers (with a job in East Germany) between the 15th and 50th wage
percentile and at the median wage to all leavers (who were employed in East Germany
in year t, but not in t+ 1), and to the subgroup of leavers with a new job in West
Germany. The latter category combines migrants from East to West and commuters
who work in West Germany, but continue to live in East Germany. Leavers are
older and more likely to be high-skilled than stayers, while outmigrants are younger
and more skilled than stayers. In terms of wages, leavers including outmigrants are
close to the median earner in 1995; by 2004, leavers perform worse than the median
East German worker. Instead, leavers are located somewhere between the 15th
and 50th percentile of the East German wage distribution by 2004. Hence, leavers
become more negatively selected between 1995 and 2004, but never come from the
very bottom (below the 15th percentile) of the East German wage distribution.
The bottom panel of table 3.B5 compares those entering the labor market in the
2004-2014 period during the employment miracle to stayers. Here, we distinguish
between all entrants (who do not have a record in t, but a social security record
in t+ 1) and labor market entrants (who appear in the social security records for
the first time). Entrants are of similar age and much more likely to be high-skilled
than the typical employee (stayer) at the median or between the 15th and 50th
percentile range. Not surprisingly, labor market entrants are much younger and
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less likely to be medium-skilled than stayers. On average, entrants have lower
earnings than the median worker, but are located in the range between the 15th
and 50th wage percentiles both in 2004 and 2014.14 Not surprisingly, first-time
entrants have the lowest earnings but improve their relative position over time.
Overall, the consequences of the net employment losses between 1995 and 2004 on
the East German wage structure are not clear as migrants are positively selected but
other leavers negatively selected compared to stayers. In contrast, the individuals
who found new jobs during the 2004-2014 period are negatively selected compared
to stayers. As such, we would expect that selection into work overstates the rise
in wage inequality after 2004.
To assess the impact of selective entry and exit on the wage structure more
formally, we impute missing wages using alternative assumptions on the earnings of
leavers and entrants following the literature on the Black-White or gender wage
gaps (see, e.g., Johnson et al., 2000, Chandra, 2003, and Neal, 2004, who study
the Black-White wage gap; or Hunt, 2001, and Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2008, who
analyze gender wage gaps).15 We thus define a new wage variable, which is equal to
the observed wage wit for employed workers and equal to an imputed wage w˜it for
observations with missing wages. Our first approach exploits the panel structure
of our data to impute wages using an individual’s past (for leavers) or future (for
entrants) wage information. That imputation method assigns an imputed wage that
is close to an individual’s true earnings potential; yet, it only captures individuals
who remain attached to the labor market. The second approach imputes wages
based on observable characteristics (education, age and year). In effect, we assign
the mean wage within each cell to individuals with missing wages belonging to the
same education and age group in each year. This method will impute wages for
14The evidence that entrants after 2004 have lower earnings capacity than the median earner,
but do not come from the very bottom of the wage distribution is in line with Price (2018). He
shows that individuals who found a new job after the Hartz IV reforms earned 4-8% less than the
average employee but found few wage effects overall because of shorter non-employment spells.
15Alternatively, one could use a control function approach to correct wages for selection along
the employment margin. Unfortunately, a quasi-experimental setting being absent, it is difficult
to identify an exclusion restriction that would affect job finding or employment probabilities but
has no effect on the individual’s earnings capacity.
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many more individuals than the first method but will not capture differences in
unobservables. Our third method uses the information from table 3.B5 that leavers
and entrants are, in terms of their earnings capacity and observable skills, located
somewhere between the 15th and 50th percentiles of the wage distribution. We thus
assign wages based on the assumption that leavers or entrants are close to the median
wage earner; or somewhat negatively selected by assigning a wage equal to workers
at the 15th percentile. We view these two alternative assumptions as an lower and
upper bound of how selection affects the wage structure. The resulting 85-50 and
Table 3.2: Log Wage Gaps after Imputation
Imputation of leavers’ wages
1996 2004
50-15 Gap 85-50 Gap 50-15 Gap 85-50 Gap
No Imputation 0.33 0.44 0.40 0.53
Carried-forward wages 0.33 0.44 0.39 0.55
Imputation on observables 0.33 0.41 0.40 0.51
Leaver wages set to 50-pct. 0.30 0.39 0.37 0.48
Leaver wages set to 15-pct. 0.26 0.46 0.31 0.57
Imputation of entrants’ wages
2004 2014
50-15 Gap 85-50 Gap 50-15 Gap 85-50 Gap
No Imputation 0.40 0.53 0.41 0.58
Carried-backward wages 0.41 0.54 0.40 0.59
Imputation on observables 0.39 0.51 0.40 0.55
Entrant wages set to 50-pct. 0.37 0.49 0.38 0.54
Entrant wages set to 15-pct. 0.33 0.56 0.34 0.61
Note.- The table shows 50-15 and 85-50 log wage gaps including individuals who have
no full-time job spell next year (top panel); and the same wage gaps when the wages
of entrants in the East German labor market are included. Carried-forward wages use
the panel structure to impute wages; imputation on observables predicts missing wages
based on education, age and year. The last two imputation methods set missing wages
to the 50th percentile or the 15th percentile of employees in the particular year.
Source: 2% SIAB Sample for East German male full-time workers between 20 and 62
years of age
50-15 wage gaps using the different imputation methods are shown in table 3.2.16
For leavers, we start in 1996 so we can impute wages from past employment spells.
The top panel of table 3.2 shows that the 85-50 wage gap remains largely unaffected
16For West Germany, we present the same imputation procedures for leavers and entrants in
table 3.B3 in the Appendix.
82 3.5. The Role of Labor Market Institutions
by accounting for leavers independent of the imputation method used. This result
is not surprising as leavers come from the lower part of the wage distribution on
average. It is somewhat more surprising that there is little effect on the 50-15 wage
gap as well. The only exception is when we assign all leavers the wage of the 15th
percentile, which reduces the 50-15 wage gap by 0.07-0.09 log points (or about 20%).
For entrants, the bottom panel of table 3.2, we find very similar effects. The
imputed 85-50 wage gaps are a bit lower or higher than the observed 85-50 wage
gap but the difference is very small. For the 50-15 wage gap, we find deviations of
0.07 log points (or about 35%) when we assign entrants the 15th percentile wage
of stayers for non-employment spells prior to actual entry. In sum, selection along
the employment margin, if anything, overstates the growth in wage inequality at
the bottom of the distribution. Accounting for selective exit and entry along the
employment margin cannot explain the fast growth in East German wage inequality
at the top of the distribution until 2009.
Overall, accounting for changes through job leavers and the composition of
the workforce more broadly cannot explain the changes in the wage structure
documented in the previous section. We next turn to the question how labor market
institutions influenced wage inequality in East Germany.
3.5 The Role of Labor Market Institutions
How might labor market institutions help to explain the faster growth in wage
inequality in East Germany prior to 2010 and its reversal since 2010? Legally,
labor market institutions do not differ between East and West Germany. However,
because the institutions operate in labor markets that differ in their underlying
structure, they might have different consequences for wage inequality. During
our sample period, several industries have introduced sector-specific minimum
wages. Furthermore, Germany, like other countries, has experienced a significant
decline in union coverage over time. We explore the contribution of each of these
factors on the wage structure in turn.
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3.5.1 Decline in Unionion Coverage
We first assess whether unions and their decline play a role for the rising wage
inequality in East Germany until 2010. Several studies have pointed to the contribu-
tion of de-unionization to the widening wage distribution in the United States (e.g.
DiNardo et al., 1996; Card et al., 2004; Farber et al., 2018) and in West Germany
(Dustmann et al., 2009; Antonczyk et al., 2010; Fitzenberger et al., 2013).
In Germany, trade unions can negotiate collective bargaining agreements either
with employer associations at the industry and regional level or with individual
firms. If a trade union has reached an agreement with an employers’ association,
the negotiated result applies to all employees of establishments that are members
of the employers’ association, irrespective of whether an employee is member of the
union or not. While collective bargaining agreements between unions and employers’
associations cover whole industries, bilateral agreements between unions and firm
apply only to employees of the particular firm.
To assess the role of unions, we use the matched employer-employee data (LIAB)
combining plant-level information on the type of bargaining agreement with social
security records of all workers in that plant. Figure 3.6 shows a sharp decline in
trade union coverage until 2005 and a much more modest decline since then. In
West Germany, the proportion of employees covered by an industry-wide collective
agreement fell from 76% in 1996 to 63% in 2005 and to 57% in 2014. Collective
bargaining declined even more dramatically in East Germany: the share of workers
covered by an industry-level trade union agreement decreased from 59% in 1996
to 40% in 2005 and to 36% in 2014. The decline cannot be explained by inter-
industry shifts in employment; rather, union coverage declines in all industries –
those with traditionally high coverage rates like manufacturing and those without
like services (Antonczyk et al., 2010).
84 3.5. The Role of Labor Market Institutions
Figure 3.6: Collective Bargaining Coverage
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Note.- The figures display the share of workers covered by an industry-level (left panel)
or firm-level (right panel) collective bargaining agreement.
Source: LIAB Data
The right panel of figure 3.6 shows that firm-level agreements are generally rare,
but more common in East Germany than in West Germany. The share of workers
covered by firm-level agreements declines from 10-15% to about 8-12% since 2000
and remained roughly stable since. The patterns in figure 3.6 suggest that the decline
in union coverage might have its strongest impact on wage inequality prior to 2005
– and with a potentially stronger effect in East Germany. To quantify how declining
union coverage rates influence the East German wage structure, we again use inverse
probability weighting (DiNardo et al., 1996). We hereby focus on the period from
1996, the first year in the LIAB data, and 2005, as union coverage rates leveled off
in both East and West Germany thereafter. To construct the counterfactual, we
reweigh the 2005 wage distribution to reflect the 1996 level of union coverage. We
use a flexible specification including all possible interactions between the three states
of collective bargaining (sector, firm or none), eight age and three education groups
to estimate the propensity score. Based on the propensity score, we then compute
the weights. Note that the chosen specification accounts for changes in workforce
composition as well as differential changes in union coverage rates across education
and age groups. It is also important to stress that the reweighting approach is
flexible enough to allow for differential union wage premiums at the bottom and top
of the wage distribution. As before, the approach abstracts from general equilibrium
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effects assuming that these union wage premiums are unaffected by declining union
coverage rates. As existing evidence suggests that the causal effect of union coverage
on wages is close to zero, this assumption seems innocuous.17 Figure 3.7 shows the
observed real wage growth between 1996 and 2005 (the blue line) and the reweighted
counterfactual using the 1996 union coverage rates (the dashed red line).
Figure 3.7: Unionization and Wage Inequality
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Note.- The figures compare the actual change in log real wages between 1996 and 2005
with a scenario where unionization are adjusted to their 1996 level for both East Germany
(left panel) and West Germany (right panel).
Source: LIAB Data
The panel for East Germany on the left-hand side reveals a surprising pattern:
higher union coverage rates in 2005 would not have raised wages at the bottom of
the wage distribution. Quite on the contrary: The union coverage effects are positive
above the 20th percentile and strongest in the middle part of the East German wage
distribution. In sharp contrast, the pattern is the exact opposite in West Germany:
Higher union coverage in West Germany would have raised wages at the bottom
of the wage distribution. The effect on wage inequality declines above the 20th
percentile and becomes zero for wages above the 60th percentile. Why would low-
wage workers in East Germany not benefit from the higher union coverage rates that
prevailed in 1996? One potential explanation is that coverage rates are lower at the
bottom of the wage distribution than in the middle or top of the wage distribution.
17OLS regressions indicate a union wage premium of about 4-6% in Germany, while the evidence
using instrumental variable regressions suggest no return (Antonczyk et al., 2011).
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Table 3.3: Union Coverage by Wage Percentiles
Share of workers without union coverage
East West
Below 15 15 to 50 50 to 85 Above 85 Below 15 15 to 50 50 to 85 Above 85
1996 46.81% 23.89% 13.80% 14.49% 18.03% 9.41% 12.56% 13.23%
2005 65.74% 43.10% 29.37% 29.89% 38.27% 21.45% 24.54% 27.10%
Note.- The table shows the share of the share of workers without any bargaining agreement for workers
earning below the 15th percentile (‘Below 15’), workers earning between the 15th and 50th percentiles (‘15
to 50’), workers earning between the 50th and 85th percentiles (‘50 to 85’) and workers earning above the
85th percentile (‘Above 85’).
Source: LIAB data for male full-time workers between the ages of 20 and 62.
Table 3.3 shows union coverage rates in 1996 and 2005 for workers at different
percentiles of the wage distribution. The most striking feature emerging from table
3.3 is that union coverage rates are much lower for East German workers earning
below the median wage than West German workers. Almost half of East German
workers with wages below the 15th percentile are not covered by any collective
bargaining agreement already in 1996. By 2005, the share without coverage has
increased to two-thirds of all employees with wages below the 15th percentile.
To the extent that the weaker coverage translates into a worse bargaining
position during wage negotiations, the decline of union representation had little
effect on the bottom of the wage distribution in East Germany. Instead, the decline
of unions muted wages in the middle and upper part of the distribution (see also
DiNardo et al., 1996, for similar evidence). If coverage rates had remained at their
1996 level, wage inequality at the top would have increased even more. Overall then,
unions play only a limited role in explaining the evolution of wage inequality in the
East – in sharp contrast to West Germany where the decline of unions contributed
to rising wage inequality (see also Dustmann et al., 2009).
3.5.2 Sectoral Minimum Wages
Sector-specific minimum wages were first introduced in Germany in 1997. Since
1996, the federal government could declare collective bargaining agreements as
binding for all workers in an industry irrespective of union coverage. The main
intention of the law was to protect domestic employees and employers from foreign
competition by defining legal standards, among them a minimum wage. While
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the first minimum wages covered relatively small industries, several large sectors,
like temporary agency work, building cleaners or care and nursing, introduced
minimum wages between 2007 and 2013.18
We obtain data on minimum hourly wages listed in collective bargaining agree-
ments from the Federal Statistical Office (German Federal Statistical Office, 2017).
In 2014, the hourly minimum wage ranges from 7.86 Euros per hour in temporary
work to 11.92 Euros per hour in mining. The minimum wages apply to the whole
country in about half of the industries, while they are lower in East Germany in
the remaining 50%. The maximum differential in minimum wages for the same
industry between East and West is 15% for building cleaners. As wage levels are
almost 30% lower in East Germany (see table 3.2), minimum wages have been more
binding in the East German labor market. Sector-specific minimum wages are thus
a promising candidate for explaining the reversal in wage inequality, especially in
East Germany, since 2009. We restrict our analysis to the period from 2008 to
2014 as most sector-specific minimum wages were introduced over this period.19
We convert hourly values into monthly wages using 30 working hours per week
for our sample of full-time workers.20
18See appendix 3.A for a list of the industries. A national minimum wage covering all sectors
was introduced only after the end of our sample period on January 1,2015.
19As minimum wage industries are identified at the 5-digit level only, the restriction to the
2008-2014 period also help us avoid inconsistencies due to structural breaks in the industry
classification in 1993, 2003 and 2008.
20Assuming a 30-hour workweek provides a conservative estimate of the share of affected workers
if the typical workweek is above 30 hours.
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Figure 3.8: Sectoral Minimum Wages: Share of Affected Workers
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Note.- The figures show the share of workers potentially affected by a minimum wage,
i.e. with wages below the minimum wage in their industry in the following year. The left
panel refers to all full-time workers, the right panel includes wage earners up to the 15th
percentile only.
Source: 2% SIAB Sample for male full-time workers between 20 and 62 years of age.
Figure 3.8 plots the fraction of workers whose wage is below next year’s minimum
wage in their respective industry relative to all workers (in the left panel) and
workers with wages up to the 15th percentile (in the right panel). The share of
workers potentially affected by sector-specific minimum wages is much higher in
East Germany (6% of all workers by 2012) than in West Germany (only 2% of all
workers) reflecting the lower wage levels in East Germany. Compared to low-wage
earners the share of East German workers affected by minimum wages even triples
from around 10% to 30% between 2008 and 2012.
To explore the distributional effect of sector-specific minimum wages, figure 3.9
plots the wage distributions in East Germany (in 2008 and 2014) separately for all in-
dustries with a sector-specific minimum wage (left panel) and for all other industries
(right panel). The most striking feature of figure 3.9 is that there is a noticeable shift
to the right at the bottom of the wage distribution in industries with a minimum
wage. In contrast, the wage distribution is unchanged for all other industries.
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Figure 3.9: Wage Distributions in Industries with and without Minimum Wages
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Note.- The figures plot the wage distributions in East Germany for industries with a
sector-specific minimum wage (left panel) and all other industries (right panel) in 2008
and 2014. Monthly wages above 3500 Euros are omitted for better visibility.
Source: 2% SIAB Sample for male full-time workers between 20 and 62 years of age
Figure 3.9 indicates that sector-specific minimum wages are a good candidate to
explain the decline in inequality at the lower tail in East Germany. To substantiate
this claim, we again use the reweighting method to calculate counterfactual wage
distributions for 2014 if sector-specific minimum wages had not been introduced.
For industries without a sector-specific minimum wage, we use the actual wage
distribution of that industry in 2014. For industries with a sector-specific minimum
wage, we use the actual wage distribution above the minimum wage and the 2008
distribution for wages below the minimum wage. Our decomposition imposes four
assumptions: first, the method abstracts from spillover effects on other industries,
i.e. the adoption of minimum wages in one industry does not affect wages in
other industries. If wages in other industries were pushed up, however, we would
underestimate the contribution of minimum wages to wage growth. Under the
assumption of no cross-industry spillovers, we can use the actual wage distribution
in 2014 for industries without a minimum wage. The counterfactual wage density
for 2014 is then simply the sum of the counterfactual densities for each minimum
wage industry and the actual density of all industries without a minimum wage
evaluated at 2014 industry shares φi:
f(w|x, t = 14,m08) =
I∑
i=1
φifi(x, t = 14,m08)
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We further assume that there are no spillovers to wages above the respective
minimum wage in a covered industry.21 Then, the counterfactual 2014 indus-
try distribution is identical to the respective actual distribution for wages above
the respective minimum wage:
1(w > m14)fi(x, t = 14,m08) = 1(w > m14)fi(x, t = 14,m14)
The available evidence suggests some positive spillover on wage earners above the
minimum wage in selected industries (see Aretz et al., 2013, for evidence on the
roofing industry). In that case, we underestimate the contribution of minimum wages
to overall wage growth. A third assumption is that the counterfactual wage densities
in 2014, which would have emerged without minimum wages (or minimum wages set
at their 2008 level), are proportional to the conditional wage densities in 2008. Hence,
1(w ≤ m14)fi(x, t = 14,m08) = ψ(x,m14)1(w ≤ m14)fi(x, t = 08,m14),
where ψ(x,m14) is the inverse probability weight. The weight is computed from the
propensity score that an observation is from the year 2014 (rather than 2008) us-
ing three education, eight age groups and all interactions as predictors of the
propensity score.
Finally, we abstract from negative employment effects of minimum wages. If
individuals displaced in a minimum wage industry earn lower wages in a different
industry, we would observe a shift to the left, which would reduce the contribution
of minimum wages to the decline in wage inequality after 2009. Given that existing
evaluations of the sector-specific minimum wages have found few disemployment
effects, this assumptions seems again of minor concern (see Fitzenberger and
Doerr, 2016, for an overview). Based on these four assumptions, we compute the
counterfactual wage density for 2014 from separate kernel density estimates for
each industry in East Germany for 2008 and 2014. We then integrate the estimated
counterfactual density to a CDF and use its inverse to obtain estimates for the
counterfactual wages at the median and the 10th or 15th percentiles. We present the
21While Autor et al. (2016b) find evidence for some spillover effects in the United States, they
cannot rule out that these are due to misreporting.
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Table 3.4: Minimum Wage Counterfactual for 2014
2008 2014 Change from 2008 to 2014
Actual Actual Counterfactual Actual Counterfactual
10-percentile 1325 1475 1400 11.3% 5.7%
15-percentile 1468 1594 1550 8.6% 5.6%
50-percentile 2222 2371 2350 6.7% 5.7%
50-15 Log Wage Gap 0.415 0.397 0.416 -0.018 0.001
actual percentiles in 2008 and 2014 together with the estimated counterfactual wages
in table 3.4. In the counterfactual scenario, East German wage growth at the 10th
percentile would have been 50%, wage growth at the 15th percentile would still have
been 35% lower between 2008 and 2014. Even at the median, wage growth would
have been lower without sector-specific minimum wages.22 Sector-specific minimum
wages therefore account for a sizable share of wage growth at the bottom of the wage
distribution since 2009. Moreover, the last row of table 3.4 shows that the adoption
of sector-specific minimum wages can explain all of the decline in East German
wage inequality and the leveling of West German wage inequality since 2009.
3.6 The Labor Demand Side
While sector-specific minimum wages can account for the turnaround in wage
inequality in recent years, the fast rise in East German wage inequality, especially
at the top, prior to 2009 remains unexplained. Our next step is thus to identify the
type of demand-side changes that account for the growth in the 85-50 wage gap. To
provide some guidance about the potential forces, figure 3.10 plots several estimates
of the 85-50 wage gap: the raw wage gap, the wage gap after taking out observable
skills (education, age and their full interaction), the wage gap after adding 3-digit
industry fixed effects in addition to the skill variables; and finally, the wage gap
after accounting for 3-digit occupation fixed effects in addition to the skill variables.
22In West Germany, wage growth between 2008 and 2014 is overall much lower: only 4% at the
10th percentile and between 2.7-3.6% at the 15th and 50th percentiles, respectively. Using the
same decomposition as for East Germany, we find that sector-specific minimum wages contribute
a similar share to wage growth in the lower tail: sector-specific minimum wages account for the
majority of the modest wage gains at the 10th and 15th percentiles but play no role for median
wages.
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In East Germany (shown in the left panel), 30% (0.05/0.17) of the increase
in the 85-50 wage gap between 1995 and 2009 is explained by wage differentials
between skills. In contrast, observable skills cannot explain any of the rise in top
wage inequality in West Germany (shown in the right panel). Industries play an
important role in explaining the rise of residual wage inequality at the top. In
East Germany, inter-industry wage differentials (within skill groups) account for
about 35% (0.06/0.17) of the rise in top wage inequality; in West Germany, the
contribution is with 30% (0.03/0.10) only slightly lower. Taken together, wage
differentials between observable skills and industries account for 65% of the increase
in East German wage inequality at the top. In West Germany, in contrast, 70%
of the rise in top wage inequality occurs within skill and industries.
Figure 3.10: Raw and Residual 85-50 Wage Gaps
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Note.- The figures show the raw 85-50 wage gap, the residual wage gap (three education,
eight age groups and all interactions estimated separately in each year); the residual wage
gap after accounting for 3-digit industries; and the residual wage gap after controlling for
3-digit occupations.
Source: 2% SIAB Sample for male full-time workers between 20 and 62 years of age.
3.6.1 Wage Differentials between Education Groups
Wage differentials between educational groups are important to explain the evolution
of inequality at the top in East Germany. We first turn to the role of supply and
demand forces in shaping the evolution of skill premiums over time. As we seek
to explain the rise in inequality at the top, we focus on the skill premium between
the high-skilled (those with a college or university degree) and medium-skilled
3. Evolution of the East GermanWage Structure 93
(those with a vocational or high school degree). We obtain the skill premiums from
separate regressions of imputed log wages in East or West Germany on education
and age categories as well as a full set of interactions for each year from 1995 to
2014. We then compute the wage differentials between the high- and medium-skilled
using the average education and age composition of the workforce over the whole
period (calculated separately for East and West Germany). Hence, changes in the
demographic composition of the workforce through demographic aging, for instance,
cannot explain the observed changes in the skill premiums. The left panel of figure
3.11 shows that the skill premium for high-skilled workers has been rising in both
East and West Germany until 2010 and then declined sharply thereafter. Even
more importantly, the skill premium rises much faster in East Germany than in
the West: while the skill premiums are similar until 2000, the East German skill
premium for the high-skilled exceeds the West German one by around 5 percentage
points in 2010 and 2014. The higher growth in East Germany suggests one of two
things: a stronger growth in the demand for high-skilled workers or a slower growth
in the supply of high-skilled workers in East Germany compared to West Germany.
The evidence in table 3.1 suggests that the high-skilled share has expanded
more slowly in the East than in the West. To capture the influence of growth in
relative supply on the skill premium, we calculate relative skill supplies. We first
compute average wages in 1995 for each of 24 education-age cells (three education
and eight age groups) normalized by the average wage of the reference group (37-40
years-old, medium-skilled individuals).23 We choose the start of our sample period
in 1995 as reference year in order to abstract from potential demand side shifts
in later years. To calculate the labor supply of an age-education cell, we then
take the total number of employees in each 24 education-age cell in year t times
the normalized 1995 wage. The relative supply of high-skilled to medium-skilled
labor in a given year measured in efficiency unit is then calculated as the sum
23The results do not depend on the particular choice of the reference group. This skill supply
measure is similar to an efficiency unit representation of the relative supply of college and
non-college labor as in e.g. Autor et al. (2008).
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of high-skilled employees over all age groups in that year divided by the sum of
medium-skilled employees across all age groups in the same year.
Figure 3.11: Skill Premiums and Relative Skill Supplies
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Note.- The left panel plot the age-adjusted skill premium between high- and medium-
skilled men for East and West Germany. The right panel plots the relative skill supply of
high-skilled relative to medium-skilled workers measured in efficiency units.
Source: 2% SIAB Sample for male full-time workers between 20 and 62 years of age.
The right panel of figure 3.11 shows that the relative skill supply of high-skilled
workers has been rising in East and West Germany throughout the 1995-2014 period.
As the skill premium increased in both regions until 2010 as well (see left panel of
figure 3.11), the relative labor demand for high-skilled workers must have increased
even faster than the supply of high-skilled workers. Yet, the growth in the relative
skill supply of high-skilled workers has been much slower in East Germany because
of high outmigration rates of high-skilled employees and those planning to obtain
a university education prior to 2010. After 2010, the relative supply continues to
increase in East and West but the skill premium actually declines pointing to a
slowdown in the demand for high-skilled workers.
The corresponding skill premium and relative supply of medium- to low-skilled
(those without a highschool or vocational degree) workers is contained in figure 3.B2
in the appendix. The medium-low skill premium is much lower in East Germany
than in West Germany, converges toward the West German one until around
2009 and then declines again thereafter. The relative supply of medium-skilled
workers, which is computed in a corresponding fashion to the relative supply of
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high-skilled workers, is higher in East Germany, but grows at a similar rate in East
and West Germany between 1995 and 2014. The East German pattern is consistent
with a positive relative demand shift for medium-skilled workers until 2008. The
development after 2008 is consistent with the evidence above that sector-specific
minimum wages, by pushing up wages at the bottom of the distribution, reduced
the skill premium between medium- to low-skilled workers in East Germany.
To assess the role of relative supply changes on wages of different skill groups
more formally, we use an aggregate CES production function with high-skilled
(with a college degree) and all other labor in East Germany as inputs (see e.g.
Goldin and Katz, 2007, for a similar approach).
Yt = At [λtCρt + (1− λt)Nρt ]
1
ρ (3.1)
Moreover, labor without a university or college degree N is measured through a
CES-production function combining medium- and low-skilled workers as inputs:
Nt = [θtLηt + (1− θt)Mηt ]
1
η (3.2)
The shares of different types of labor are represented by the technology parameters
λt and θ. These parameters reflect, among other things, any changes in production
through technology or labor market institutions other than the aggregate labor
inputs modeled in the production function. The elasticity of substitution between
the medium- and low-skilled workers is represented by σML = 11−η . Assuming that
labor is paid its marginal product, we obtain
log
(
wCt
wNt
)
= log
(
λt
1− λt
)
− 1
σCN
log
(
Ct
Nt
)
, and (3.3)
log
(
wMt
wLt
)
= log
(
θt
1− θt
)
− 1
σML
log
(
Mt
Lt
)
. (3.4)
Equations (3.3) and (3.4) are estimated in two steps. We first estimate equation
(3.4) to obtain σML; we then use this estimate to compute the quantity of labor
without a college degree, which we use as input to estimate equation (3.3). In the
estimation, the first terms in both equations, which represent changes in technology
or the institutional framework over time, are substituted with linear time trends.
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To account for generated regressor bias, we bootstrap standard errors in the second
step. The estimates in columns (1) and (3) are negative, but only statistically
Table 3.5: Two-level CES Production Function Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
East West
Medium-to-Low College-to-Noncollege Medium-to-Low College-to-Noncollege
Relative Supply -0.106 0.273*** -0.0646* 0.269***
(0.103) (0.0807) (0.0353) (0.0507)
Time Trend 0.0114** 0.00284 0.00665*** -0.00747***
(0.00493) (0.00203) (0.00150) (0.00201)
Constant 0.378 1.012*** 0.324*** 1.046***
(0.314) (0.172) (0.0688) (0.104)
Observations 20 20 20 20
R2 0.616 0.932 0.970 0.871
Notes: The table shows estimates of the determinants of skill premiums using a CES production framework.
Columns (1) and (2) present estimates for East Germany, whereas columns (3) and (4) contain results for West
Germany. We estimate two-level CES production functions for labor with a college degree and those without a
college degree (shown in columns (2) and (4)) where the latter combines low- and medium-skilled workers estimated
in the first step (and shown in columns (1) and (3)). The standard errors in even columns are bootstrapped to
adjust for generated regressor bias in the second step.
Source: 2% SIAB Sample for male full-time workers between 20 and 62 years of age
significant at the 10% level for West Germany. The R2 for East Germany is only 0.62
compared to 0.97 in West Germany suggesting that there is substantial variation
left in the skill premium after accounting for a linear trend and relative supply
changes. The implied elasticity of substitution between low- and medium-skilled
workers is with σML = 10(1/0.106) for East Germany and σML = 15(1/0.065) for
West Germany very high in both regions suggesting that low- and medium-skilled
workers are very good substitutes.24 The estimates in columns (2) and (4) on the
relative supply and college and (composite) non-college labor are actually positive
and very similar for East and West Germany, which indicates that relative supply
shifts cannot explain the movements in the skill premium of high-skilled workers.
In sum, figure 3.B2 and the evidence in table 3.5 suggest that the slow growth
in high-skilled supply is an important driver for the fast rise in the skill premium of
high-skilled workers. At the same time, supply-side changes alone cannot account
24The CES production function combining low- and medium-skilled labor into one production
factor as in table 3.5 might be misspecified. Alternatively, we combine high- and medium-skilled
labor into one production factor and low-skilled labor into a second. Estimating this specification
in one step, we obtain coefficients that have the same sign and are of similar magnitude than the
estimates reported in columns (1) and (3) in table 3.5. Hence, that alternative specification does
not provide any additional insight.
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for the evolution of the skill premium because the skill premium (net of a linear,
skill-biased demand shift) rose even as relative supply expanded over our sample
period. Therefore, sizable changes on the demand side are needed to reconcile
the growth in the relative supply of high- and medium-skilled workers with rises
in the skill premiums prior to 2010.
3.6.2 Polarization and Routinization
While the demand for skilled, and esp. college-educated labor has been rising, a
substantial share of the rise in top wage inequality in figure 3.10 occurs within
education and age groups. Several authors have argued that technological change is
no longer skill-biased in favor of highly educated workers (Autor and Dorn, 2013;
Goos et al., 2009, 2014). Rather, technological change has increasingly automated
routine tasks, which are easily codifiable and repetitive. As routine tasks are typically
performed in the middle of the skill distribution, routine-replacing technological
change reduces employment and possibly wages in the middle of the skill distribution.
Employment and possibly wages rise, in turn, at the top, where workers perform
complementary, non-routine tasks, and at the bottom, where workers perform
manual and interactive tasks – resulting in a polarization of the wage distribution.
To assess the role of routine-replacing technological change for top wage inequal-
ity, we first track the task content of occupations along the skill distribution. To this
end we use task data from the 1997/98 wave of the Qualification and Career Survey
(BiBB), which has been previously analyzed by Spitz-Oener (2006), Dustmann
et al. (2009) and Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2010). We classify tasks into analytic,
interactive, non-routine manual and routine tasks and calculate separate measures
for East and West Germany.25 Sorting occupations by their experience-adjusted
median wage in 1995 and dividing them into equal-sized skill groups, we plot the
smoothed task intensity for the different tasks in figure 3.B3. In East Germany,
25We use the criterion-validated task measures following Rohrbach-Schmidt and Tiemann (2013).
The four task measures are calculated from twelve questions on the task content of jobs. Analytical
tasks include organizing, conducting research and measuring. We classify training, consulting,
buying, advertising and negotiating as interactive tasks. Non-routine manual tasks are repairing
and nursing, while routine manual tasks include monitoring and producing.
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routine tasks are important between the 10th and 50th percentiles of the wage
distribution; in West Germany, they are important for all occupations up to the
60th percentile. Routine tasks are least important at the top of the skill distribution
in both parts of the country. Analytical skills, in turn, increase, while manual tasks
decrease monotonically across the skill distribution. Interactive tasks are highest
at the top and lowest in the middle of the skill distribution.
If labor demand for routine tasks declines, but increases for non-routine manual
and analytical tasks, we should observe employment gains at the top and employment
losses at the lower and middle part of the skill distribution. We next plot smoothed
changes in employment for each skill percentile (defined by the experience-adjusted
median wage of an occupation in 1995) in East and West Germany separately
for the 1995-2000, 2001-2005 and 2006-2010 period.26 Figure 3.12 suggests some
Figure 3.12: Occupational Shifts Along the Skill Distribution
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Note.- The figures plot the relative changes in employment share for occupations along
the skill distribution.
Source: 2% SIAB Sample for male full-time workers between the ages of 20 and 62.
employment polarization in East (shown in the left panel) and West Germany
(shown in the right panel). Employment polarization is strongest during the 1995-
2000 period (the orange line) and starts to level off across the skill distribution
in later periods (the dark red lines). Figure 3.12 also shows important differences
between East and West: in East Germany, employment at the bottom and top
26We limit the time period to the period from 1995 to 2010 for two reasons: first, we want to
understand the rise in top end wage inequality, which reversed since 2010. Second, by restricting
the period of analysis until 2010, we avoid inconsistencies in the reporting of occupations in 2011.
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of the skill distribution grow by 10% between 1995 and 2000 and declines by the
same amount in the middle. After 2000, there is little employment growth at
the top of the skill distribution in East Germany. In West Germany, in turn,
there is no employment growth at the bottom, but strong employment growth
(by 15%) at the top between 1995 and 2010.
We next investigate whether there is any corresponding polarization in wages
that follows the same pattern as employment. Hence, we compute the change in
experience-adjusted occupational median wages for the three time periods along
the occupational skill distribution and plot them in figure 3.B4 in the appendix.
We find no evidence for wage polarization, neither in East, nor in West Germany
during the 1995-2010 period (see also Antonczyk et al. (2011) for a similar result).
Rather, wages at the bottom show modest losses in all of Germany between 1995
and 2010, while wages at the top grow, especially between 1995 and 2005. In line
with the strong growth in the 85-50 wage gap documented in Section 3.3 above, the
wage gains at the top are much more pronounced in East Germany: wages at the
top grow by 7.5% between 1995 and 2000 and still around 6% between 2001 and
2005. In West Germany, wages grow only by 3-4% on average over the same period.
Can we explain the rise in top wage inequality before 2009 by the employment
changes across occupations observed in figure 3.12? To investigate this question, we
again use the DiNardo et al. (1996) approach to re-weigh occupational employment
to their 1995 shares.27 The approach again relies on the assumption that the
observed employment shifts between 1995 and 2010 do not affect skill returns seems
to be satisfied given that we find no wage polarization (see figure 3.B4). Figure
3.13 plots the actual 85-50 and 50-15 log wage gaps and the counterfactual wage
gaps based on the re-weighted occupational structure. Changes in the occupational
structure play a minor role for the lower end of the wage distribution, esp. in
East Germany. Even more importantly, figure 3.13 shows that changes in the
27An alternative approach would be to reweigh by task intensities or a combined routinization
index (as introduced by Autor and Dorn, 2013). As these alternative measures are calculated
at the occupation level, occupations with the same task intensities would be assigned identical
weights in the DFL approach. Our approach is more flexible as we allow separate weights for each
occupation.
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Figure 3.13: Log Wage Gaps - DFL Reweighting to 1995 Occupational Structure
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Note.- The figures plot the wage gap between the 85th and 50th percentiles and the
wage gap between the 50th and 15th percentiles. The solid lines show the observed wage
gaps, while the dashed lines show the counterfactual wage gaps when the occupational
employment shares are re-weighted to their 1995 level. The left panel refers to East
Germany, the right one to West Germany.
Source: 2% SIAB Sample for male full-time workers between the ages of 20 and 62.
occupational structure play no role for the rise in top wage inequality in East
and West Germany between 1995 and 2009. Hence, routine-biased technological
change and the employment polarization of the wage distribution cannot explain
the rising wage inequality at the top prior to 2009.
3.6.3 The Role of International Trade
Figure 3.10 indicates that between-industry shifts account for a sizable share of the
rise in top wage inequality in East Germany. Globalisation with its accompanying
reorganization of production and cross-border value chains might be an important
driver of top end inequality during the 1990s and 2000s. Specifically, Eastern Europe
and especially China have been integrated into the world market over our sample
period. As a result, Germany’s open economy experienced an increased demand
for export goods and increasing competition from imports (e.g. Dauth et al., 2014,
2017b). Further, international trade affected some industries much more than others:
export-oriented industries (like automobiles or machinery, for examples) experienced
sizable growth, while industries facing import competition (like textiles, furniture
or toys) suffered employment declines (see figure 3.B1). While East Germany had
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traditionally a smaller export sector, employment shares in manufacturing, services
and construction have moved closer to West German levels over time.
To examine the impact of sectoral employment changes on wage inequality, we
re-weigh industry employment shares to their 1995 values using the DiNardo et al.
(1996) approach. We present both actual and adjusted 85-50 and 50-15 log wage
gaps in figure 3.14. Shifts in industrial employment shares have only a small effect
Figure 3.14: Log Wage Gaps - DFL Reweighting to 1995 Industry Structure
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Note.- The figures plot the wage gap between the 85th and 50th percentiles and the
wage gap between the 50th and 15th percentiles. The solid lines shows the observed wage
gaps, while the dashed lines show the counterfactual wage gaps calculated for the industry
shares observed in 1995. The left panel refers to East Germany, the right one to West
Germany.
Source: 2% SIAB Sample for male full-time workers between the ages of 20 and 62.
on the 85-50 wage gap. However, the re-weighting procedure abstracts from changes
in industry premiums over time. And as industry fixed effects explain a sizable
share of upper-tail wage inequality, we next investigate whether trade-related wage
premiums changed over our sample period.
To do so, we analyze how industry-level trade exposures to new trading partners
in Eastern Europe and China have affected manufacturing wages.28 Following Dauth
et al. (2017b), we define the export exposure of an industry as the annual share of
exports to new trading partners in its total exports. Import exposures are define
28The countries included for the calculation of the trade exposures are Azerbaijan, Bulgaria,
Belarus, China, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania,
Latvia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine
and Uzbekistan.
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accordingly. Our estimation of the effect of trade exposures on wages is then given by
wijt = β1ImExpjt + β2ExExpjt + γi + φt + ψJ + εijt, (3.5)
where wijt represents log wages of individual i employed in manufacturing industry
j in year t relative to 1995. The variables ImExpjt and ExExpjt measure the trade
exposure to Eastern European countries and China for each 3-digit manufacturing
industry in each year. To control for contemporaneous demand shocks, we implement
the instrumental variable approach of Autor et al. (2013) where we instrument
Germany’s exposure to import and exports from Eastern Europe and China with
trade exposures of eight other Western economies.29 All specifications also control
for year fixed effects φt, person fixed effects γi and 2-digit industry fixed effects
ψJ . We cluster standard errors at the industry-year level in all specifications. In
Table 3.6: Effects of trade on manufacturing wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
East West
Below 15 15 to 50 50 to 85 Below 15 15 to 50 50 to 85
ImExp 0.044 -0.1885*** -0.2822*** -0.0234 -0.111*** -0.1509***
(0.0758) (0.043) (0.0475) (0.0275) (0.0038) (0.0119)
ExExp 0.1115 0.1704*** 0.1633*** 0.1464*** 0.0587*** 0.1615***
(0.1114) (0.0453) (0.0564) (0.038) (0.0142) (0.0187)
Emp. Share Export Mft. 10.01% 11.22% 10.67% 8.82% 12.62% 22.24%
Emp. Share Import Mft. 6.56% 12.77% 11.14% 5.93% 12.52% 15.48%
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Person fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
2-digit industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 29,604 63,038 69,038 222,170 518,301 518,322
Within R2 0.0330 0.0824 0.0606 0.0240 0.1129 0.2819
Note.-The table presents regression of log wages on import and export exposures of 3-digit industries. We
split the sample along percentile categories and compute separate regressions for workers earning below the 15th
percentile (‘Below 15’), workers earning between the 15th and 50th percentiles (‘15 to 50’), workers earning
between the 50th and 85th percentiles (‘50 to 85’). We also report the 2014 employment shares of export and
import manufacturing for the seperate percentile categories.
Source: 2% SIAB Sample for male full-time workers between 20 and 62 years of age
addition, we have divided the sample into wage percentile categories, which we
calculate from the wage percentiles for the entire period. The percentile categories
are workers earning below the 15th percentile (‘Below 15’), workers earning between
29 These are Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, Singapore and
Sweden
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the 15th and 50th percentiles (‘15 to 50’), workers earning between the 50th and
85th percentiles (‘50 to 85’).
The results of these regressions are shown in table 3.6. Interestingly, import
competition has negative wage effects at the top but the effects are much stronger
in East Germany than in West Germany. In contrast, important competition has no
or smaller wage effects below the 15th and below the 50th percentiles. In contrast,
export exposure has strong positive wage effects at the top of the wage distribution
in East and West Germany. However, even the East German employee earning
between 15th and 50th percentiles benefits from rising exports. Between 1995 and
2014, the average export (import) exposure in East Germany increased by 12.6
(15.5) percentage points while it increased by 14 (16.9) p.p. in the West. Evaluating
the effect of trade exposures on East German manufacturing wages between the
15th and 50th percentiles implies a 2.9% decline in wages associated with import
exposure and a 2.1 % wage increase related to export exposure. Similarly, wages
between the 50th and 85th percentiles, export exposure increases wages by 2.5%,
while import exposure reduces wages by 4.3 %.
Overall then, the wage effects of import and export exposure are very similar for
East German employees earning between the 15th and 85th percentiles. Furthermore,
(export and import) manufacturing accounts for a comparatively small share of
employment, the growth in trade with new trading partners do not play an important
role for explaining the rise in top end wage inequality.30
3.7 Conclusion
Wage inequality has widened in both East and West Germany between 1995 and
2009, with wage dispersion in East Germany exceeding West Germany, especially
at the top of the distribution. Since 2009 wage inequality is no longer rising in
Germany and has even been declining in East Germany.
30Employees earning between the 50th and 85th percentiles in West Germany are much more
likely to be employed in manufacturing. Furthermore, trade exposure is associated with smaller
wage gains for wages between the 15th and 50th percentiles and large gains for workers earning
above the median wage. Thus, trade exposure plays a larger role for upper-tail wage inequality in
West Germany than in East Germany.
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Compositional changes of the workforce and selection along the employment
margin play only a minor role as does the decline of union coverage for the rise in
wage inequality. Conversely, the introduction of minimum wages in some industries
explains the complete reversal in wage inequality at bottom of the distribution
after 2009. Changes on the demand side seem to be at the root of the rise in
wage dispersion at the top. More rapid inequality growth in East Germany can
be attributed to the slow increase in the number of highly skilled workers, partly
due to strong east-west migration before 2010.
We also show that two major demand-side forces do not explain the rise in East
German inequality at the top: Even though routine-biased technological change
leads to employment polarization, it has little effect on the East or West German
wage structure. The trade exposure to Eastern European countries and China, on the
other hand, is far less important for the wage structure in the East than in the West,
due to the smaller and less export-oriented manufacturing sector in East Germany.
3.A Data Appendix
In addition to our main data from the social security records, we use several
additional datasets to characterize the labor demand side and minimum wages
in the German labor market.
3.A.1 Sector-specific Minimum Wages
To assess the influence of sector-specific minimum wages on the wage structure,
we obtain data on minimum hourly wages listed in generally binding collective
bargaining agreements from the Federal Statistical Office (German Federal Statistical
Office, 2017). From the reported minimum hourly wages, we then compute minimum
daily and monthly wages assuming a 30 hours work week.
The following sectors have introduced sectoral minimum wages: Waste man-
agement (January of 2010), education and training services (August of 2012), the
main construction industry (January of 1997), mining (November of 2009), roofing
(October of 1997), electrical installation (June of 1997), hairdressing (November of
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2013), buildings cleaners (June of 2007), scaffolding (August of 2013), temporary
agency work (January of 2012), painting and varnishing (December of 2003), the
nursing and care industry (August of 2010), chimney sweepers (April of 2014), se-
curity services (June of 2011), laundry services (November of 2009), stone masonry
and stone carving (October of 2013).
3.A.2 Task-structure of occupations
To track labor demand changes in technology and offshoring, we use information on
the task content of occupations from the 1998/99 wave of the BiBB Qualification and
Career Survey (also used in Spitz-Oener, 2006; Dustmann et al., 2009; Gathmann
and Scho¨nberg, 2010). The survey asks almost 35,000 employees in East and West
Germany about the content of their job. The East German sample includes about
7,000 observations, the West German one 28,000. The sample includes all workers
aged 15 years and older who work in regular, paid employment for at least 10 hours
per week. Apprentices or students working in a company were excluded.
Based on twelve questions about the task content of a job, we classify tasks into
routine manual, non-routine manual, analytic and interactive tasks. Analytical tasks
include organizing, conducting research and measuring. We classify training, consult-
ing, buying, advertising and negotiating as interactive tasks. Non-routine manual
tasks are repairing and nursing, while routine manual tasks include monitoring
and producing. We then calculate each task measure using the criterion-validated
method following Rohrbach-Schmidt and Tiemann (2013).
3.A.3 Trade Exposure
To track the influence of trade on the wage structure, we combine the social
security records with aggregate data on trade exposure at the 3-digit industry level.
The trade data come from the BACI international trade database (see Gaulier
and Zignago, 2010, for a detailed description), a harmonized version of the UN
COMTRADE database. The data contain information on trade flows between 150
countries for more than 5000 products using the SITC rev. 2/3 classification. Using
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a correspondence table between SITC and 3-digit NACE codes, we then calculate
industry-level trade-flows between countries for 92 percent of all products. We
focus attention to trade in manufacturing and thus drop trade in raw materials and
agricultural goods. All import and export flows are converted to 2014 prices.
We then calculate industry-level export and import intensities for Germany’s
new trading partners in Central and Eastern Europe whose markets became acces-
sible after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Specifically, the trading partners include:
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Belarus, China, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The import
(export) intensities are defined as the share of annual imports (exports) relative to to-
tal industry-specific German imports (exports) (see Dauth et al., 2017b, for details).
3.B Additional Results
Figure 3.B1: Net Migration between East and West Germany and from Abroad
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Note.- The left panel shows internal net migration between East and West Germany as
well as Berlin between 1995 and 2014. The right panel shows net migration to Germany
since 1995 and separately to East and West Germany as well as Berlin since 1997.
Source: Federal Statistical Office.
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Figure 3.B2: Skill Premium and Relative Skill Supplies of Medium- to Low-skilled
Workers
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Note.- The left panel plot the age-adjusted skill premium between medium- and low-
skilled men for East and West Germany. The right panel plots the relative skill supply of
medium-skilled relative to low-skilled workers measured in efficiency units.
Source: 2% SIAB Sample for male full-time workers between the ages of 20 and 62.
Figure 3.B3: Occupational task inputs
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Note.- The figures plots along task inputs across the occupational skill distribution.
Source: 2% SIAB Sample for male full-time workers between the ages of 20 and 62.
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Figure 3.B4: Occupational median wage shifts along the skill distribution
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Note.- The figures plot the change in occupational median wages along the skill distribu-
tion.
Source: 2% SIAB Sample for male full-time workers between the ages of 20 and 62.
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Table 3.B1: Summary Statistics
Monthly Wages
East West
1995 2004 2014 1995 2004 2014
Mean 2598 2733 2836 3668 3822 3883
Standard Deviation 1069 1403 1470 1427 1844 1955
15-percentile 1696 1593 1620 2492 2345 2220
50-percentile 2350 2368 2400 3334 3368 3420
85-percentile 3606 4039 4290 5045 5473 5700
Sectoral Employment Shares
East West
1995 2004 2014 1995 2004 2014
Export Manufacturing 7.63% 10.14% 10.88% 17.93% 18.04% 17.40%
Import Manufacturing 9.71% 10.50% 10.98% 17.49% 14.72% 13.04%
Services 60.77% 66.24% 66.38% 52.66% 58.42% 61.20%
Construction 17.57% 10.03% 9.03% 9.08% 6.57% 6.30%
Other 4.33% 3.10% 2.74% 2.84% 2.25% 2.06%
Aggregate Variables
East West
1995 2004 2014 1995 2004 2014
GDP per capita 21830 23825 27618 32180 33571 36898
Unemployment rate 13.90% 18.40% 9.80% 8.10% 8.50% 5.90%
Employment rate 43.99% 41.69% 47.77% 44.25% 43.63% 49.77%
Note.- The table shows summary statistics of wages, sectoral composition and aggregate
indicators of economic activity for East and West Germany in 1995, 2004 and 2014. The
employment rate is calculated relative to the total population in each region and year.To
do so, we divide the manufacturing sector into export- and import-intensive industries. We
subdivide the manufacturing sector into import and export manufacturing. Following Dauth
et al. (2017a), we define export manufacturing if the change in net exports to the trading
partners from Eastern Europe and China was above the median change for manufacturing as a
whole between 1995 and 2014. The new trading partners included are Azerbaijan, Bulgaria,
Belarus, China, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Similarly, manufacturing industries are import-
intensive if their net exports are below the median change for manufacturing as a whole
over the same period.
Source: 2% SIAB Sample for German male full-time workers between 20 and 62 years of age
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Table 3.B2: West German Wage Inequality by Education and Age
Low Education
1995 2004 2014 1995 2004 2014
50-15 gap 85-50 gap 50-15 gap 85-50 gap 50-15 gap 85-50 gap Employment Share
20-36 0.32 0.23 0.53 0.34 0.39 0.37 5.0% 2.9% 1.9%
37-47 0.24 0.23 0.34 0.25 0.45 0.32 4.2% 3.6% 1.5%
48-62 0.22 0.23 0.28 0.24 0.39 0.27 4.2% 2.9% 2.3%
All 0.28 0.22 0.45 0.27 0.46 0.33 13.5% 9.4% 5.8%
Medium Education
1995 2004 2014 1995 2004 2014
50-15 gap 85-50 gap* 50-15 gap 85-50 gap* 50-15 gap 85-50 gap* Employment Share
20-36 0.25 0.28 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.35 32.1% 24.2% 21.3%
37-47 0.27 0.35 0.31 0.37 0.37 0.42 23.9% 30.9% 23.2%
48-62 0.28 0.38 0.32 0.43 0.38 0.43 20.1% 20.4% 29.6%
All 0.27 0.36 0.33 0.38 0.37 0.42 76.1% 75.5% 74.1%
High Education
1995 2004 2014 1995 2004 2014
50-15 gap* 85-50 gap* 50-15 gap* 85-50 gap* 50-15 gap* 85-50 gap* Employment Share
20-36 0.29 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.33 3.8% 3.9% 5.1%
37-47 0.31 0.30 0.36 0.39 0.40 0.36 4.2% 7.5% 7.4%
48-62 0.26 0.28 0.39 0.38 0.42 0.39 2.5% 3.7% 7.7%
All 0.35 0.33 0.39 0.40 0.43 0.40 10.5% 15.1% 20.1%
Note.- The table shows 85-50 and 50-15 log wage gaps in West Germany both across and within age and education
groups as well their employment shares in 1995, 2004 and 2014. The results are based on imputed and hence, uncensored
wages. The star denotes that the the 85th wage percentile for the high-skilled is above the censoring bound.
Source: 2% SIAB Sample for East German male full-time workers between 20 and 62 years of age
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Table 3.B3: Log Wage Gaps after Imputation - West Germany
Imputation of leavers’ wages
1996 2004
50-15 Gap 85-50 Gap 50-15 Gap 85-50 Gap
No Imputation 0.29 0.42 0.36 0.49
Carried-forward wages 0.31 0.42 0.38 0.49
Imputation on observables 0.28 0.40 0.35 0.46
Leaver wages set to 50-pct. 0.27 0.39 0.33 0.45
Leaver wages set to 15-pct. 0.25 0.43 0.31 0.50
Imputation of entrants’ wages
2004 2014
50-15 Gap 85-50 Gap 50-15 Gap 85-50 Gap
No Imputation 0.36 0.49 0.43 0.51
Carried-backward wages 0.39 0.49 0.45 0.52
Imputation on observables 0.35 0.47 0.41 0.49
Entrant wages set to 50-pct. 0.34 0.45 0.40 0.48
Entrant wages set to 15-pct. 0.32 0.50 0.38 0.54
Note.- The table shows 50-15 and 85-50 log wage gaps including individuals who have
no full-time job spell next year (top panel); and the same wage gaps when the wages
of entrants in the West German labor market are included. Carried-forward wages use
the panel structure to impute wages; imputation on observables predicts missing wages
based on education, age and year. The last two imputation methods set missing wages
to the 50th percentile or the 15th percentile of employees in the particular year.
Source: 2% SIAB Sample for West German male full-time workers between 20 and 62
years of age
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Table 3.B4: Demographic Adjustments and Change in Log Wage Gaps
Change in 50-15 Log Wage Gap
Overall Log Wage Gap Residual Log Wage Gap
1995-2004 2004-2014 1995-2014 1995-2004 2004-2014 1995-2014
Actual 0.070 -0.003 0.067 0.046 0.001 0.047
1995 demographics 0.049 0.011 0.060 0.028 0.000 0.028
2004 demographics 0.070 0.009 0.079 0.048 -0.001 0.047
2014 demographics 0.075 -0.016 0.060 0.050 -0.027 0.023
Change in 85-50 Log Wage Gap
Overall Log Wage Gap Residual Log Wage Gap
1995-2004 2004-2014 1995-2014 1995-2004 2004-2014 1995-2014
Actual 0.106 0.047 0.153 0.079 0.025 0.104
1995 demographics 0.087 0.018 0.105 0.065 0.020 0.085
2004 demographics 0.112 0.041 0.153 0.077 0.026 0.103
2014 demographics 0.100 0.021 0.121 0.074 0.015 0.089
Note.-The table shows the evolution of total and residual log wage gaps for the periods from 1995 to
2004, 2004 to 2014 and 1995 to 2014. We present both the actual change in wage gaps and changes in
wage gaps where demographics are adjusting to the workforce composition of 1995, 2004 and 2014.
Source: 2% SIAB Sample for East German male full-time workers between 20 and 62 years of age
Table 3.B5: Entrant and Leaver Characteristics
1995 2004
Stayers Leavers Stayers Leavers
15 to 50 Pct. Median Overall Outmigrants 15 to 50 Pct. Median Overall Outmigrants
Mean Wage 2026 2350 2427 2367 1973 2368 2253 2146
Std. Dev. Wage 180 1116 1177 210 1272 1287
Mean Residual Wage 2309 2539 2472 2611 2205 2598 2301 2370
Std. Dev. Residual Wage 429 529 936 952 454 295 1080 1029
Share Low-Skilled 4.0% 2.7% 5.7% 3.8% 2.4% 1.5% 5.6% 7.0%
Share Medium-Skilled 92.3% 89.1% 77.4% 82.2% 93.4% 96.9% 78.4% 80.8%
Share High-Skilled 3.7% 8.2% 16.9% 14.1% 4.3% 1.5% 16.0% 12.2%
Mean Age 38.31 39.06 42.11 32.14 40.29 40.82 42.90 34.79
Std. Dev. Age 10.46 10.26 12.42 8.95 10.28 8.98 12.25 9.84
2004 2014
Stayers Entrants Stayers Entrants
15 to 50 Pct. Median Overall First Entrants 15 to 50 Pct. Median Overall First Entrants
Mean Wage 1973 2368 2079 1761 1986 2400 2286 2088
Std. Dev. Wage 210 1111 989 208 1251 1030
Mean Residual Wage 2205 2598 2167 2309 2210 2563 2307 2443
Std. Dev. Residual Wage 454 295 1006 872 441 476 1087 858
Share Low-Skilled 2.4% 1.5% 3.4% 13.8% 1.6% 2.1% 2.3% 8.6%
Share Medium-Skilled 93.4% 96.9% 83.7% 72.9% 94.0% 90.5% 80.6% 65.2%
Share High-Skilled 4.3% 1.5% 12.9% 13.3% 4.4% 7.4% 17.0% 26.3%
Mean Age 40.29 40.82 40.23 26.73 42.13 42.17 41.16 28.78
Std. Dev. Age 10.28 8.98 10.08 8.56 11.37 11.02 10.80 7.82
Note.- The table displays the characteristics of labor market leavers, entrants and stayers. The upper panel compares east German labor
market stayers between the 15th and 50th wage percentile and at the median wage with all leavers (who were employed in East Germany in
the year t, but not in t+ 1) and with a subgroup of leavers with a new job in West Germany in a later year both for the years 1995 and 2004.
The bottom panel compares labor market entrants (who do not have a record in t, but a social security record in t+ 1) in the 2004-2014 to
stayers. We distinguish between all entrants and first entrants (who appear in the social security records for the first time).
Source: 2% SIAB Sample for East German male full-time workers between 20 and 62 years of age
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A Novel Approach to Estimate Labor Supply Elasticities:
Combining Data from Actual and Hypothetical Choice1
4.1 Introduction
The preference for leisure which characterizes how individuals trade off working
time and income is a key parameter for economic policy. The income-leisure tradeoff
not only determines retirement choices among older workers but also the labor
supply responses to social transfers (see Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). It is also
an important parameter to assess the welfare costs of taxation (e.g. Saez, 2002;
Prescott, 2004; Alesina et al., 2005)
A vast literature has estimated labor supply elasticities at the extensive and
intensive margin using a variety of empirical approaches. By and large, the profession
has settled on a value for the compensated intensive margin elasticity close to zero for
prime-age males and somewhat higher for married women. There is also a consensus
that intensive margin elasticities are smaller than extensive margin elasticities (see
e.g.the surveys in Pencavel, 1986; Heckman, 1993; Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999;
Meghir and Phillips, 2010; Keane, 2011).
Recently, a number of authors have questioned the above consensus (e.g. Keane,
2011; Meghir and Phillips, 2010; Pencavel, 2016). Building on earlier contributions,
they argue that popular empirical approaches may not identify the preference for
1This chapter is co-authored with Christina Gathmann
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leisure after all. Instead, the estimates identify an equilibrium parameter that is
composed of both preferences and frictions. Frictions can emerge both on the supply
and the demand side. On the labor supply side, for instance, optimization errors due
to rational inattention, inertia or switching costs might reduce the responsiveness
of workers to changes in wages or taxes. On the labor demand side, firms might be
constrained to offer certain bundles of working hours and wages to their employees.
In this last case, the response of one worker to tax or wage changes not only depends
on her taste for leisure but also upon the flexibility of the production function.
These frictions drive a wedge between the behavioral elasticity which matters
for long-run welfare and the observed elasticity which is often estimated from
short-run variation in wages or taxes (e.g. Chetty et al., 2012). Such a wedge has
important consequences for policy. The efficiency cost of a tax levied on a worker,
for example, then depends not just upon on her labor supply elasticity but also upon
the production process in case of demand side frictions. Similarly, the consensus
that it is optimal to levy higher tax rates on men than women because they are
less elastic (see e.g. Alesina et al., 2011) might no longer hold if the difference
in observed elasticities across genders is caused by heterogeneity in occupational
frictions on the demand side rather than tastes on the supply side. And yet, most
approaches in the literature ignore supply and demand side frictions, leading to
downward biased estimates of behavioral elasticities.
Recent evidence suggests however, that frictions are an important part of
observed responses to taxes or transfers (see Chetty et al., 2011; Chetty, 2012; Gelber
et al., 2013; Kleven and Waseem, 2013). These studies use nonlinearities (kinks)
or discontinuities (notches) in the tax system to identify labor supply responses.
In most cases however, these kinks or notches (or their disappearance) only affect
a relatively small share of the working population. Due to heterogeneity in labor
supply responses across individuals, local elasticities may differ from population
parameters typically needed to evaluate the steady-state effects of tax and transfer
policies at the national level (Manski, 2014; Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999).
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In this chapter, we propose a different approach to estimate the preferences for
leisure at the intensive margin. We use data on hypothetical labor supply choices
to separate true preferences from constraints. As a first step, we pose a variety
of hypothetical labor supply choices to a representative sample of respondents in
Germany. Each scenario consists of two choices specifying a combination of hours
of work, earnings and other income. For example, one choice would offer higher
wages and hours while the other would offer both lower wages and hours but similar
non-labor income. Respondents then choose which alternative they would prefer.
Our hypothetical decisions approach could provide important insights to supple-
ment existing econometric knowledge with additional information that is not readily
available with actual choices (Manski, 2014). Since the hypothetical choice scenarios
are not limited by what nature offers, we can elicit choices over a wide range of
wage and hours. Estimates from actual choices often rely on small changes in wages
or tax rates instead. Even more importantly, kinks or notches often affect a small
share of the total population only. If preferences for leisure vary in the population,
the elasticities identified at the kink or notch might not be representative of the
response in the population (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). In addition, our data
contain hypothetical choices from workers as well as non-workers. We therefore do
not have to worry about the selection problem of assigning wages to non-workers.
We use the data on hypothetical choices from our sample of respondents to
estimate the taste for leisure. Our empirical framework relies on a random utility
model (McFadden and Train, 2000; Hensher et al., 1999). Specifically, we use mixed
logit methods which allow for heterogeneity both along observable and unobservable
dimensions (Train, 2003; Revelt and Train, 1998).2
We show that there is a lot of heterogeneity in labor supply elasticities. This het-
erogeneity can only be partly attributed to differences along demographic variables
such as gender, age or education. Our estimates are robust to a number of alternative
specifications for the underlying utility function or the estimation method.
2Hausman (1981) is an early contribution suggesting a random coefficient model to incorporate
individual preference heterogeneity (but based on revealed preference data).
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Our analysis contributes to two strands of economic literature. Most importantly,
we contribute to the vast literature on labor supply elasticities (see Blundell and
MaCurdy, 1999; Keane, 2011; Meghir and Phillips, 2010, for recent surveys). Several
contributions to this literature have relied on tax reforms to identify the elasticities
of interest (see e.g. Eissa, 1995; Eissa and Hoynes, 2004; Meyer and Rosenbaum,
2001; Blundell et al., 1998; Bianchi et al., 2001). More recently, studies have relied
on kinks or notches for identification (Chetty et al., 2011; Kleven and Waseem,
2013; Gelber et al., 2013). Most of the literature imposes strong functional form
assumptions and assumes that the response to tax or wage changes is the same
for everybody (see Burtless and Hausman (1978); Stern (1986); Mroz (1987) for
early contributions; Blundell and Shephard (2012); Blundell et al. (2011) for recent
examples that allow for heterogeneity across socio-demographic groups).
Second, we contribute to a growing literature that relies on stated preferences to
identify behavioral responses (see Barsky et al. (1997) for evidence on risk tolerance
and time preferences; Van Soest and Vonkova (2014) for retirement choices; Kapteyn
and Teppa (2003) for inter-temporal consumption choices; Blass et al. (2010) for
preferences for electricity; or Benjamin et al. (2012) for measures of subjective
well-being). We are the first to apply the stated preference approach to labor
supply choices. To allow respondents to be uncertain about their choices, we employ
probabilistic polling following the suggestion by Manski and Molinari (2010).
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section introduces the repre-
sentative online panel and our data on hypothetical choices. The third section
presents a simple static labor supply model that provides the basic framework
for our estimations. Section 4 lays out our empirical strategy based on a random
utility framework and mixed logit models to estimate labor supply elasticities from
hypothetical choices. Section 5 reports our estimated preferences for leisure and
explores their heterogeneity. Section 6 presents a range of robustness checks. Finally,
Section 7 discusses the implications of our results and concludes.
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4.2 Data Sources
4.2.1 German Internet Panel (GIP)
The data come from a random probability sample of the population in Germany.
The survey elicits information from all adult household members aged between 16
and 75.3 Recruitment was conducted offline with short face-to-face interviews (about
15 minutes), during which respondents were invited to the online panel. To improve
the representativeness of the sample, the survey includes respondents without
computer and internet access, by providing them with the necessary equipment
and training. Eligible persons, who had a computer and a broadband Internet
connection at home, were sent an invitation letter together with a login name
and a password to the online survey. Households without Internet access and/or
computer were also invited to the study and sent login details. Furthermore, they
were informed that someone would call them to make an appointment to install
the Internet and/or a personal computer.
Comparing the online sample to population distributions of the German census
of 2011 shows that the German Internet Panel (GIP) represents basic demographic
groups well. Including previously off-line respondents in the panel substantially
improves the representativeness of the GIP with regard to both age and gender.
However, the GIP somewhat under-represents the oldest age-groups (above 65)
but we exclude this group from our sample below. As such, the results from the
internet panel are representative of the population in Germany.
Every two months (at the first day of each uneven month), the survey participants
receive an invitation (mostly per email) to participate in a new survey wave. Each
survey lasts about 20-25 minutes. Participants receive four Euros for participation
as well as a bonus payment if they participate in all surveys in a given calendar
year. In addition, extensive efforts are made by the survey team to maintain the
panel. As a consequence of these monetary and non-monetary incentives, panel
participation rates are high: 96% of all participants registered online participated
3TNS Infratest (2012) and Blom et al. (2015) provide a more detailed description of the
sampling strategy and recruitment in the German Internet Panel.
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in the first wave, 80% are still in wave 3 and 73% in wave five. Table 4.A1 provides
summary statistics for the sample we use.
4.2.2 Hypothetical Labor Supply Choices
We pose a series of hypothetical decision scenarios to the same sample of respondents
at two points in time (March 2013 and January 2014). Each scenario shows the
respondent two alternatives: one choice might have high working hours per week
and net wages, while the other might offer lower working hours per wages and
net wages with similar non-labor income.4
The choice scenario is presented in such a way that individuals interpret them
as a shift in the wage profile and not just a transitory change in the wage. The
scenarios are presented in blocks of four choice questions separated by questions on
other topics. Overall, we elicit twelve hypothetical choices on the intensive margin:
eight choices in the first survey and four choices in the second wave.
To design the choices, we start from actual working hours, wages and different
income measures for each individual (”pivoting”). Pivoting allows us to to present
more realistic choice scenarios to each individual which improves the reliability of
answers. At the same time, it introduces some correlation between the characteristics
of hypothetical choices and unobserved components in the utility function which
influences actual choices. In principle then, the starting point of our hypothetical
choice scenarios (actual wages and hours) are endogenous as they are based on the
outcome of an optimization problem. However, Train and Wilson (2008) shows
that under certain assumption, standard methods can still be used to identify the
parameters of interest. For individuals who are un- or non-employed, we use the
wages and working hours of the last job. For individuals with missing information,
we assign average wage based on education (3 groups), age (5 year groups) and
gender separately for East and West Germany. We have four questions in each
block in each wave. The order of each block within a survey wave and the order of
each question in the block is randomized for every individual. In our scenarios, we
4See figure 4.A1 for a screenshot of a choice scenario shown to the survey participants.
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vary wages from from -30% and +70% of the actual wage in our first survey wave
and from from -80% and +60% in our second survey wave. Hours are calculated
accordingly by increasing (or decreasing) hours by the same percentage as wages.
To introduce additional variation in our data we multiply the hours in the choice
scenarios in the first survey wave by a hypothetical elasticity drawn from the interval
[-0.4; 1.5]. In the second survey wave we vary hours in 10 hours increments ranging
from 0 to 60 hours. Moreover, we include both a question block, where non-labor
income does not vary and one where we randomly decrease or increase non-labor
income in the given scenario. In our extensive margin scenarios in the first wave, we
lower wages 30%, 50% or 70%. Hours are then calculated in the work option as for
the intensive choices. In the second wave we adjust wages between -70% and +50%
and set hours in the work option are actual hours (or some positive minimum hours
if zero). Income in the not working option are adjusted to proxy welfare payments.
As hypothetical choice models might not provide the full information set as in
actual choices (e.g. some context information might be missing), we use probabilistic
polling to allow that individuals are uncertain about their decision. We use an 11-
point answer scale based on evidence that most people round probability questions
to the nearest 10 percent. Therefore, it does not seem informative to include the full
1-100 scale. Manski (2012) argues that one should use probabilistic choices rather
than stated choices in lieu of actual choices (“revealed preferences”) to allow for mea-
surement error (esp. because individuals might not be sure which choice to prefer).5.
Figure 4.1 shows a histogram of responses for all scenarios. The responses are
strongly bimodal with around 50% of the probability mass concentrated at the
two endpoints. The histogram suggests that respondents were certain about their
decisions. We therefore collapse the data to binary decisions and use variants of
the mixed logit model for estimation.6.
5The idea of measuring choice intentions probabilistically has much precedent, dating back to
Juster (1966). Probabilistic polling has recently been used to elicit beliefs about future, uncertain
events (see Manski, 2004; Hurd, 2009; Delavande et al., 2014, for surveys)
6The less parametric LAD estimator proposed by Manski (1985) does not perform well when
the probability mass is concentrated at the extremes.
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Figure 4.1: Histogram of choices (overall)
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4.3 Theoretical framework
We start out with the simple static labor supply model that we will use to compute
elasticities from our estimation of random utility models. Here, we make the standard
assumptions that the utility function is additively separable over time which allows
us to focus on the allocation of income between consumption and leisure; yet, it rules
out dynamic aspects such as human capital investments (Keane, 2011). The utility
function of the individual is given by Ui(ci, hi) subject to the budget constraint:
Ai + w ∗ hi = ci (4.1)
where we normalize the price of the consumption bundle to 1. Conditional
on h > 0, we can substitute the budget constraint into the utility function. The
first-order condition is then given by:
w ∗ Uc(whi + A, hi) + Uh(whi + A, hi) = 0 (4.2)
where Uc = δUδc and Uh is defined accordingly. Equation 4.2 implies that the wage
rate is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption.
Next, we use the the total differential of equation 4.2 to examine, how hours worked
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respond to changes in wages and income:
(Uc+Ucc∗wh+Uhc∗h)dw+(w∗(Ucc∗w+Uch)+Uhc∗w+Uhh)dh+(Ucc∗w+Uhc)dA = 0
(4.3)
Now, define B = w ∗ (Ucc ∗ w + Uhc) + Uch + Uhh. The second-order condition
for a maximum implies that B < 0. Furthermore, the quasi-concavity of the utility
function also implies that Ucc ≤ 0 and Uhh ≥ 0.
Holding wages constant ( i.e. dw = 0), the effects of non-labor income on
labor supply are given by:
dh
dA
= w ∗ Ucc + Uhc−B (4.4)
The denominator is positive (because of the second-order conditions). The
nominator and hence, the income effect may be positive, negative or zero. The
income effect will be negative (such that hours worked decline when unearned
income increases) when Uhc < 0, i.e. if the utility function is such that additional
income always raises the marginal disutility of work. It will also be negative as long
as Uhc is not “too” positive, i.e. as long as additional income does not reduce the
marginal disutility of work “too much”.7
The effects of wage changes on labor supply (holding income constant, i.e.
dA = 0) are:
dh
dw
= Uc + h(w ∗ Ucc + Uhc)−B (4.5)
which we can also write as the Slutsky equation:
dh
dw
= Uc−B + h(
dh
dA
) (4.6)
The first term is the substitution effect which is always positive. the second
represents the income effect and is a-priori indeterminate. Note that if utility is
7Note that if the utility function is linear or quasi-linear, the income effect would be zero, since
the first term in the denominator would be zero as Ucc = 0. And additive separability between
consumption and leisure implies that Uch = Uhc = 0
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linear (or quasi-linear in income), the second term in equation 4.6 is zero. We later
use the simple model in this section to compute hicksian and marshallian labor supply
elasticities for the utility functions we specify in our random utility estimations.
4.4 Mixed Logit Estimation
Having rich data on hypothetical discrete choices, we use a random utility framework
(RUM) to represent the choices individuals make (Thurstone, 1927; McFadden,
1974). For each choice c, a decision maker i chooses an alternative j if her utility
is larger than the utility of any other alternative. The utility of person i choosing
alternative j for choice c is given by
Uijc = β′ixijc + εijc , (4.7)
where xijc is a vector of the observed characteristics of an alternative, for example,
hours of work, wages and unearned income. εijc is an i.i.d extreme value distributed
random term. The parameters of interest are the random coefficients βi 8. The
resulting choice model is a mixed logit model which allows for individual-specific
heterogeneity in tastes as well as correlation between alternatives.9 Furthermore,
the mixed logit is flexible enough to approximate any random utility model, given
the choice of variables and mixing distribution (McFadden and Train, 2000)see.
The individual-specific coefficients can be specified as βi = β¯ + ηi where β¯ is
the mean preference in the population and ηi describes the individual heterogeneity
around the population mean. Due to this heterogeneity, βi is distributed with some
density f(βi|θ) with parameters θ. This distribution can take different functional
forms. We will use a normal distribution, such that ηi ∼ N(0, ση). However, in
our robustness checks we also relax this parametric assumption by using a finite
mixture. 10 Moreover, observable heterogeneity along individual characteristics can
8With a linear utility function, the βi would simply be the marginal utilities for the observed
xijc
9See Revelt and Train (1998) for an early application of mixed logit using repeated choices for
the same individual.
10In this case our choice model is a latent-class logit model (Greene and Hensher, 2003)see.
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be incorporated in a similar way, such that βi = γ′Zi + ηi, where Zi are individual
demographics like age and education group, number of children.
Next, we will discuss estimation, for which we will need the probability of
observing each individuals choices as function of the mixing distributions parameters
θ. Conditional on βi, the probability of observing a sequence of C choices c = 1, ..., C
for decision maker i is given by:
S(βi) =
C∏
c=1
J∏
j=1
(
exp(β′ixijc)∑J
j=1 exp(β′ixijc)
)yijc
, (4.8)
where yijc indicates whether individual i chose alternative j when facing choice
c. Integrating over the distribution of the random coefficient, the probability of
observing individual i making the particular sequence of choices is:
Pi(θ) =
∫
Si(βi)f(β|θ)dβi (4.9)
The distribution parameter θ can then be estimated by simulated maximum likeli-
hood (SML).11 Based on SML, we obtain estimates for the mean preference in the
population (β¯) and the variation of preferences in the population (ση). In addition,
we can estimate the preference parameter βi for each individual from the observed
sequence of hypothetical choices and choice characteristics as follows:
E[βi|yi, xi] =
∫
βS(βi)f(β|θ)dβ∫ ∏C
c=1
∏J
j=1 Lijc(β)yijcf(β|θ)dβ
(4.10)
These individual preference parameters can be used to compute marginal utili-
ties for working hours and consumption for everyone. Depending on the utility
function used, marginal utilities are a function of one or more coefficients and
the levels of consumption and working hours. 12 We then use the actual values
of consumption and working hours to compute the marginal utility and elasticity
for each individual in our sample.
11Train (2003) provides an overview of the simulation methods available.
12With a linear utility function the preference parameters themselves are marginal utilities.
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4.5 Preferences from Hypothetical Choices
4.5.1 Baseline Results
We first report on our benchmark results for a quadratic utility function. Stern (1986)
compares different utility functions used to analyse the response of hours worked
to wages and finds that the quadratic direct utility function offers considerable
flexibility. This is because the quadratic utility function can serve as a second degree
Taylor approximation to any utility specification. Consequently, our model should
be sufficiently flexible to allow for a wide range of possible substitution patterns.
Our basic specification only includes variables for total income (calculated
as the sum of monthly wages and non-labor income) and hours worked as well
as their quadratic terms. To relax the additive separability assumption for the
consumption-leisure decision, we add an interaction term between the two as well.
Estimation is based on a mixed logit model and uses a normal mixing distribution
to model unobserved heterogeneity.
Table 4.1: Baseline Estimates - Intensive Margin
(1) (2) (3)
Hours -0.12675*** 0.06597*** 0.06129***
(0.0036614) (0.0084979) (0.0086008)
sd Hours 0.07421*** 0.1076*** 0.10819***
(0.0031812) (0.0043523) (0.0043379)
Consumption 0.0049*** 0.01054*** 0.01033***
(0.0001538) (0.0003803) (0.0003825)
Consumption2 1.83 ×10−6*** 2.09 ×10−6***
(1.09 ×10−7) (1.32 ×10−7)
Hours2 -0.00265*** -0.00282***
(0.000105) (0.000117)
Consumption × Hours 0.00002***
(5.40 ×10−6)
Observations 24138 24138 24138
AIC 12656.65 11092.68 11082.19
BIC 12680.92 11133.14 11130.74
Pseudo R2 0.0521 0.0936 0.0945
Note.- The table reports the baseline mixed logit results for 3 different utility
specifications. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The table
includes the Akaike information criterion (AIC), the Bayesian information criterion
(BIC) and MacFadden’s Pseudo R2 for each specification. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
Moreover, we model a random effect on the hours variable, allowing for dif-
ferent leisure-preferences across individuals. For simplicity, we assume a normal
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distribution for this coefficient. However, we show below that this functional form
assumption is not crucial for our results.
Table 4.1 shows the results for our baseline model. The estimates are consistent
with economic theory. While the coefficients for hours in column (2) and (3)
are positive, we find negative marginal utilities of working hours and positive
marginal utilities of consumption for almost all survey participants. Furthermore,
the coefficient for the interaction term in column (3) is statistically significant which
suggests that consumption and working hours are not additively separable.
At the bottom of the table, we report common information criteria for our
alternative specifications of the utility function for model choice. Our quadratic
model (in column (3)) outperforms a simple linear specification (in column (1)) as
well as a specification without an interaction term between hours and consump-
tion (in column (2)). The quadratic utility specification has the lowest Bayesian
Information Criterion and the highest Pseudo-R2. Although there seems to be
only a minor difference in the criteria between the specifications in Column (2)
and (3), the difference is very robust to further extensions of the model. When
more coefficients are modeled with a random effect and the parametric assumptions
on the distribution of the random effect are relaxed in a latent-class logit model,
the difference between a model that allows for non-additive separability and one
that does not becomes more pronounced.
From our preferred specification (column (3)), we then calculate compensated
and uncompensated labor supply elasticities. We find positive elasticities of hours
with respect to wages below 1 for most of our respondents. For less than 1% of
our sample, Hicksian labor supply elasticities are negative which would imply a
backward bending labor supply curve. We find very high elasticities for about 10%
of the sample. The median Hicksian labor supply elasticity for the entire sample
is 0.41. Income effects are consistently negative, but small.
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4.5.2 Heterogeneity
We next explore how well observable demographics typically employed in the
literature can explain the heterogeneity we observe in our data (see e.g. Blundell
and Shephard, 2012; Blundell et al., 2011). We add commonly used observable
characteristics like gender, age, college education and the presence of small children
to our specification. Specifically, we add interaction effects between the choice
characteristics and the observed demographics. If observed demographics capture the
preference heterogeneity well, the re-estimated parameter of preference variation (ση)
should be small and possibly no longer statistically significant. As above, we use the
estimated parameters from the mixed logit model to predict labor supply elasticities
for each individual from her characteristics Xic and observed sequence of choices.
We find that all demographic interactions are highly statistically significant.13
Hence, preferences for leisure indeed differ for men and women, between low-
and high-skilled individuals or for families with or without small children. This
result indicates that observed individual characteristics can indeed explain some
of the variation in elasticities across individuals. More surprisingly, we find that
allowing for observable heterogeneity through socio-demographic characteristics
does not affect the mean and standard deviation of the coefficients on working
hours much. Hence, a lot of the heterogeneity in preferences for leisure remain
even conditional on observable characteristics. In sum, our results show that
there is sizable heterogeneity in preferences for leisure which varies both between
demographic groups as well as within those groups.
To examine the variation across observed characteristics, we calculate elasticities
for every individual and report quartiles of the elasticity distribution for different
subgroup of our sample in Table 4.2.
The median Hicksian elasticities are generally close to the sample median of
0.40. The largest difference at the median can be found between East and West
Germany. Along the entire distribution, elasticities in East Germany are about
13Table 4.A2 in the appendix provides results for both the baseline model and a model with
observed heterogeneity.
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Table 4.2: Intensive Margin Elasticities
Hickisan Elasticity
Gender Region Age
Men Women East West Sub 30 30-50 over 50
1. Quartile 0.27 0.28 0.22 0.31 0.20 0.31 0.28
Median 0.40 0.41 0.30 0.43 0.34 0.45 0.39
3. Quartile 0.50 0.61 0.39 0.57 0.54 0.59 0.50
Marshallian Elasticity
Gender Region Age
Men Women East West Sub 30 30-50 over 50
1. Quartile 0.24 0.23 0.2 0.25 0.16 0.28 0.23
Median 0.34 0.34 0.26 0.36 0.3 0.39 0.32
3. Quartile 0.41 0.53 0.32 0.47 0.41 0.51 0.41
Income Elasticity
Gender Region Age
Men Women East West Sub 30 30-50 over 50
1. Quartile -0.00044 -0.00051 -0.00038 -0.00048 -0.00045 -0.00047 -0.00047
Median -0.00026 -0.00032 -0.00025 -0.00029 -0.00025 -0.0003 -0.00027
3. Quartile -0.00011 -0.00015 -0.00013 -0.00013 -0.0001 -0.00014 -0.00014
Note.- These elasticities are predicted using individual coefficients for the mixed logit model
that includes observable heterogeneity. Quantiles are calculated from the distribution of the
individual elasticity estimates.
0.10 (one standard deviation of the overall elasticity distribution) lower than in
West-Germany. That implies that individuals in East Germany respond less to
wage and tax changes than individuals in West Germany.
Moreover, we find somewhat less pronounced differences along age groups and
gender. Individuals between the ages of 30 to 50 generally seem to have larger
elasticities than both younger and older age groups in our sample. Contrary to
most of the previous literature, we do not find large gender differences in labor
supply elasticities. Women’s labor supply elasticities are somewhat higher at the
upper tail of the distribution; yet, both the median and the lower quartile estimates
are very close to the values for men. These results suggest that tastes for leisure
do not seem to be very different for men and women. The observed differences in
actual responsiveness to wage or tax changes might therefore be the consequence
of different frictions either on the supply or demand side.
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Figure 4.2: Intensive Margin Elasticities
0
5
10
15
D
en
si
ty
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Hicksian Elasticity
No unobserved heterogeneity
Unobserved Heterogeneity included
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
Smaller group D P-value Corrected
Actual 0.5360 0.000
Cumulative: -0.5694 0.000
Combined K-S: 0.5694 0.000 0.000
Next, we focus on the relative importance of observed and unobserved hetero-
geneity in preferences. To do so, we predict two sets of individual elasticities using
similar quadratic specifications, once using a mixed-logit model that allows for both
observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity and once a simple conditional
logit model that only allows for observed heterogeneity.
Figure 4.2 shows the densities of the elasticities estimated from the model that
allows both for observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity (blue) and the
elasticities based on a model that only allows for observed heterogeneity (red).
The elasticity distributions are drastically different for the two cases. Allowing
only for observed characteristics yields a elasticity distribution that is shifted to
the left and has a much smaller spread than the distribution that also allows for
unobserved heterogeneity. Unsurprisingly, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows that
the two elasticity distributions are indeed not identical.
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Hence, observable characteristics alone which are typically used in many em-
pirical studies of labor supply elasticities do not capture the full heterogeneity
in preferences for leisure.
4.5.3 Comparison to estimates of the existing literature
A comparison of our estimates to those of the existing literature (shown in Table
4.A5) exhibits two interesting patterns: first, our estimates are typically larger than
those obtained from tax reforms for identification (see e.g. Bargain et al., 2014).
They are also somewhat larger than estimates from structural models for Germany
(see e.g. Haan and Wrohlich, 2007; Haan and Steiner, 2005).
The second striking feature is that our elasticity estimates are the same for
men and women - in contrast to data from actual choices where elasticities for
women are consistently larger than for men. These patterns indicate that fric-
tions which reduce the responsiveness of workers to tax or wage changes might
be an important determinant of elasticities derived from actual choices. The com-
parison also shows that the downward bias from frictions might be much more
pronounced for men than for women.
4.6 Robustness
This section presents a range of robustness checks to see whether our estimated
preferences for leisure are sensitive to alternative specifications. Most concerns about
the validity of our analysis arise from the specification of the random utility model
we use and from the choice of the mixing distribution in our mixed logit approach.
In addition, the ordering of questions could have an influence on responses if earlier
questions act as a prior or respondents learn over the course of the questionnaire. 14
We address these concerns as follows. First, we check whether the specification of
our utility function or mixing distribution has a significant influence on our results.
We estimate alternative models using multiple random utility specifications with
14Respondent fatigue could also lead to ordering effects.
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a discrete mixture as mixing distribution (latent class logit). Second, we analyze
whether the order of question blocks or questions within a block influence our results.
4.6.1 Changes in specification
To relax the parametric assumption of a normal distribution of the random coefficient
in our model, we allow for a discrete distribution of the random coefficients resulting
in a latent class model. In this model every respondent is assumed to belong to
one of C pre-specified classes. Then the distributional parameter θ of the mixing
distribution f(β|θ) we estimate is the vector of shares of respondents that belong
to a specific class. This non-parametric approach can approximate any discrete
or continuous mixing distribution.
We estimate latent class models for multiple specifications of the random utility
model analyzing different polynomial representations of the utility function up
to a fifth-order polynomial. We choose the number of classes C by maximizing
the Bayesian information criterion over a range from 1 to 20 classes for each
specification. We then compare the elasticity distribution for the different models
with our baseline mixed logit quadratic utility model.
Figure 4.3: Elasticity Distribution by choice model
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Figure 4.3 presents the densities of the elasticity distributions of the Hicksian
intensive margin elasticity for all latent class logit and the baseline mixed logit
model. While the more flexible specifications of latent class models with higher
order terms, predict less symmetric elasticity distributions with partially different
frequencies at specific elasticities , the differences are generally small.
More than 75% of all deviations in the Hicksian elasticities of the alternative models
from the baseline quadratic mixed logit specification are smaller than a quarter
standard deviation of the baseline elasticity distribution (see Table 4.A3 for a
comparison of the model deviation from the baseline).
4.6.2 Ordering Effects
We now also turn to a brief discussion of ordering effects. To examine whether such
affects our estimates, we add interactions of the hours term with indicators for the
order of question blocks to our baseline model. Then, we estimate elasticities for
a model with block ordering controls and compare them to our baseline.
While the ordering coefficients are indeed statistically significant, the effects
on response patterns seem negligible.15 The resulting elasticity distribution for a
model with ordering controls is very close to the baseline distribution. This suggests
that there is no significant difference in the resulting elasticities. Similarly, we also
analyze, how the ordering of questions within question blocks affects our results
and also find no significant effects for the resulting elasticity distribution.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter proposes a new approach to estimate labor supply elasticities. We
use information from hypothetical decision scenarios for a representative sample
of the German population to estimate a pure preference for leisure that is not
constrained by external restrictions.
15See Table 4.A4 in the appendix.
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We calculate separate labor supply elasticities for each individual in our sample.
We find an average Hicksian labor supply elasticities of 0.40, which is larger than
most estimates obtained from tax reforms for identification. At the same time, the
elasticities we estimate are still in the same order of magnitude as estimates from
previous literature. While this suggests that observed elasticities are larger than
behavioural elasticities due to frictions, long-term behavioral elasticities are still
relatively close to previous measures. Thus the disincentive effects of progressive tax-
ation are in similar order of magnitude even when accounting for potential frictions.
However, frictions play an important role in the differences in labor supply
elasticites between subgroups of the population. The most striking difference
between our friction-less estimates of the the preference for leisure and previous
literature is that our estimates do not vary much between men and women. Conse-
quently, the consensus that it is optimal to impose higher tax rates on men than
women since their Labor Supply is less elastic does not hold up to the evidence
from hypothetical decision scenarios.
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4.A Appendix
Figure 4.A1: Screenshot of a hypothetical choice
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Table 4.A1: Summary Statistics
Summary Statistics: Wave 4
Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Observations
Actual Wage 1819 1173 1750 0 9000 1118
Actual Other Income 1077 1408 500 0 8750 1118
Actual Hours 34.52 14.19 40 0 99.9 1118
Overtime Hours 5.4 6.7 3 0 50 570
Summary Statistics: Wave 9
Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Observations
Actual Wage 1852 1225 1750 75 9000 1045
Actual Other Income 1572 1097 1500 0 7500 1045
Actual Hours 37.5 12.6 40 2 90 1045
Sample Compostion: Gender, Region and Employment
Men Women East West Employed Non-Emloyed
Frequency 541 559 236 864 733 385
Share 49% 51% 21% 79% 67% 35%
Sample Composition: Age and Education
Age: sub 30 Age: 30-50 Age: over 50 Low Educ. Medium Educ. High Educ.
Frequency 181 406 513 210 362 505
Share 16% 37% 47% 19% 33% 46%
Sample Composition: Family Information
No Children 1 Child 2 Children 3 Children 4+ Children
Frequency 372 236 331 110 49
Share 34% 21% 30% 10% 4%
Note.- Information about the sample composition was collected in a seperate core wave for both our first (Wave 4) and
second (Wave 9) questionnaire. The education categories are based on Germany’s three-tiered education system. Low
education refers to Hauptschule and below, middle education is for Realschule, and high education indicates a gymnasium
or fachgymnsium degree.
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Table 4.A2: Intensive Margin Elasticities - Observed Heterogeneity
(1) (2)
Hours 0.06129*** 0.06214***
(0.0086) (0.0093)
sd Hours 0.10819*** 0.10426***
(0.00434) (0.00447)
Consumption 0.01033*** 0.0101***
(0.00038) (0.00041)
Consumption2 -2.09 ×10−6*** -2.05 ×10−6***
(0.00000013) (0.00000014)
Hours2 -0.00282*** -0.0022***
(0.00012) (0.00017)
Consumption × Hours 1.92 ×10−6*** 2.17 ×10−6***
(0.0000054) (0.0000057)
Hours × Age 30-50 -0.00052***
(0.00014)
Hours × Age 50+ -0.00034**
(0.00014)
Hours × Children -0.00031*
(0.00017)
Hours × Female -0.00049***
(0.000097)
Hours × College -0.00037***
(0.00011)
Observations 24138 20916
AIC 11082.2 9475.5
BIC 11130.7 9562.9
Pseudo R2 0.094 0.091
Note.- Standard Errors in Parentheses.∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p <
0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. All interaction terms for the hours variables are
interactions of the hours variable with demographic dummies.
Table 4.A3: Absolute Differences to baseline model elasticities
Quadratic 3rd order 4th order 5th order
1. Quartile 7.81% 6.73% 6.47% 6.87%
Median 15.41% 14.75% 14.50% 15.86%
3. Quartile 28.96% 29.70% 26.31% 28.78%
Note.- This table provides quantiles of the distribution of the
absolute differences between the mixed logit models Hicksian elas-
ticities and the Hicksian elasticities of the alternative models. The
absolute differences are normalized to the standard deviation of
the mixed logit models elasticity distribution and differences are
reported as percentages of that standard deviation.
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Table 4.A4: Intensive Margin Elasticities - Ordering Effects
(1) (2)
Hours 0.06129*** -0.13158***
(0.0086) (0.0178)
sd Hours 0.10819*** 0.2078***
(0.00434) (0.0111)
Consumption 0.01033*** 0.02518***
(0.00038) (0.0011)
Consumption2 -2.09 ×10−6*** -4.25 ×10−6***
1.33 ×10−7*** (3.55 ×10−7)
Hours2 -0.00282*** -0.00195***
(0.00012) (0.0002)
Consumption × Hours 1.92 ×10−6*** -5.83 ×10−5***
5.40 ×10−6*** (1.34 ×10−5)
First Block × Hours 0.03797***
(0.0087)
Second Block × Hours 0.05183***
(0.0098)
Observations 24138 16342
AIC 11082.2 6195.4
BIC 11130.7 6257.1
Pseudo R2 0.094 0.142
Note.- Standard Errors in Parentheses.∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p <
0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
Table 4.A5: Comparison to previous literature
Authors Hicks Marshall Population and Variation
Fuest et al. (2008) - 0.20 SOEP (2004) working age men, structural model
Fuest et al. (2008) - 0.38 SOEP (2004) working age women, structural model
Steiner & Wrohlich (2004) - 0.11 - 0.38 SOEP (2002) working age men structural model
Steiner & Wrohlich (2004) - 0.16 - 0.55 SOEP (2002) working age women, structural model
Keane (2011) 0.31 0.06 Average of a survey of 20 articles
Blundell-Duncan-Meghir (1998) 0.20 0.17 U.K. Women, 1980s Tax reforms
Our estimates 0.40 0.34 Men
Our estimates 0.41 0.34 Women
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